SAMANTABHADRA'S

ĀPTAMĪMĀṀSĀ

CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY

[ALONG WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND AKALAṄKA'S SANSKRIT COMMENTARY AṢṬAŚATĪ]

Translation etc. by

NAGIN J. SHAH

SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMĀLĀ 7

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FOREWORD

The Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā has great pleasure indeed in offering to scholars of Indian philosophy the English translation of Samantabhadra's (*c.* 550 A. D.) Āptamīmāṁsā ("Critique of an Authority"). This is the seventh book in the Series.

Samantabhadra laid a firm foundation of *Anekānta* logic and his Āptamīmāṁsā provided a model for subsequent authors for criticising onesided philosophical views. Āptamīmāṁsā has the good fortune of being commented upon by such stalwarts of *Anekānta* logic as Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Yaśovijaya. Akalaṅka's commentary called Aṣṭaśatī, though elaborate enough, is not too elaborate. Hence it is included in the present work. It is not a word-by-word commentary on Āptamīmāṁsā. So it can be read as an independent work.

Notes and comments added to the English translation enhance the value of the work. The introduction elucidates several points of philosophical interest.

It is hoped that the publication of this work will be of great value to the scholars of Indian philosophy.

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Nagin J. Shah
General Editor

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Jainism is one of the important systems of Indian philosophy and *Anekāntavāda* is regarded by scholars as the central philosophy of Jainism. *Anekāntavāda* is a theory of manysidedness of reality and truth. It presupposes the theory of standpoints or partial truths (*nayavāda*). It investigates how each of the views contains some truth. As a result, it arrives at the conclusion that different systems of philosophies are partially true, that none of them is wholly true, and if each of them would see things from the opponent's viewpoint as well as from its own, there would be perfect harmony all round. The theory is so important and interesting that we have decided to study an important Sanskrit text neatly dealing with it – the text neither too intricate nor too heavy. Such a text we found in Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṁsā. Before we translate and expound it, we would like to say something more about *Anekāntavāda*.

Nayavāda and Anekāntavāda

According to Jaina philosophy a real thing has infinite characters (*anantadharmātmaka*), implying thereby that it has even opposite characters. A real thing is many-sided (*anekāntātmaka*). Again, Jaina thinkers maintain that both the substance and mode constitute the nature of a real thing[1]; and further they relate permanence to substance and origination and destruction to modes. Therefore, a real thing has two opposite characters – permanence and change[2]. Again, they contend that a real thing is constituted of general features and unique features. Hence it has two opposite characters – universality and particularity, or similarity and dissimilarity, or the One and the Many. Thus, ontologically a real thing is a veritable confluence of opposites.

A real thing is not merely a mixture of the opposites. It is not a mixture of substance and mode but something *sui generis* (*jātyantara*). Substance and mode are so blended as to present a real thing *sui generis* which is, therefore, not vitiated by the defects of the two taken singly and separately[3]; at the same time they are never found outside a real thing, nor one without the other. Similar is the case with universal and particular of a real thing. Thus a real thing is a unique synthesis of opposites.

1. *dravyaparyāyātmā arthaḥ...* / Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 3.
2. *utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṁ sat* / Tattvārthasūtra V. 30.
3. *ayam arthaḥ – na dravyarūpaṁ na paryāyarūpaṁ nobhayarūpaṁ vastu, yena tattatpakṣabhāvī doṣaḥ syāt, kintu sthityutpādavyayātmakaṁ śabalaṁ jātyantaram eva vastu* / Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, Ed. Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Singhi Jain Granthamālā, p. 29.

We ordinary mortals can attend to one aspect or character of a real thing at a time and consequently can have the knowledge of only one aspect or character of a real thing. And our concentration on one aspect or character is conditioned by our purpose, intention, etc. Such partial knowledge of only one aspect or character is called *naya*[4] and a judgment based on such partial knowledge is also called *naya*. A *naya* is defined as a particular opinion or a viewpoint – a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is, thereby, expressive of partial truth about a real thing – as entertained by a knowing agent[5]. A viewpoint (*naya*) can prevent itself from lapsing into dogmatic absolute assertion and becoming thereby a pseudo-viewpoint (*durnaya*), by qualifying itself with a word '*syāt*' (= 'from a particular standpoint', 'in a certain sense') expressing conditionality, thus keeping open the possibility of other different viewpoints. Thus the doctrine of *naya* is the doctrine of relativity of knowledge and of conditioned judgment. Our knowledge or judgment is true only in reference to the standpoint adopted and the aspect of a real thing considered. The doctrine means that Reality is conveyed to the mind differently from different viewpoints. Or, it means that mind approaches Reality differently from different viewpoints. As we look at Reality from different angles or viewpoints, our descriptions of it differ. All these descriptions are partially true, none of them presents the whole truth. The various Non-Jaina systems of philosophy represent aspects of Reality and hence they are partially true. These *nayas* (viewpoints) are not subjective but objective. They have as their objects different aspects of Reality. The doctrine of *Naya* analyses a real thing into different aspects from different standpoints. Jaina theoreticians have attempted to find out philosophical viewpoints and to classify them on different principles of classification.

The next step is to effect synthesis of these different philosophical views or partial truths into the whole concrete truth. To assign them their proper place in the whole truth and synthesise them into the whole truth is the task of *Anekāntavāda* at epistemological and logical levels. *Anekāntavāda* integrates *nayas* into a consistent and comprehensive synthesis. The Jaina *Anekānta* philosophy emerges as the whole synthetic concrete truth from the mutual conflicts of the

4. *ekadeśaviśiṣṭo'rtho nayasya viṣayo mataḥ* / Nyāyāvatāra, verse 29.
5. *anirākṛtapratipakṣo vastvaṁśagrāhī jñāturabhiprāyo nayaḥ* / Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 676.

abstract partial truths represented by the several philosophical schools. In this sense, Jaina *Anekānta* philosophy becomes Philosophy of philosophies. For presenting a synthesis of all possible philosophical views on a point the Jaina thinkers have devised a methodology of *saptabhaṅgī* (the sevenfold predication or sevenfold judgment). Let us take the point of existence. Regarding it, the following seven views are possible. They are :

(i) From a certain viewpoint, *x* exists.

(ii) From a certain viewpoint, *x* does not exist.

(iii) From a certain viewpoint, *x* exists and does not exist.

(iv) From a certain viewpoint, *x* is inexpressible (with regard to existence–nonexistence characters).

(v) From a certain viewpoint, *x* exists and is inexpressible.

(vi) From a certain viewpoint, *x* does not exist and is inexpressible.

(vii) From a certain viewpoint, *x* exists, does not exist and is inexpressible.

These are the seven *avayavas* (constituent parts) of the whole synthetic statement (*vākya*) on a particular point[6].

The first *avayava* (*naya*) means that *x* exists from the viewpoint of its 'own nature.' *X* exists as *x*. The second means that *x* does not exist from the viewpoint of 'foreign nature'. *X* does not exist as other-than-*x*. The third predicates of *x* both existence and non-existence in succession. This *avayava* is a compound of the first and the second. It is not simple and primary. The fourth means that both existence and non-existence cannot be predicated of *x* simultaneously due to the limitation of language. But it does not mean that they are not present in *x* simultaneously. We may say that both the third and fourth are compounds of the first and second but in the third there is successive predication while in the fourth there is simultaneous predication. Both are *sui generis* (*jātyantara*). Vidyānanda notes that the fourth is the joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial (of existence in *x*).[7] The fifth is a compound one combining the first and the fourth, the sixth is a compound one combining the second and the fourth, and the seventh

6. *ekatra jīvādau vastuni ekaikasattvādidharmaviṣayapraśnavaśāt avirodhena pratyakṣādibādhāparihāreṇa pṛthagbhūtayoḥ samuditayoś ca vidhiniṣedhayoḥ paryālocanayā kṛtvā syācchabdalāñchito vakṣyamāṇaiḥ saptabhiḥ prakāraiḥ vacanavinyāsaḥ saptabhaṅgīti gīyate* / Syādvādamañjarī, Ed. A. B. Dhruva, pp. 142-143.

7. Aṣṭasahasrī, p. 125

is a compound one combining the third and the fourth. These seven *avayavas* exhaust all the mathematical possibilities with regard to one character. When they are taken as seven constituent parts of a *vākya* (statement or judgment) they together present an integrated and comprehensive true description of a real thing with regard to one particular point or character (*dharma*). And as there are infinite characters in a real thing, there are infinite such *saptabhaṅgī vākyas* (sevenfold judgments).

Evolution of Anekāntavāda

Doctrine of relative judgment (*nayavāda*) is traceable to the Āgamas. In Bhagavatīsūtra Lord Mahāvīra states that *jīva* (soul) and *pudgala* (matter) are both permanent and changing, permanent from the point of view of substance (*davvaṭṭhayāe*) and changing from the point of view of modes (*bhāvaṭṭhayāe*)[8]. Thus here a fundamental pair of standpoints is referred to. In Anuyogadvārasūtra we come across a passage referring to seven standpoints, viz. *naigama* etc. Again, it states that the different parts of a physical aggregate might be characterised by *ānupūrvī, anānupūrvī* and *avaktavya*. This can very well be regarded as a mention of three primary *avayavas* or *bhaṅgas* of *saptabhaṅgī vākya*. Dr. A. N. Upadhye has found reference to the three primary *avayavas* in the Bhagavatīsūtra.[9] In Āvaśyakaniryukti the definitions of seven viewpoints (*naigama* etc.) are given. Again, it mentions three pairs of *dravyārthika-paryāyārthika, vyavahāra-niścaya* and *jñāna-kriyā*. In Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama we find the neat employment of the doctrine of *nayas*. Umāsvāti devotes two aphorisms to the doctrine of *nayas*.[10] He speaks of traditional seven *nayas* and the contemporary literature is full of references to them. He does not make any explicit reference to the seven *avayavas* of the *saptabhaṅgī*. Till the times of Umāsvāti, while dealing with the doctrine of *nayas* no explicit reference to non-Jaina schools of philosophy is made, nor can it be said that such a reference is implicity present. The viewpoints are not studied with their supporting arguments, nor are they examined and criticised. With Umāsvāti ends the age of Āgamas. And with Siddhasena Divākara the age of Logic sets in. In this age we find explicit mention of non-Jaina philosophical schools, supporting arguments of their viewpoints and

8. Bhagavatīsūtra, VII. 2.273
9. His Introduction to Pravacanasāra (Bombay 1955) p. 83
10. Tattvārthasūta, I. 34-35

their criticism. Siddhasena says : 'Since a thing has infinite characters, it is comprehended only by the omniscient. But a thing becomes the subject-matter of a *naya*, when it is conceived from one particular standpoint.'[11] Interesting is his following statement : 'There are as many views of the form of *nayas* as there are the ways of speaking, while there are as many rival (non-Jaina) philosophical tenets as there are views of the form of *nayas.*'[12] Again, he declares : 'All the standpoints (*nayas*) are right in their own respective spheres - but if they are taken to be refutations, each of the other, then they are wrong. But a man who knows the 'non-onesided' (*anekānta*) nature of reality never says that a particular view is absolutely wrong'.[13] Siddhasena was probably the first in the Jaina tradition to synthesise the Sāṅkhya view with the Buddhist view. Thus, he observes : 'The system of philosophy taught by Kapila is a representation of substance viewpoint, and that which is taught by the son of Śuddhodana (the Buddha) is an exposition of mode viewpoint.'[14] Regarding Vaiśeṣika system he remarks : 'Although the philosophical system of Kaṇāda applies both standpoints, it is also fallacious because the standpoints are employed each independently of the other.'[15] "The point of Siddhasena is that the Vaiśeṣikas simply *combine* the two standpoints, but do not *synthesise* them. The Jainas, on the other hand, synthesise the two and build them into a coherent whole. Siddhasena also claims that the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists are correct in so far as they point out the faults and fallacies of the Sāṅkhya view of causation and the Sāṅkhya philosophers are correct in so far as they criticise the Buddhists and the Vaiśiṣikas. But when these two views of causality (*satkārya* and *asatkārya*) are adjusted together in compliance with the *anekānta* method, the result will be the True Insight (*samyag-darśana*, omniscience)."[16] In its unmistakably recognizable form doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī* first appears in Siddhasena's Sanmati.

Next we take Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya. It does not much concern itself with the views of rival systems of philosophy, though it is not wholly bereft of occasional references to some. His treatment

11. Nyāyāvatāra, verse 29
12. Sanmatitarka, III. 47
13. Ibid, I. 28
14. Ibid, III. 48
15. Ibid, III. 49
16. B. K. Matilal, The Central Philosophy of Jainism, p. 33

of seven *nayas*, occasional application to certain specific cases and his account of *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* are interesting.[17] He defines *jñānanaya* and *kriyānaya*. He presents three versions of *niścayanaya-vyavahāranaya*.[18] His reference to the *saptabhaṅgī* doctrine is extremely summary and fails to be informative.

Kundakunda's Samayasāra certainly adds a new dimension to the discussion concerning the problem of *vyavahāranaya* (the standpoint of worldly behaviour) vs. *niścayanaya* (the transcendental standpoint). His recourse to it is so massive that it startles us. From the transcendental standpoint the soul is independent, self-existent and uncontaminated by matter while from the standpoint of worldly behaviour it is involved in karma as well as in the birth and rebirth cycle. As to view the *niścaya-vyavahāra* pair in more than one ways is possible, the procedure adopted by Kundakunda was not totally impermissible. But what was un-Jainalike was Kundakunda's declaration that standpoint of worldly behaviour is a totally false standpoint.[19] In his Pañcāstikāya he mentions the fullfledged seven *avayavas* or *bhaṅgas* of *Saptabhaṅgī*.

Samantabhadra laid a firm foundation of *Anekāntavāda* upon which Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Yaśovijaya built a grand superstructure. His Āptamīmāṁsā which we are going to translate and study in the latter part of this book deserves a special mention in the history of *Anekānta* philosophy for more reasons than one. The framework worked out in Āptamīmāṁsā for criticising onesided philosophical views proved to be a major helpful model for subsequent authors. Certainly, the task of the Jaina thinkers belonging to the later times was to command mastery over the contemporary systems of philosophy and subject them to criticism mainly in terms of the model provided by Āptamīmāṁsā. The work has a good fortune of being commented on by Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Yaśovijaya. It is meritorious inasmuch as the fundamentals of *Anekāntavāda* has found in it a most clear-cut formulation. "Samantabhadra had a clear consciousness of what constitutes the central contention of the doctrine of *Anekānta*, viz. that a thing must be characterised by two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time. He also realised that the doctrine

17. Verses 2180-2274 and verses 414-426
18. Verses 3586-3591
19. *vavahāro'bhūdattho bhūdattho desido suddhaṇao* / Samayasāra, 13

was applicable rather universally; that is to say, he felt that taking anything and any feature at random it could be shown that this thing is characterised by this feature as also by the concerned contradictory feature... Another aspect of Samantabhadra's performance also deserves notice. He apparently attaches utmost importance to the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine and in fact makes it the starting point of his investigation (in Āptamīmāṁsā)."[20]

Again, what is noteworthy is his attributing the name '*naya*' to each of the seven *bhaṅgas* as also the name '*syādvāda*' to the totality of all the seven *bhaṅgas.*

Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* is a much advanced text as compared to Āptamīmāṁsā but for the most part it adopts the latter's model while arranging its material. It is chiefly interested in vindicating the validity of *Anekāntavāda.*

As is expected, Akalaṅka's most crystal-like and concentrated enunciation and defence of *Anekāntavāda* occurs in his Aṣṭaśatī, a commentary on Āptamīmāṁsā. Here he elaborately deals with the most fundamental philosophical views centring around the acceptance or otherwise of two contradictiry features. His discussions constitute the first most comprehensive and mature vindication of *Anekāntavāda.* This is so because in them he has taken into consideration the rival positions as actually maintained in the contemporary works of various non-Jaina schools, particularly Buddhist, and also because by his time these schools - particularly Buddhist - had reached almost the acme of perfection.

"Samantabhadra had clinched the most crucial point that the Jaina thinkers of his age had to elaborate, viz. the all-out importance of *Anekāntavāda* as the central criterion for evaluating the contemporary non-Jaina philosophical systems. He has offered valuable hints as to the lines on which the systems like Buddhist, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had to be assailed. But he hardly went beyond offering mere hints. Akalaṅka continued what Samantabhadra had begun and so he was in a position to enter into a larger number of details than was the case with the latter.... (But) Akalaṅka's was not an all-round battle against possible rivals. The credit for waging such a battle goes to Vidyānada who had thoroughly mastered both the contemporary systems and the legacy left by Akalaṅka... His most outstanding treatment of *Anekāntavāda* is found in Aṣṭasahasrī, a commentary on

20. Jaina Ontology, pp. 135-136

Aṣṭśatī. For in this work he undertook a detailed examination of certain one-sided views on certain most burning philosophical questions... Vidyānanda's studies in *Anekāntavāda* is the most solid contribution to the treasure-house of philosophy. *Anekāntavāda* is a much misunderstood doctrine and its defence at the hands of incompetent persons only makes matters worse. But Vidyānanda's competence was of a higher order and so his elaboration of the essentials of *Anekāntavāda* deserves serious study by those who harbour genuine misgivings against this typical Jaina philosophical doctrine."[21]

In Yaśovijaya's works we reach the highest pinnacle of *Anekāntavāda*. He had thoroughly mastered the rich heritage. Of his writings the most important are three texts devoted to the problems of *Anekāntavāda*, viz. Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā and Nayopadeśa. His Aṣṭasahasrī-vivaraṇa, a commentary on Vidyānanda's Aṣṭasahasrī is noteworthy. Like Vidyānanda he was extermely well-versed in the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. Besides, he was gifted with a brain whose sharpness and acuteness were unparallelled, this may be due to his mastery over the intricacies of Navya-nyāya. Let us see how he utilises his learning of Navya-nyāya in elucidating and defending the doctrine of *Anekānta*. "It was an old Jaina position that a thing exists from the standpoint of its own properties while it does not exist from the standpoint of the alien properties... It constituted the heart of *Anekāntavāda* doctrine and so the generations of Jaina scholars defended it as best they could. But in Navya-nyāya circles a position similar to the present one began to be maintained. Thus they would speak of 'a thing's absence "limited" by a property not belonging to it' e.g. 'a jar's absence "limited" by clothness (*paṭatvāvadhikaghaṭābhāvaḥ*)'; and it was given out that such an absence of a thing exists even at a place where the thing itself exists. Yaśovijaya aptly pointed out that this amounted to endorsing the Jaina position that a thing as viewed from the standpoint of the alien properties does not exist (i.e. is absent) even at a place where it is seen to exist, it being the case that at this place it exists only as viewed from the standpoint of its own properties... Navya-naiyāyikas would argue that variegated colour is a type *sui generis* and not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the constituent colours; Yaśovijaya pointed out that in a similar fashion the unity of opposites spoken of by the Jaina is a type *sui generis* and

21. Ibid, pp. 148-152

not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the opposites concerned. As a matter of fact, a close observer could not fail to see that there was some sort of basic similarity between the Jaina's traditional preoccupation with the problem of 'standpoint' and the Navya-naiyāyika's current preoccupation with the problem of '*avacchedakatā*'; both were meant to ensure that no ambiguities remained attached to what one says. Yaśovijaya was as thorough a student of Navya-nyāya as that of the traditional Jaina positions and this one fact is sufficient to make his treatment of *Anekāntavāda* unique performance."[22]

Demands of Anekāntavāda on its upholders

Anekāntavāda being the synthesis of partial truths (philosophical viewpoints) into the whole concrete truth, it requires the understanding of partial truths with their logic, otherwise whose synthesis it will effect. And *Anekānta* becomes richer and richer as it takes into its fold more and more partial truths to make synthesis. So, it becomes imperative on the upholders of *Anekāntavāda* to study and understand as many philosophical views as are possible. Their task is stupendous but rewarding. They should not neglect any philosophical system propounded by any thinker. Their study should not be confined to Jaina works only. The Jaina ācāryas of the past realised this and hence they studied and understood all the philosophical views prevalent in their times in India. At present the philosophical works of the thinkers of the whole world are within the reach of Jaina thinkers and students; so if they are really upholders of *Anekāntavāda* they should study them and find out whatever truth there is in them and give them due place in the synthetic concrete whole truth which *Anekāntavāda* tries to arrive at.

Non-violence (Ahiṁsā) and Anekāntavāda

The highest goal of all systems of Indian philosophy is liberation (*mokṣa*). For the attainment of this goal they have prescribed their respective spiritual disciplines which do not differ much from one another. In all these spiritual disciplines the practiser is necessarily

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22. Ibid, pp. 162-163
23. *tatrāhiṁsā sarvathā sarvadā sarvabhūtānām anabhidrohaḥ, uttare ca yamaniyamās tanmūlās tatsiddhiparatayā tatpratipādanāya pratipādyante, tadavadātarūpakaraṇāyaivopādīyante* / Vyāsabhāṣya, 2.30
ahiṁsāyā avirodhenaiva satyādayo yamaniyamā anuṣṭheyā iti / Yogavārtika, 2.30
yathā nāgapade'nyāni padāni padagāminām /
sarvāṇy evāpi dhīyante padajātāni kauñjare //
evaṁ sarvam ahiṁsāyāṁ dharmārtham api dhīyante // –Mokṣadharmaparva

required to cultivate five prime virtues, viz. non-violence, truth, non-theft, celibacy and non-possession. And among these five, non-violence is supreme and fundamental. It is so fundamental that the rest depend on it and are included in it, not only that but it provides us with the sole criterion for determining as to what is truth, etc.[23] That which involves violence is not truth even though it may be factually true, and conversely that which does not involve violence is truth even though it may be factually untrue. That which hurts others is never truth. So, one should not speak what hurts others and should also respect the views of others.[24] One should not be stubborn to state that what one says is the only truth. Not to hurt others in presenting one's view implies one's respect for others' views. So, one should be very cautious in one's statement of one's view. One should qualify one's statement by 'this is my faith' 'this is my view' etc. implying thereby that others may have different faith or view. By thus saying one protects the truth, while making absolute statements one harms the truth.[25] This spirit prevails in all the ethical systems of India. It is this spirit that has given rise to the theory of *Anekāntavāda*. *Anekāntavāda* recognises non-onesidedness or manifoldness of the truth. The whole concrete truth is the synthesis of the viewpoints. *Anekāntavāda* finds some truth in each and every view. It assigns all the viewpoints their proper place to form the whole truth. It accepts all the views in its fold and effects such a synthesis of them all as would result in the whole concrete truth *sui generis*. It is not merely juxtaposition or mixture of the opposite views. It rejects no view.

"Non-violence i.e. abstention from killing or taking the life of others, was the dominant trend in the whole *śramaṇa* movement in India, particularly in Buddhism and Jainism. I think the Jainas carried the principle of non-violence to the intellectual level, and thus propounded their *Anekānta* doctrine. Thus the hallmark of the *Anekānta* doctrine was toleration. The principle embodied in the respect for the life of others was transformed by the Jaina philosophers at the intellectual level

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24. *eṣā (vāg) sarvabhūtopakārārthaṁ pravṛttā na bhūtopaghātāya, yadi caivaṁ apy abhidhīyamānā bhūtopaghātaparaiva syāt na satyaṁ bhavet pāpam eva bhavet, tena puṇyābhāsena puṇyapratirūpakeṇa kaṣṭatamaṁ prāpnuyāt* / Vyāsabhāṣya on Yogasūtra 2.30

25. *saddhā ce pi, Bhāradvāja, purisassa hoti; 'evaṁ me saddhā' ti vadaṁ saccaṁ anurakkhati, na tveva tāva ekaṁsena niṭṭhaṁ gacchati - 'idam eva saccaṁ, moghaṁ aññaṁ' ti* / Caṁkisutta, Majjhimanikāya.

into respect for the views of others. This is, I think, a unique attempt to harmonize the persistent discord in the field of philosophy."[26]

"...this doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* helps us in cultivating the attitude of toleration towards the views of our adversaries. It does not stop there but takes us a step forward by making us investigate as to how and why they hold a different view and how the seeming contradictories can be reconciled to evolve harmony. It is thus an attempt towards syncretism."[27]

The Logical and the Historical Significance of the Jaina philosophical Tradition

The Āptamīmāṁsā of Ācārya Samantabhadra is one of the earliest important texts on Jaina philosophy. Hence a general evaluation of the Jaina philosophical tradition should enable the reader to better follow the Ācārya's arguments here set forth. However, a proper evaluation of the Jaina philosophical tradition necessarily requires a proper evaluation of the Indian philosophical tradition as a whole. For even a reader who has a fairly correct idea of what the Jainas have to say by way of solving the fundamental philosophical problems might underrate or overrate the Jaina performance in case he happens to be ignorant of or misinformed about the background of this performance. We, therefore, begin our treatment of the Jaina philosophical tradition with a brief preliminary survey of the Indian philosophical scene of the times when this tradition arose and developed.

By philosophy we understand a reasoned and systematic working out of the fundamental nature of what constitutes reality, and as thus understood philosophy is a comparatively late product of India's otherwise hoary history. The material that has come down to us in the form of the Mantra, Brāhmaṇa or even the Āraṇyaka portion of the Vedas has the remotest affinity with a philosophical enquiry, but the Upaniṣads seem to make a break with the pre-philosophical past. However, even the Upaniṣadic texts are not of the form of systematic treatizes on philosophical problems; for what they do is to narrate stories that inevitably culminate in a dialogue where certain characters discuss - more or less elaborately - some stray problems whose philosophical import is doubtless obvious. The first attempt to systematize the scattered philosophical teachings of the Upaniṣads was

26. B. K. Matilal, The Central Philosophy of Jainism, p. 61

27. H. Kapadia, Introduction to Haribhadra's Anekāntajayapatākā, p. cxiv.

made in the Brahmasūtras, but even they do not seem to have influenced in any material fashion the contemporary discussions on philosophy which went on without taking any serious notice of them till at least the time of Śaṅkara, the author of the earliest available commentary on them. In the post-Śaṅkara period there was no doubt a spate of mutually hostile commentaries on the Brahmasūtras, but the scholastic atmosphere that was the hall-mark of these commentaries - Śaṅkara's not excluded - was substantially out of tune with the tradition of free philosophical enquiry that had matured in the country by the time Śaṅkara appeared. It is the rise and development of this tradition that constitutes the real subject-matter of a historian of Indian philosophy; and the pre-Śaṅkara phase of this tradition requires to be specially studied with a view to correctly assessing the influence exerted on it by Śaṅkara and his fellow-commentators (all hostile to him as to each other) of the Brahmasūtras.

The Indian tradition of a systematic treatment of philosophical problems can be broadly subdivided into two groups. One of these repudiates the reality of empirical phenomena and banks on some sort of mystic intuition as the sole means of comprehending that trans-empirical reality which is here declared to be 'real' reality (in contrast to 'illusory' reality that empirical phenomena allegedly are). The other group ascribes sole reality to empirical phenomena and seeks to comprehend their nature through rational means. For the sake of convenience, the former group might be designated 'transcendentalist', the latter 'empiricist'. Now the earliest powerful spokesmen of the transcendentalist trend are the authors adhering to the Buddhist schools of Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda while the earliest powerful spokesmen of the empiricist trend are those adhering to the Brāhmanical schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā; (the Brāhmanical school of Sāṅkhya, too, was empiricist and had a considerable past, but in the period of systematic treatizes - a period which alone matters from the point of view of our present interest, it wielded meagre influence and was extremely vulnerable to criticism. From the point of view of our present interest, it is also an immaterial consideration whether the Sāṅkhya as well as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools had not a 'pre-Brahmanical' past). An empiricist trend within the Buddhist camp took some time to crystallize. For it is the followers and commentators of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti in their capacity as Sautrāntika thinkers who constitute the really powerful school of Buddhist empiricism, a school

whose pre-history may be traced in the philosophical investigations of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika authors of the pre-Dinnāga period. That the followers of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti - and the Masters themselves - have to be studied sometimes in their capacity as Sautrāntikas and sometimes in their capacity as Vijñānavādins is an anomaly but is the only course open to the student who wishes to appreciate the most valuable of the Buddhist contributions to the empiricist tradition of Indian philosophy.

It was in this background that the Jaina entered the arena of philosophical enquiry. His affiliation to the empiricist tradition was unequivocal but his mode of arguing his case had two conspicuous tendencies. In the first place, he thought fit to cross swords with the transcendentalist whose teaching it was that 'real' reality can in no way be described through words (and that because it can in no way be comprehended through rational means). Secondly, he made it a fashion to demonstrate how a particular philosophical thesis of his was a synthesis of two onesided theses whose respective defects it managed to avoid precisely because it was such a synthesis. The first of these tendencies was responsible for the emergence of the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion', the second left its indelible imprint on the stand taken by the Jaina on those burning questions which the empiricist philosophers of the time were seeking to answer in their respective manners. We consider these tendencies one by one.

A favourite - and basic - argument of the transcendentalist was that each and every empirical phenomenon is illusory because it is in the very nature of things impossible to describe it either as existent or as non-existent or as both existent and non-existent or as neither existent nor non-existent. In essence the argument was that an empirical phenomenon is indescribable (and hence illusory) because there is no knowing what this phenomenon is or what it is not. And a simple answer to this argument would have been that an empirical phenomenon is describable because we can know both what this phenomenon is and what it is not. But, as a matter of historical fact, the argument in question was considered by the general run of Indian empiricists to be too fantastic to merit an answer. To the Jaina, this attitude of his empiricist colleagues seemed to betray complacence and he on his part came out with an elaborate rejoinder against the transcendentalist. Thus, he maintained that an empirical phenomenon is describable in

as many as seven ways, viz.

(i) By pointing out what this phenomenon is,

(ii) By pointing out what this phenomenon is not,

(iii) By first pointing out what this phenomenon is and then what it is not,

(iv) By confessing that it is impossible to simultaneously point out what this phenomenon is and what it is not,

(v) By combining the attitudes (i) and (iv),

(vi) By combining the attitudes (ii) and (iv),

(vii) By combining the attitudes (iii) and (iv).

In this rejoinder of the Jaina against the transcendentalist, three points are noteworthy :

1. The Jaina suggests that to point out what an empirical phenomenon is is to describe it as existent while to point out what it is not is to describe it as non-existent. Thus the transcendentalist who asserts that an empirical phenomenon is describable neither as existent nor as non-existent is sought to be silenced by the Jaina by his counter-assertion that it is describable both as existent and as non-existent. An impartial reader should nevertheless take note of the rather technical character of the Jaina's description of an empirical phenomenon as non-existent (i.e. of his description of it not as something utterly non-existent but as something different from the phenomena that are other than itself).

2. The Jaina suggests that to confess that it is impossible to simultaneously point out both what an empirical phenomenon is and what it is not is to confess that this phenomenon is indescribable. This might seem to be a concession in favour of the transcendentalist who is of the view that an empirical phenomenon is utterly indescribable. As a matter of fact, the Jaina simply demonstrates to the transcendentalist the only possible sense in which (according to the Jaina) an empirical phenomenon can be said to be indescribable; he is thus forestalling the latter's extravagant claims in this connection. In any case, an impartial reader should take due note of the rather technical character of the Jaina's admission that an empirical phenomenon is also somehow indescribable.[28]

28. There is also another sense – not intended in the present context – in which the Jaina admits an empirical phenomenon to be indescribable. That sense is conveyed when it is argued that an empirical phenomenon is indescribable because it is possessed of an infinite number of attributes which it is impossible to describe in their entirety.

3. The crux of the Jaina's position lies in asserting that an empirical phenomenon is describable both as what it is and as what it is not, an assertion which was fully endorsed by the entire camp of empiricists who stood opposed to the transcentalist's rank nihilism and obscurantism.

The Jaina's intervention in the inner-family discussions of the Indian empiricists had its own peculiar features. These empiricists were one in maintaining that the empirical world of physical and psychological phenomena is a veritable reality and is guided in its operations by the law of causal determination; but the different schools offered different accounts of the physical and psychological phenomena and of the functioning of the law of causation. The most acute - and the most fruitful - controversies were those in which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors on the one hand and their Buddhist counterpart on the other were parties; (however, certain typical Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṁsā positions, too, made for a better clinching of the philosophical issues). The most important questions that gave rise to controversy were following :

(i) What is permanent and what is transient in the world of empirical phenomena ?

(ii) What relation holds between a composite body and its component-parts ?

(iii) What is the nature of the substance-attribute relationship ?

(iv) What is the nature of the universal – as contrasted to the particular – features exhibited by empirical phenomena ?

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors were chiefly concerned with the last three questions, the Buddhist authors with the first; but as controversy developed the two schools defined their respective positions on each of the four questions. Briefly stated these positions are as follows :

(i) On the question of permanence and transience the Buddhists maintained that the entire world of empirical phenomena is ever-changing, so that nothing lasts for more than one moment. As against this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintained that certain phenomena are no doubt momentary but that certain others last for a limited period of time while still others last for ever.

(ii) On the question of the relation between a composite body and its component parts the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣkas maintained that a composite body is an independent entity over and above its component-parts (the former residing in the latter by the relation technically called *samavāya*). As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely

conventional to say that there exists a composite body over and above its component-parts.

(iii) On the question of the substance-attribute relationship the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintained that substances constitute one group of real entities while their attributes (further subdivided into qualities and actions and residing in substances by *samavāya*-relation) constitute another such group. As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely conventional to say that the empirical world consists of substances on the one hand and their attributes on the other.

(iv) On the question of the universal features exhibited by empirical phenomena the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintained that a universal feature is an independent (and eternal) entity that resides (by *samavāya*-relation) in the substances, qualities or actions of which it is the universal feature. As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely conventional to say that certain empirical phenomena share a universal feature in common.

Now the Jaina found something unsatisfactory – and also something satisfactory – about both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist positions on the four questions here posed. Hence in each case he sought to offer a new position which was in his eyes free from the defects vitiating the two rival positions that had held the field. The following is how he proceeded :

(i) On the question of permanence and transience he maintained that each and every empirical phenomenon is permanent so far as its substance-aspect is concerned while it is momentary so far as its mode-aspect is concerned.

(ii) On the question of the relation between a composite body and its component-parts he maintained that to assume the form of a composite body is nothing but the assuming of a particular mode by the concerned component-parts in their capacity as substances.

(iii) On the question of the substance-attribute relationship he maintained that a substance represents the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon while its attributes represent either the quality-aspect or the mode-aspect of this phenomenon.[29]

29. Certain Jaina scholars make no distinction between quatity-aspect and mode-aspect; on their view it can be said that the attributes of a substance represent the mode-aspect of an empirical phenomenon. On the other hand, those Jaina scholars who distinguish between quality-aspect and mode-aspect tend to identify quality-aspect with substance-aspect, but since an express distinction between substance-aspect and quality-aspect is necessary to their position the above formulation may be taken to represent this very position.

(iv) On the question of the universal features exhibited by empirical phenomena he maintained that a universal feature exhibited by certain particular phenomena is but the mode called 'similarity in relation to the rest' which each of these phenomena comes to assume.

On closer perusal it turns out that differences among the Indian empiricists on the question of permanence and transience were more vital than those on the remaining three questions. As a matter of fact, we can even say that on these last three questions the positions adopted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Jaina schools were virtually the same and can easily be translated from one into another. The reason for it is that all these three schools seek to explain (and not to explain away – as was done by their transcendentalist rivals) the phenomenon of the composition of a body out of certain component-parts, the phenomemon of a particular feature belonging to a particular entity, and the phenomenon of a universal feature belonging to a group of entities; in each of these cases the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika offered his explanation by speaking of these or those independent entities (of the form of substances, qualities, actions, universals) entering into the relationship technically called *samavāya*, the Buddhist by speaking of these or those conventional usages being adopted, and the Jaina by speaking of these or those substances assuming different modes. There is no denying that each of these modes of speech has its own advantages and disadvantages, but to think – as will be done by the partisans of the three schools in question – that the idea sought to be conveyed by these different modes of speech is not the same seems fraught with confusion.

Then we come to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Jaina treatments of the question of permanence and transience. On this question the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist stands was considerable, that between the Buddhist and Jaina stands virtually non-existent. The following considerations should elucidate the point. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ever remained unconvinced of the correctness of the thesis that it is impossible for an entity while occupying a particular place and time to exhibit precisely the same totality of features as it does while occupying another place and time. But it was this very thesis that the Jaina endorsed when he maintained that two empirical phenomena must differ in respect of their mode-aspect even if they happen to be identical in respect of their substance-aspect. The Buddhist virtually agreed with the Jaina criticism of the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stand, but since he made no distinction between the substance-aspect and the mode-aspect of an empirical phenomenon he expressed this agreement of his by simply maintaining that any two empirical phenomena must differ from each other. Thus the Jaina agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insofar as both find it possible to somehow distinguish between an entity and its features, while he agrees with the Buddhist insofar as both hold that the totality of features exhibited at one place and time can never be precisely the same as that exhibited at another. Deeper probe, however, reveals that the Jaina's present agreement with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is well-nigh nominal while his present agreement with the Buddhist is extremely substantial. For to distinguish or not to distinguish between an entity and its features is almost a matter of adopting or not adopting a particular mode of speech; but to hold or not to hold that the totality of features exhibited at one place and time can never be precisely the same as that exhibited at another is a matter of adopting or not adopting a philosophical thesis of great importance. It is, therefore, a point of material significance that the Buddhist and Jaina agree in maintaining that the world of empirical phenomena is ever-changing, a thesis in opposition to which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that the world of empirical phenomena is not ever-changing but that it just exhibits change here and there, now and then. On the other hand, it is a point of mere formal significance that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina agree in employing a terminology that distinguishes between an entity and its features, a procedure in opposition to which the Buddhist employs a terminology that does not make this distinction.

In passing, it should also be noted that the Jaina's closer agreement with the Buddhist than with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the most crucial question of permanence and transience leads him to agree more closely with the Buddhist than with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also on the remaining three central questions of philosophical enquiry. However, as has already been pointed out, on these three questions the difference between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is itself rather meagre.

The Subject-matter of the Āptamīmāṁsā

We next come to the subject-matter of the Āptamīmāṁsā. The text containing 114 verses[30] is divided into ten sections, of which each seeks to set forth the Jaina position on some particular problem of

30. The 115th verse seems to be an interpolation.

philosophy (to be precise, of ontology, logic, epistemology, ethics, ethico-theology) contrasting it with two onesided positions whose synthesis it itself is declared to be; (the first eight verses of the first section touch upon certain rather non-philosophical matters while the last fourteen verses of the last section represent a general summing up of the whole discussion rather than a discussion of some particular problem of philosophy). The following sectionwise analysis of the text (leaving aside the first eight and the last fourteen verses) should make the point clear.

Section 1

Problem : Is a real entity existent or non-existent by nature ?

9-11 The first alternative (i.e. a real entity is absolutely existent by nature).

12 The second alternative (i.e. a real entity is absolutely non-existent by nature).

13 (a) Both alternatives (i.e. a real entity is both absolutely existent and absolutely non-existent by nature).

(b) Neither alternative (i.e. a real entity is absolutely indescribable).

14-23 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions (i.e. a real entity is somehow existent by nature, somehow non-existent, somehow both, and somehow indescribable.

Section 2

Problem : Is a real entity one with every other real entity or is it different from every other real entity ?

24-27 The first alternative.

28-31 The second alternative.

32 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

33-36 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 3

Problem : Is a real entity permanent or momentary ?

37-40 The first alternative.

41-54 The second alternative.

55 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

56-60 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 4

Problem : Is there the relation of distinctness or non-distinctness between a composite body and its component-parts, a quality and the thing qualified by this quality, a universal and the particular possessing this universal ?

61-66 The first alternative.

67-69 The second alternative.

70 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

71-72 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 5

Problem : Is there the relation of dependence or independence between an entity and its features ?

73 (first half) The first alternative.

73 (second half) The second alternative.

74 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

75 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 6

Problem : Is inference or scripture the authoritative source of knowledge ?

76 (first half) The first alternative.

76 (second half) The second alternative.

77 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

78 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 7

Problem : Is cognition subjective or does it have an objective reference ?

79-80 The first alternative.

81 The second alternative.

82 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

83-87 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 8

Problem : Is fate or perseverance the decisive agency in one's everyday career ?

88 The first alternative.

89 The second alternative.

90 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

91 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 9

Problem : Do virtue and sin arise from respectively causing pleasure and pain to others or do they arise from respectively causing pain and pleasure to oneself ?

92 The first alternative.

93 The second alternative.

94 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

95 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Section 10

Problem : Does worldly bondage result from even slight ignorance or does *mokṣa* (liberation) result from even slight knowledge ?

96 (first half) The first alternative.

96 (second half) The second alternative.

97 (a) Both alternatives.

(b) Neither alternative.

98-100 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

Now the single verse which sets forth the position adopting both alternatives as also the one adopting neither is the same in each section – so that the verses 13, 32, 55, 70, 74, 77, 82, 90, 94, 97 read exactly alike. Again, it is only in the first section that we are explicitly shown how the Jaina position involves a conditional acceptance of all the four concerned positions; in the remaining sections what is explicitly shown is how the Jaina position involves a conditional acceptance of the position adopting the first alternative and of the one adopting the second. The procedure is significant. For it clearly indicates that the real contribution of the Jaina philosophical tradition lies in its ability to synthesize two extremist rival positions on these or those questions while

the presentation of the Jaina's case in the form of four – nay, seven – mutually supplementary (in a way, mutually equivalent) statements is but a matter of formal embellishment. In any case, the success of Samantabhadra's arguments will be measured by the amount of plausibility characterizing his synthesis of the concerned rival positions on this or that question and not by our mechanical ability to present his findings in the form of four or seven statements of the prescribed form. In this connection the discussion recorded in the ninth and tenth sections is revealing. The ninth section discusses the problem of the causation of virtue and sin, the tenth that of the causation of worldly bondage and *mokṣa*. In both cases the two proposed alternatives are (in Samantabhadra's eyes) irrelevant to the causation concerned. And yet the formal structure of Samantabhadra's argument tends to suggest as if in both cases both the proposed alternatives have been somehow incorporated in the final Jaina position - just as in the earlier eight sections (where the two proposed alternatives were not considered to be irrelevant) both the proposed alternatives had been similarly incorporated. In order to grasp the anomaly of this structure of argument let us symbolize the two proposed alternatives as 'a causes x' and 'b causes x' while Samantabhadra's understanding of the matter as 'c causes x'. Now Samantabhadra's 'synthesis' amounts to saying : 'a causes x because it does cause x when c is available to it; similarly, b causes x because it does cause x when c is available to it'. Perhaps it would have been better if we were frankly told that both the proposed alternatives are irrelevant to the problem concerned. Be that as it may, let us at least note that nothing prevents the Jaina from rejecting both the proposed solutions of a problem in case he finds both of them to be unsatisfactory – this in spite of the formal structure of his argument which might tend to suggest as if he is accepting (rather than rejecting) both these solutions.

In this background it will be useful for us to undertake a summary review of the precise manner in which Samantabhadra has worked out a synthesis of two rival (and to his mind onesided) positions in the different sections of his text. As has been noted, each of these sections deals with some one philosophical problem and everywhere the Jaina position has been presented in the form of a synthesis of two proposed alternatives; for the sake of convenience in our following review we will give the title 'thesis' to the first of these alternatives, the title 'antithesis' to the second, and the title 'synthesis' to the final Jaina position. We take up these sections in their original order.

Section 1

In this section the problem discussed is whether a real entity is existent or non-existent by nature. The thesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely existent, meaning thereby that it exists at all place and time. The antithesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely non-existent, meaning thereby that it exists at no place or time. The synthesis asserts that a real entity is somehow existent and somehow non-existent, meaning thereby that it exists at its own place and time while it does not exist at what is not its own place and time. It cannot be said with certainty as to which historically evolved schools (if any at all) Samantabhadra has in mind as the respective proponents of the thesis and the antithesis in question. For the transcendentalist schools of Indian philosophy have repudiated the reality of the empirical world that occupies space-time and they have instead posited the reality of a trans-empirical world that occupies no space-time. Hence insofar as they maintain that one changeless and differenceless trans-empirical reality exists where the spatio-temporal world seems to be existing they might be said to endorse the spirit of the thesis in question; on the other hand, insofar as they maintain that the trans-empirical reality occupies no space-time they might be said to endorse the spirit of the antithesis in question. But the difficulty is that the advocate of the thesis, inasmuch as he says that a real entity exists at all place and time, does not seem to be of the view that a real entity exists beyond space-time; on the other hand, the advocate of the antithesis, even while submitting that a real entity exists at no place or time, does not expressly say that a real entity exists beyond space-time. Maybe, Samantabhadra was simply entertaining the logical possibility of someone upholding the position that a thing exists everywhere and always as also that of someone upholding the position that a thing exists nowhere and never; for these precisely can be two rival positions whose synthesis is represented by Samantabhadra's own position that a thing exists where and when it does while it does not exist where and when it does not. But it is also likely that Samantabhadra considered the Sāṅkhya philosopher to be the advocate of the thesis in question and the transcendentalist (of any hue) to be the advocate of the antithesis in question. For it is a Sāṅkhya position that a thing that is produced at some place and time was already in existence at that place and time, and this position coupled with the rather plausible supposition that it

is possible to produce any thing at any place or time might give rise to the opinion that a real entity exists at all place and time. Similarly, the transcendentalist repudiates the reality of the empirical world existing in space-time and posits instead the reality of a trans-empirical world existing beyond space-time; as such he can well be said to maintain that a real entity (i.e. the trans-empirical reality posited by him) exists at no place or time.

Section 2

In this section the problem discussed is whether a real entity is one with every other real entity or it is different from every other real entity. The thesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely one with every other real entity, meaning thereby that there exists just one real entity and that it is devoid of all internal change or difference. The antithesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely different from every other real entity, meaning thereby that there exist a number of real entities and that they are utterly different from each other both numerically and qualitatively. The synthesis asserts that a real entity is somehow one with every other real entity and it is somehow different from every other real entity, meaning thereby that two real entities even if different from each other must also be one with each other either numerically or qualitatively; (when two entities constitute two modes of the same substance they are numerically identical, when they just exhibit some similarity they are qualitatively identical). Here the advocate of the thesis is unmistakably the transcendentalist who, while repudiating the reality of the empirical world, posits some one trans-empirical reality under the title Śūnya, Vijñāna, Brahman or the like. The advocate of the antithesis is the Buddhist empiricist, and Samantabhadra's trenchant criticism of this Buddhist position is worthy of as much serious attention as his powerful advocacy of the Jaina position on the question. For that way we will be enabled to form an idea of how strenously – and on substantially identical lines – two schools of Indian empiricism were grappling with the problem of identity and difference – numerical as well as qualitative.

Section 3

In this section the problem discussed is whether a real entity is permanent or momentary. The thesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely permanent, the antithesis that it is absolutely momentary; as against them, the synthesis asserts that a real entity is somehow

permanent and somehow momentary. Here the advocate of the thesis is the Sāṅkhya philosopher but he is summarily disposed of – perhaps because he is not an ideal choice; (in the immediately preceding section the transcendentalist was summarily disposed of but that was because his position does not deserve much serious scrutiny). The most valuable portion of the present section is Samantabhadra's criticism of the Buddhist empiricist who is held out as the advocate of the antithesis in question. Really speaking, this criticism is a continuation of that urged in the immediately preceding section. But in that section the problem of change was taken up as a part of the broader problem of numerical identity, which itself was in its turn a part of the still broader problem of identity in general. In the present section the problem of change has been discussed independently and in its numerous ramifications.

Section 4

In this section the problem discussed is whether there is the relation of distinctness or non-distinctness between a composite body and its component-parts, a quality and the thing qualified by this quality, a universal and the particular possessing this universal. The thesis asserts that the relation in question is that of absolute distinctness, the antithesis that it is that of absolute non-distinctness; as against them, the synthesis asserts that the relation is somehow that of distinctness and somehow that of non-distinctness, The advocate of the thesis is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika empiricist, that of the antithesis the Buddhist empiricist. The importance of this section lies in its comprehensive criticism of the position adopted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school on certain vital questions of ontology; for so far as Samantabhadra's present criticism of the Buddhist is concerned it is not so illuminating as that launched by him in the preceding two sections (and it is even doubtful whether the Buddhist case – at least as understood by the school of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti – has been reported correctly). Another thing to be noted is that the problem of the relation between quality and the thing qualified has been left almost untouched in the present section – perhaps to be taken up in the next; moreover, what we have called the problem of the relation between a composite body and its component-parts has been called by Samantabhadra himself the problem of the relation between an effect and its cause, but the justification of our suggestion lies in the fact that the only case of causation considered in the present section is that of the causation of a composite body out of its component-parts.

Section 5

In this section the problem discussed is whether the relation obtaining between an entity and its features is that of dependence or independence. The thesis asserts that the relation in question is that of absolute dependence, the antithesis that it is that of absolute independence; as against them, the synthesis asserts that the relation is somehow that of dependence and somehow that of independence. The advocate of the thesis is the Buddhist empiricist, that of the antithesis the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. As hinted earlier, this discussion is in a way the left-over of that conducted in the immediately preceding section. For the problem of features may be divided into that of universal features and that of particular features, and even while Samantabhadra had somehow touched upon the problem of universal features in the preceding section he had there left almost untouched the problem of particular features. By raising in the present section the problem of features in general, scope has been provided for a comprehensive treatment of this one of the most important problems of ontology.

Section 6

In this section the problem discussed is whether inference or scripture is the authoritative source of knowledge. The thesis asserts that inference is the only authoritative source of knowledge, the antithesis that scripture is the only authoritative source of knowledge; as against them, the synthesis asserts that under certain conditions inference is the authoritative source of knowledge while under certain other conditions scripture is the authoritative source of knowledge. This obviously is a discussion on logic and it is reasonable to presume that the advocate of the thesis here is a thoroughgoing freethinker while the advocate of the antithesis a rabid theologian. It is interesting to watch how Samantabhadra seeks to avoid the (in his eyes undesirable) company of either.

Section 7

In this section the problem discussed is whether cognition is subjective or it has an objective reference. The thesis asserts that all cognition is a mere subjective manipulation, the antithesis that all cognition is true of its object; as against them, the synthesis asserts that there are cognitions that are true of their respective objects and also those that are not thus true. This is primarily an epistemological discussion where the advocate of the thesis is the subjective-idealist

Vijñānavādin while the advocate of the antithesis the naive-realist Prabhākarite. Samantabhadra's treatment of the problem is however somehow diffused and the issues do not seem to have been clinched with as much clarity as is desirable.

Section 8

In this section the problem discussed is whether fate or perseverance is the decisive agency in one's everyday career. The thesis asserts the omnipotence of fate, the antithesis that of perseverance; as against them, the synthesis asserts that there are conditions under which fate prevails over perseverance and also those under which the reverse happens. This is an ethical discussion where the advocate of the thesis ought to be the fatalist, that of the antithesis the materialist. Here too it is interesting to watch how Samantabhadra seeks to avoid the company of either.

Section 9

In this section the problem discussed is whether virtue and sin arise from respectively causing pleasure and pain to others or they arise from respectively causing pain and pleasure to oneself. The thesis asserts that virtue and sin exclusively arise from respectively causing pleasure and pain to others, the antithesis that they exclusively arise from respectively causing pain and pleasure to oneself; as against them, the synthesis asserts that virtue arises when an act is performed with a clean mind while sin arises when an act is performed with an unclean mind. This too is an ethical discussion and we have already taken note of the anomalous character of its formal structure. The only new point that might be added is that Samantabhadra is here emphasising the primacy of motive over overt acts; as against him, the advocate of the thesis attaches exclusive importance to the socially oriented overt acts while the advocate of the antithesis attaches exclusive importance to the self-oriented ones.

Section 10

In this section the problem discussed is whether worldly bondage results from even slight ignorance or *mokṣa* results from even slight knowledge. The thesis asserts that worldy bondage inevitably results from even slight ignorance, the antithesis that *mokṣa* inevitably results from even slight knowledge; as against them, the synthesis asserts that worldly bondage results when one is under the sway of moral delusion while *mokṣa* results when one is free from the sway of moral delusion. This is an ethico-theological discussion and in its case as well we have

already taken note of the anomalous character of its formal structure. The only new point that might be added is that Samantabhadra is here emphasizing the primacy of virtue over knowledge quâ the means of realizing man's *summum bonum*; as against him, the advocate of the thesis urges that even slight ignorance is sufficient to prevent man from realizing his *summum bonum* while the advocate of the antithesis urges that even slight knowledge is sufficient to enable man to realize the same.

The Āptamīmāṁsā has the good fortune of being commented on by such stalwarts of Jaina logic as Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Yaśovijaya (and by a lesser figure one Vasunandin). However, Akalaṅka's Aṣṭaśatī, though elaborate enough (considering its terse style), is not a word-by-word commentary. Vidyānanda, in his Aṣṭasahasrī, adopts a unique technique; for he there so formulates his arguments that all the sentences of the Aṣṭaśatī (in their original order) become a natural part of the Aṣṭasahasrī (which, as is indicated by its name, is ten times as large as the Aṣṭaśatī). Yaśovijaya, in his Aṣṭasahasrīvivaraṇa, elucidates what he considers to be the knotty passages of the Aṣṭasahasrī (which, naturally, includes the Aṣṭaśatī). Now while preparing the accompanying English translation of the Āptamīmāṁsā we have derived ample benefit from these writings of Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Yaśovijaya and Vasunandin, but no attempt has been made by us to follow any of these authors at all cost; (however, special mention has occasionally been made of a reading and/or an interpretation that is unique to the Aṣṭasahasrī – of course, as following the Aṣṭaśatī and as having been followed by the Aṣṭasahasrīvivaraṇa). Our own explanatory remarks are of two types, those called 'notes' and those called 'comments'. The 'notes' – rather few in number and brief in size – chiefly seek to clarify the meaning of a verse and a particular note will always be found to belong to a particular verse. The 'comments', on the other hand, seek to critically amplify an argument offered by the author and in most cases a comment is appended to a group of verses; (in four places an entire section has been considered together, in four places the 'thesis', 'antithesis' and 'synthesis' have been taken up one by one, in one place the 'thesis' and 'antithesis' have been considered togather but the 'synthesis' taken up separately, in the first section the 'thesis', 'antithesis' and 'synthesis' have been dealt with separately but the 'synthesis' has been further subdivided for the convenience of treatment, the first eight verses are discussed together and so also are thirteen of the last fourteen verses).

Samantabhadra

We know almost nothing about Āc. Samantabhadra's life. "Many legends attach to his life but little can be said of it with certainty. He would seem to have been a native of the Tamil land and to have belonged to a *kṣatriya* family."[31] Prof. H. L. Jaina and Prof. M. A. Dhaky[32] assign him to *circa* A. D. 550. His authorship of Āptamīmāṁsā, Svayambhūstotra and Yuktyanuśāsana is beyond any doubt. They belong to the literary form called *stotra* (devotional poem). But they are philosophical in substance. Vidyānanda has written commentaries on Yuktyanuśāsana and Āptamīmāṁsā.

Akalaṅka

Akalaṅka[33] was the father of Jaina logic. He created Jaina doctrine of *pramāṇas* and certainly spent the best part of his labour working around this problem. He was well conversant with the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy and so was in a position to evaluate them, particularly from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda.*

As is the case with other outstanding figures, the brilliant personality of Akalaṅka too is surrounded by legends. But it is almost certain that he flourished between 720 A. D. and 780 A. D.; that he belonged to Mānyakheṭa; that he was a son of Puruṣottama, a minister of Śubhatuṅga of Mānyakheṭa; that he stayed in the Buddhist Maṭha to study Buddhist philosophy and that he had debates with a Buddhist teacher at the court of king Himaśītala of Kaliṅga.

Akalaṅka composed several works on logic – Laghīyastraya[34] (composed of Pramāṇa-nayapraveśa and Pravacanapraveśa), Nyāyaviniścaya[35] Pramāṇasaṅgraha and Siddhiviniśacaya.[36] These are his original works. On all these he himself wrote short commentaries.

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31. Jaina Yoga, R. Williams, Pub. Motilal Banarsidass, Dehli, 1983, p. 19
32. 'Svāmī Samantabhadra-no Samaya' (Gujarātī paper), Nirgrantha, Vol. 3, Ahmedabad, 1998
33. For details of Akalaṅka's life, date and works one may refer to Dr. M. K. Jaina's introduction to Siddhiviniścaya, published by Bharatīya Jñānapīṭha, Kāsī.
34. Āc. Prabhācandra (late tenth century A. D.) has written an extensive and critical commentary on Laghīyastraya, called Nyāyakumudacandra. It is edited by M. K. Jain and published by Manik Chandra Dig. Jain Granthamālā, Bombay.
35. Vādirājasūri (late tenth century A.D.) has written an elaborate and illuminating commentary (vivaraṇa) on Nyāyaviniścaya. It is edited by M. K. Jain and published by Bhāratīya Jñānapītha, Kāśī.
36. Anantavīrya (ninth century A. D.) commented upon Siddhiviniścaya. His commentary also is very elaborate and intensely logical. It is published with the original Siddhiviniścaya. See fn. 33.

Moreover, he wrote commentaries on the Tattvārthasūtra of Vācaka Umāsvāti and Āptamīmāṁsā of Āc. Samantabhadra. They are respectively named as Rājavārtika and Aṣṭaśatī.

Aṣṭaśatī is very important as it presents clear-cut, closely reasoned and concentrated enunciation and defence of *Anekāntavāda*. Here Akalaṅka finds opportunity to discuss fundamental philosophical views centring around the admission or otherwise of two contradictory features, e. g. existence and non-existence, oneness and separateness, permanence and transience, 'identity between cause and effect, substance and property, parts and whole' and 'difference between cause and effect, substance and property, parts and whole.' He loses no opportunity to criticise various one-sided ontological positions and defend the corresponding Jaina positions. He critically examines rival positions as actually maintained in the contemporary works of various non-Jaina schools, particularly Buddhist. He is very bitter against the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and causeless destruction. He attacks Buddhist *Vijñānavāda* and *Śūnyavāda*. Again, he strongly refutes the Buddhist logicians' theory of perception. Moreover, we find in Aṣṭaśatī criticism of some basic theories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā and Sāṅkhya systems. The style is compact, exact, terse and tough.

I think that Akalaṅka's works were seriously studied by the non-Jaina scholars in those days and there is all possibility that his arguments were profitably utilised by them against the common rivals. I feel that well known Nyāya logician Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (ninth century A. D.) had consulted Akalaṅka's works. He refers to and refutes some Jaina views in the ninth chapter of his famous Nyāyamañjarī. His commentator Cakradhara (10th-11th century A.D.), while commenting on Jayanta's concerned sentences, reproduces five ***kārikās*** from Akalaṅka's Siddhiviniścaya and explains them extensively in his own words.[37] This is very important and noteworthy. One more Kashmiri pandit Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇakaṇṭha (10th-11th century A. D.) refers to Akalaṅka and his Granthatraya by name is his Vṛtti on Mṛgendratantra. His actual words are : *sadasadvādinām arhatām ca mateṣu Akalaṅka-tritaya-prabhṛtiṣu...*[38] This shows that Akalaṅka's works attracted the attention of non-Jaina scholars of even remote regions like Kashmir.

— Nagin J. Shah

37. Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga by Cakradhara, Ed. Nagin J. Shah, L. D. Series No 35, 1972, pp. 212-215.
38. Mṛgendratantra with Vṛtti, Kashmir Series No L, 1930 A. D.

समन्तभद्रविरचिता

आप्तमीमांसा

CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY

SECTION I
EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE

1-8 Verses

देवागमनभोयानचामरादिविभूतयः ।
मायाविष्वपि दृश्यन्ते नातस्त्वमसि नो महान् ॥१॥

The miraculous attainments like an attendance offered by the celestial beings, a walking in the sky, a fan-service (worked by the celestial beings), and so on and so forth are found in the possession of even jugglers; these (miraculous attainments which you certainly possess) are (therefore) not what make you great in our eyes. (1)

अकलङ्कनिबद्धा अष्टशती

उद्दीपीकृतधर्मतीर्थमचलज्योतिर्ज्वलत्केवला-
ऽऽलोकालोकितलोकलोकमखिलैरिन्द्रादिभिर्वन्दितम् ।
वन्दित्वा परमार्हतां समुदयं गां सप्तभङ्गीविधिं
स्याद्वादामृतगर्भिणीं प्रतिहतैकान्तान्धकारोदयाम् ॥१॥
तीर्थं सर्वपदार्थतत्त्वविषयस्याद्वादपुण्योदधे-
र्भव्यानामकलङ्कभावकृतये प्राभावि काले कलौ ।
येनाचार्यसमन्तभद्रयतिना तस्मै नमः सन्ततं
कृत्वा विव्रियते स्तवो भगवतां देवागमस्तत्कृतिः ॥२॥

देवागमेत्यादिमङ्गलपुरस्सरस्तवविषयपरमाप्तगुणातिशयपरीक्षामुपक्षिपतैव स्वयं श्रद्धागुणज्ञतालक्षणं प्रयोजनमाक्षिप्तं लक्ष्यते । तदन्यतरापायेऽर्थस्यानुपपत्तेः । शास्त्रन्यायानुसारितया तथैवोपन्यासात् । आज्ञाप्रधाना हि त्रिदशागमनादिकं परमेष्ठिनः परमात्मचिह्नं प्रतिपद्येरन्, नास्मदादयः, तादृशो मायाविष्वपि भावात्, इत्यागमाश्रयः ॥१॥

अध्यात्मं बहिरप्येष विग्रहादिमहोदयः ।
दिव्यः सत्यो दिवौकस्स्वप्यस्ति रागादिमत्सु सः ॥२॥

The divine excellence of body etc. – an excellence which might be of an internal or an external sort – is a genuine possession of even the denizens of heaven who are (by nature) under the sway of the spiritual deficiencies like attachment etc. (2)

Note : An illustration of the divine bodily excellence of an internal sort is utter absence of perspiration, an illustration of the divine bodily excellence of an external sort is the receiving of fragrant rainfall; the former is called 'internal' because its cause is organic to body, the latter is called 'external' because its cause is not thus organic.

बहिरन्तःशरीरादिमहोदयोऽपि **पूरणा**दिष्वसम्भवी व्यभिचारी, स्वर्गिषु भावादक्षीणकषायेषु । ततोऽपि न भवान् परमात्मेति स्तूयते ॥२॥

तीर्थकृत्समयानां च परस्परविरोधतः ।
सर्वेषामाप्तता नास्ति कश्चिदेव भवेद्गुरुः ॥३॥

As for the preachings of the various sect-founders, they cannot be all authentic because they are mutually contradictory; (hence) of these sect-founders some one at the most can be worthy of reverence. (3)

Note : The exact meaning of the statement *kaścid eva bhaved guruḥ* seems to be somewhat obscure. For if some one of the non-Jaina sect-founders is worthy of reverence why not try to find out as to who is that ? Maybe the statement means '(hence) there ought to be some one sect-founder who is worthy of reverence'.

न हि तीर्थकरत्वमाप्ततां साधयति शक्रादिष्वसम्भवि, सुगतादिषु दर्शनात् । न च सर्वे सर्वदर्शिनः परस्परविरुद्धसमयाभिधायिनः । ततोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुः । अत एव न कश्चित् सर्वज्ञ इत्ययुक्तम्, श्रुतेरविशेषादप्रमाणतापत्तेः । तथेष्टत्वाददोष इत्येकेषामप्रामाणिकैवेष्टिः ।

न खलु प्रत्यक्षं सर्वज्ञप्रमाणान्तराभावविषयम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। नानुमानम्, असिद्धेः। प्रमाणतः सिद्धं नाऽनात्मसिद्धं नाम, अन्यथा परस्यापि न सिद्ध्येत्। तदिमे स्वयमेकेन प्रमाणेन सर्वं सर्वज्ञरहितं पुरुषसमूहं संविदन्त एवात्मानं निरस्यन्तीति व्याहतमेतत्। तीर्थच्छेदसम्प्रदायानां तथा सर्वमवगतमिच्छतामाप्तता नास्ति, परस्परविरुद्धाभिधानात्। एकानेकप्रमाणवादिनां स्वप्रमाव्यावृत्तेः, अन्यथानैकान्तिकत्वात्। सर्वप्रमाणविनिवृत्तेः, इतरथा संप्रतिपत्तेः। वागक्षबुद्धीच्छापुरुषत्वादिकं क्वचिदनाविलज्ञानं निराकरोति, न पुनस्तत्प्रतिषेधवादिषु तथा, इति परमगहनमेतत्। तदित्थं सिद्धं सुनिश्चितासंभवद्बाधकप्रमाणत्वम्। तेन कः परमात्मा? चिदेव लब्ध्युपयोगसंस्काराणामावरणनिबन्धनानामत्यये भवभृतां प्रभुः। न हि सर्वज्ञस्य निराकृतेः प्राक् सुनिश्चितासंभवत्साधकप्रमाणत्वं सिद्धं येन परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठेत। नापि बाधकासंभवात् परं प्रत्यक्षादेरपि विश्वासनिबन्धनमस्ति। तत् प्रकृतेऽपि सिद्धम्, यदि तत्सत्तां न साधयेत् सर्वत्राप्यविशेषात्। तदभावे दर्शनं नादर्शनमतिशेते, अनाश्वासात्, विभ्रमवत्। साधकबाधकप्रमाणयोर्निर्णयात् भावाभावयोरविप्रतिपत्तिः, अनिर्णयादारेका स्यात्। न खलु ज्ञस्वभावस्य कश्चिदगोचरोऽस्ति यन्न क्रमेत, तत्स्वभावान्तरप्रतिषेधात्। चेतनस्य सतः सम्बन्ध्यन्तरं मोहोदयकारणकं मदिरादिवत्। तदभावे साकल्येन विरतमोहः सर्वं पश्यति, प्रत्यासत्तिविप्रकर्षयोरकिञ्चित्करत्वात्, अत एवाक्षानपेक्षा अञ्जनादिसंस्कृतचक्षुषो यथा आलोकानपेक्षा ॥३॥

दोषावरणयोर्हानिर्निःशेषाऽस्त्यतिशायनात्।
क्वचिद् यथा स्वहेतुभ्यो बहिरन्तर्मलक्षयः ॥४॥

In some person there must be a total destruction of the spiritual deficiencies and of the physical veilings (that act as the cause of these deficiencies), for there must be a case where such destruction is most complete of all; this is just as by an employment of appropriate means it is possible to bring about in a physical substance a total destruction of the extraneous as well as organic impurities which it had happened to accumulate. (4)

Note: By 'physical veilings' are to be understood the karmas (more correctly, karmans) which are supposed to have been accumulated by a soul as a result of its good or bad past acts and which the Jaina tradition conceives in the form of physical entities.

वचनसामर्थ्यात् अज्ञानादिर्दोषः स्वपरपरिणामहेतुः। अत एव लोष्टादौ निःशेषदोषावरणनिवृत्तेः सिद्धसाध्यतेत्यसमीक्षिताभिधानम्, साध्यापरिज्ञानात्। दोषावरणयोर्हानिरति-

शायनात् निःशेषतायां साध्यायां बुद्धेरपि किं न परिक्षयः स्यात्, विशेषाभावात्, अतोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुः, इत्यशिक्षितलक्षितम्, चेतनगुणव्यावृत्तेः सर्वात्मना पृथिव्यादेरभिमतत्वात्। अदृश्यानुपलम्भादभावासिद्धिरित्ययुक्तम्, परचैतन्यनिवृत्तावारेकापत्तेः, संस्कर्तॄणां पातकित्वप्रसङ्गात्, बहुलमप्रत्यक्षस्यापि रोमादेर्विनिवृत्तिनिर्णयात् । यदि पुनरयं निर्बन्धः सर्वत्र विप्रकर्षिणामभावासिद्धेः, तदा कृतकत्वधूमादेर्विनाशानलाभ्यां व्याप्तेरसिद्धेर्न कश्चिद्धेतुः । ततः शौद्धोदनिशिष्यकाणामनात्मनीनमेतत्, अनुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्। तथा हि-यस्य हानिरतिशयवती तस्य कुतश्चित् सर्वात्मना व्यावृत्तिः, यथा बुद्ध्यादिगुणस्याश्मनः । तथा च दोषादेर्हानिरतिशयवती कुतश्चित् निवर्तयितुमर्हति सकलं कलङ्कम्, इति कथमकलङ्कसिद्धिर्न भवेत् ? मणेर्मलादेर्व्यावृत्तिः क्षयः, सतोऽत्यन्तविनाशानुपपत्तेः । तादृगात्मनोऽपि कर्मणो निवृत्तौ परिशुद्धिः । कर्मणोऽपि वैकल्यमात्मकैवल्यमस्त्येव । ततो नातिप्रसज्यते । प्रतिपक्ष एवात्मनामागन्तुको मलः परिक्षयी स्वनिर्ह्रासनिमित्तविवर्धनवशात् ।।४।।

ननु निरस्तोपद्रवः सन् आत्मा कथमकलङ्कोऽपि विप्रकर्षिणमर्थं प्रत्यक्षीकुर्यात् ?

सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद् यथा ।
अनुमेयत्वतोऽग्न्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञसंस्थितिः ।।५।।

The objects that are minute, concealed or distant must be amenable to somebody's perception, because they are amenable to inferential knowledge, just like fire etc. – it is this argument that establishes the existence of an omniscient personage. (5)

स्वभावकालदेशविप्रकर्षिणामनुमेयत्वमसिद्धमित्यनुमानमुत्सारयति, यावान् कश्चित् भावः स सर्वः क्षणिक इत्यादिव्याप्तेरसिद्धौ प्रकृतोपसंहारायोगात्, अविप्रकर्षिणामनुमितेरानर्थक्यात् । सत्त्वादेरनित्यत्वादिना व्याप्तिमिच्छतां सिद्धमनुमेयत्वमनवयवेनेति न किञ्चित् व्याहतं पश्यामः । तेऽनुमेया न कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षाश्च स्युः, किं व्याहन्यते ?, इति समानमग्न्यादीनाम्। तथा चानुमानोच्छेदः स्यात्। तदभ्युपगमे स्वसंवेद्यविज्ञानव्यक्तिभिरध्यक्षं किं लक्षयेत् प्रमाणतया परमप्रमाणतया ? इति, न किञ्चिदेतत् तया नैतत्तया वा अयमभ्युपगन्तुमर्हति। तदेवं प्रमेयत्वसत्त्वादिर्यत्र हेतुलक्षणं पुष्णाति तं कथं चेतनः प्रतिषेद्धुमर्हति संशयितुं वा ? धर्मिण्यसिद्धसत्ताके भावाभावोभयधर्माणामसिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकत्वात् कथं सकलविदि सत्त्वसिद्धिः ? इति ब्रुवन्नपि देवानांप्रियः तद्धर्मिस्वभावं न लक्षयति । शब्दानित्यत्वसाधनेऽपि कृतकत्वादौ अयं विकल्पः किं न स्यात् ? विमत्यधिकरणभावापन्नविनाशधर्मिधर्मत्वे कार्यत्वादेरसंभवद्बाधकत्वादेरपि संदिग्धसद्भावधर्मिधर्मत्वं सिद्धं बोद्धव्यम् ।

यदि विप्रकृष्टार्थप्रत्यक्षत्वमर्हतः साध्यते, पक्षदोषोऽप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम् । तत एव व्याप्तिर्न सिद्ध्येत्। अनर्हतश्चेत्, अनिष्टानुषङ्गोऽपि। कः पुनः सामान्यात्मा तदुभयव्यतिरेकेण, यस्य विवक्षितार्थप्रत्यक्षत्वम् ? इत्येतद्विकल्पजालं शब्दनित्यत्वेऽपि समानम्, न केवलं सूक्ष्मादिसाक्षात्करणस्य प्रतिषेधने संशीतौ वा । तदयमनुमानमुद्रां भिनत्ति । वर्णानां नित्यत्वमकृतकत्वादिना सर्वगतानां यदि साधयति स्यादप्रसिद्धविशेषणः पक्षः, इतरथा अनिष्टानुषङ्गः । कीदृक् पुनः सामान्यं नाम यदुभयदोषपरिहाराय प्रकल्प्येत ? सर्वगतत्वसाधनेऽपि समानम् । अविवक्षितविशेषस्य पक्षीकरणे समः समाधिः, इत्यलमप्रतिष्ठितमिथ्याविकल्पौघैः ॥५॥

स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् ।
अविरोधो यदिष्टं ते प्रसिद्धेन न बाध्यते ॥६॥

And such an omniscient personage you alone are whose utterance is neither in conflict with logic nor in conflict with scripture. As for the proof of such an absence of conflict, it is the circumstance that what you seek to establish is never contradicted by what is known to be the case. (6)

विप्रकर्ष्यपि भिन्नलक्षणसम्बन्धित्वादिना कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षम्। सोऽत्र भवान् अर्हन्नेव, अन्येषां न्यायागमविरुद्धभाषित्वात् । विचित्राभिसन्धितया व्यापारव्याहारादिसाङ्कर्येण क्वचिदप्यतिशयानिर्णये कैमर्थक्यात् विशेषेष्टिः, ज्ञानवतोऽपि विसंवादात्, क्व पुनराश्वासं लभेमहि ? न चैवंवादिनः किञ्चिदनुमानं नाम, निरभिसन्धीनामपि बहुलं कार्यस्वभावा-नियमोपलम्भात्, सति काष्ठादिसामग्रीविशेषे क्वचिदुपलब्धस्य तदभावे प्रायशोऽनुपलब्धस्य मण्यादिकारणकलापेऽपि संभवात् । यज्जातीयो यतः संप्रेक्षितः तज्जातीयात् तादृगिति दुर्लभनियमतायां धूमधूमकेत्वादीनामपि व्याप्यव्यापकभावः कथमिव निर्णीयेत ? वृक्षः शिंशपात्वात् इति लताचूतादेरपि क्वचिदेव दर्शनात् प्रेक्षावतां किमिव निःशङ्कं चेतः स्यात् ? तदेतददृष्टसंशयैकान्तवादिनां विदग्धमर्कटानामिव स्वलाङ्गूलभक्षणम् । यत्नतः परीक्षितं कार्यं कारणं नातिवर्तते इति चेत्, स्तुतं प्रस्तुतम् । ततोऽयं प्रतिपत्तुरपराधो नानुमानस्येति अनुकूलमाचरति । तदेवं तत् सुनिश्चितासंभवद्बाधकप्रमाणत्वम् अर्हत्येव सकलज्ञत्वं साधयति, नान्यत्र, इत्यविरोध इत्यादिना स्पष्टयति। तत्रेष्टं मतं शासनमित्युपचर्यते, निराकृतवाचोऽपि क्वचिदविप्रतिषेधात्। नियमाभ्युपगमे सुषुप्त्यादावपि निरभिप्रायप्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । प्रतिसंविदिताकारेच्छा तदा संभवन्ती पुनः स्मर्येत वाञ्छान्तरवत् । ततः

चैतन्यकरणपाटवयोरेव साधकतमत्वम् । सहकारिकारणान्तरं न वै नियतमपेक्षणीयम्, नक्तंचरादेः संस्कृतचक्षुषो वाऽनपेक्षितालोकसन्निधेः रूपोपलम्भात् । न चैवं संवित्करण-पाटवयोरप्यभावे विवक्षामात्रात् कस्यचित् वचनप्रवृत्तिः प्रसज्यते, संवित्करणवैकल्ये यथाविवक्षं वाग्वृत्तेरभावात् । न च दोषजातिस्तद्धेतुः यतस्तां वाणी नातिवर्तेत, तत्प्रकर्षापकर्षानुविधानाभावात् बुद्ध्यादिवत् । प्रमाणतः सिद्धं प्रसिद्धम् । तदेव कस्यचित् बाधनं युक्तम् । विशेषणमेतत् परमतापेक्षम्, अप्रसिद्धेनापि अनित्यत्वाद्येकान्तधर्मेण बाधाऽकल्पनात् । न ऋते प्रमाणात् प्रतिबन्धसिद्धेरभ्युपगमात् । न खलु परेषां प्रत्यक्षमग्निधूमयोः क्षणभङ्गसद्भावयोर्वा साकल्येन व्याप्तिं प्रति समर्थम्, अविचारकत्वात् सन्निहितविषय-त्वाच्च । न चानुमानम्, अनवस्थानुषङ्गात् । परोक्षान्तर्भाविना नः तर्केण सम्बन्धो व्यव-तिष्ठेत । तदप्रमाणत्वे न लैङ्गिकं प्रमाणम्, समारोपव्यवच्छेदाविशेषात् । अधिगमोऽपि व्यवसायात्मैव, तदनुत्पत्तौ सतोऽपि दर्शनस्य साधनान्तरापेक्षया सन्निधानाभेदात् सुषुप्तचैतन्यवत् ॥६॥

त्वन्मतामृतबाह्यानां सर्वथैकान्तवादिनाम् ।
आप्ताभिमानदग्धानां स्वेष्टं दृष्टेन बाध्यते ॥७॥

Those who are alien to your nectar-like doctrine, are the upholders of the utterly extremist theses, are the victims of their own vainglorious claims to be an authority (on the subject-matter they deal with) are the persons who seek to establish something that is contra-dicted by what is seen to be the case. (7)

अनेकान्तात्मकवस्तुसाक्षात्करणं बहिरन्तश्च सकलजगतसाक्षीभूतं विपक्षे प्रत्यक्षविरोधलक्षणमनेन दक्षयति । न हि किञ्चित् रूपान्तरविकलं सदसन्नित्या-नित्याद्येकान्तरूपं संवेदनमन्यद्वा संपश्यामो यथात्र प्रतिज्ञायते, चित्रज्ञानवत् कथञ्चि-दसङ्कीर्णविशेषैकात्मनः सुखादिचैतन्यस्य वर्णसंस्थानाद्यात्मनः स्कन्धस्य च प्रेक्षणात् । सामान्यविशेषैकात्मनः संवित्तिरेकान्तस्यानुपलब्धिर्वा सर्वतः सिद्धा चक्षुरादिमता-मनार्हतकल्पनाम् अस्तंगमयतीति किं नः प्रमाणान्तरेण ? न हि दृष्टाज्ज्येष्ठं गरिष्ठमिष्टम्, तदभावे प्रमाणान्तराप्रवृत्तेः, समारोपविच्छेदविशेषात्, अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोः स्वभावभेद-प्रदर्शनार्थत्वाच्च । अनेकान्तैकान्तयोः उपलम्भानुपलम्भयोः एकत्वप्रदर्शनार्थं तावदुभयमाह मतान्तरप्रतिक्षेपार्थं वा । यदाह - साधर्म्यवैधर्म्ययोरन्यतरेणार्थगतौ उभयप्रतिपादनं पक्षादिवचनं वा निग्रहस्थानमिति – न तत् युक्तम्, साधनसामर्थ्येन विपक्षव्यावृत्तिलक्षणेन पक्षं प्रसाधयतः

केवलं वचनाधिक्योपालम्भच्छलेन पराजयाधिकरणप्राप्तिः स्वयं निराकृतपक्षेण प्रतिपक्षिणा लक्षणीयेति। प्रतिज्ञानुपयोगे शास्त्रादिष्वपि नाभिधीयेत, विशेषाभावात्। यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकं, यथा घटः, संश्च शब्द इति त्रिलक्षणं हेतुमभिधाय यदि समर्थयते, कथमिव सन्धामतिशेते ?, तावतार्थप्रतिपत्तौ समर्थनं वा निगमनादिकं ?, यतः पराजयो न भवेत्। सत्त्वमात्रेण नश्वरत्वसिद्धौ उत्पत्तिमत्त्वकृतकत्वादिवचनम् अतिरिक्तविशेषणोपादानात् कृतकत्वप्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादिषु च कप्रत्ययातिरेकात् असाधनाङ्गवचनं पराजयाय प्रभवेत्। क्वचित् पक्षधर्मत्वप्रदर्शनं संश्च शब्द इत्यविगानात्, त्रिलक्षणवचनसमर्थनं च असाधनाङ्ग-वचनमपजयप्राप्तिरिति व्याहतम्। तथा अन्यस्यापि प्रस्तुतेतरस्य वादिनोक्तौ इतरस्य स्वपक्षम-साधयतो विजयासंभवात् निग्रहस्थानमयुक्तम् । साधनाङ्गस्यावचनं - प्रतिवादिनापि अदोषस्योद्भावनं दोषस्यानुद्भावनं वा - अनेन प्रत्युक्तम्। विजिगीषुणोभयं कर्तव्यं स्वपरपक्ष-साधनदूषणम् । अतोऽन्यतरेणासिद्धानैकान्तिकवचनेऽपि जल्पापरिसमाप्तिः । निराकृता-वस्थापितविपक्षस्वपक्षयोरेव जयेतरव्यवस्था, नान्यथा, इति दर्शयन्नुभयमाह ॥७॥

कुशलाकुशलं कर्म परलोकश्च न क्वचित्।
एकान्तग्रहरक्तेषु नाथ ! स्वपरवैरिषु ॥८॥

O Lord ! on the showing of all those who tenaciously stick to the extremist theses there is no distinction between a virtuous and a sinful act, nor any possibility of re-birth; these persons are (thus) verily the enemies of both what they seek to uphold and what they seek to refute (that is, their arguments are inconsequential). (8)

कर्मफलसम्बन्धपरलोकादिकम् एकान्तवादिनां प्रायेणेष्टम्, तदनेकान्तप्रतिषेधेन बाध्यते। ततोऽनुष्ठानमभिमतव्याघातकृत्, सदसन्नित्यानित्याद्येकान्तेषु कस्यचित् कुतश्चित् कदाचित् क्वचित् प्रादुर्भावासंभवात्। न हि सर्वात्मना सर्वस्य भूतावेव जन्म विरुद्धमपि तु सर्वथाऽभावेऽपि, व्यलीकप्रतिभासानामनुपरमप्रसङ्गात्। न केवलं स्वभावनैरात्म्ये एवायं दोषः किन्तु अन्तरुभयत्र वा निरन्वयसत्त्वेऽपि, कार्यकालमप्राप्नुवतः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः, चिरतरातीतवत् । सति अभवतः स्वयमेव नियमेन पश्चात् भवतः तत्कार्यत्वं विरुद्धम्, कालान्तरेऽपि किं न स्यात् ?, तदभावाविशेषात्, समनन्तरवत्। समर्थे सति अभवतः पुनः कालान्तरभाविनः तत्प्रभवाभ्युपगमे कथमक्षणिकेऽर्थक्रियानुपपत्तिः ?, तत्सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर-विशेषात्। कारणसामर्थ्यापेक्षिणः फलस्य कालनियमकल्पनायाम् अचलपक्षेऽपि समानः परिहारः । क्षणवर्तिन एकस्मात् कारणात् कारणस्वभावमभेदयतां विचित्रकर्मणाम् (= विचित्रकार्याणाम्) उत्पत्तौ कूटस्थेऽपि किं न स्यात् क्रमशः कार्योत्पत्तिः ? कथमत्रो-

त्पत्तिर्नाम ? तत्र समानः पर्यनुयोगः, सदसतोरनुत्पत्तेः, निष्पन्नखपुष्पवत्। सतः पुनर्गुणान्तराधानमनेकं क्रमशोऽप्यनुभवतः किं विरुध्येत ?, क्षणस्थायिनः कस्यचिदेव ग्राह्यग्राहककारवैश्वरूप्यानभ्युपगमेऽपि संविदितज्ञानस्य ग्राह्यग्राहककारविवेकं परोक्षं बिभ्राणस्य सामर्थ्यप्राप्तेः, अन्यथा शून्यसंविदोर्विप्रतिषेधात्। तदयं क्षणस्थायि कारणं स्वसत्तायां कार्यं कुर्वत् अभ्युपगच्छन् क्रमोत्पत्तिमुपरुणद्धि, सकलजगदेकक्षणवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। कारणस्य कार्यकालप्राप्तौ क्षणभङ्गभङ्गानुषङ्गात्, तदप्राप्नुवतस्तत्कृतौ व्यलीककल्पनाविशेषेण कूटस्थानतिशायनात्। ततः सुभाषितं कुशलाद्यसंभूतिरेकान्तग्रहरक्तेष्विति ॥८॥

Comment on verses 1-8

These verses are not an organic part of the discussion carried on by Samantabhadra in the present text. For really speaking, they contain little else than the author's expression of faith in the correctness of the Jaina philosophical tradition. However, the procedure here adopted by Samantabhadra is in some sense revealing. In the verse 1 we are told that certain characteristic qualifications of the Jaina tīrthaṅkaras (to some one of whom the whole of the present text is addressed) are shared even by a juggler, in the verse 2 that some of them are shared even by an ordinary celestial being, in the verse 3 that some of them are shared even by other sect-founders. In the verse 4 it has been argued that it is possible for a person to get rid of all spiritual defilement whatsoever, in the verse 5 that it is possible for a person to become omniscient. In the verse 6 it is claimed that a Jaina tīrthaṅkara is free from all spiritual defilement and is an omniscient – of which the proof is that his teaching does not come in conflict either with the scriptural texts or with logic. Now leaving aside the question of scriptural texts (for it may be doubted as to which ones are meant) the claim amounts to asserting that the Jaina philosophical teaching conforms to the canons laid down by the science of Logic, and the assertion is significant in its own place. In the verse 7 it is said that the teachings patronized by the non-Jaina traditions are in conflict with the findings of plain experience; this appeal to experience is again significant even if one might at times feel that the Jaina is not being fair in his criticism of an adversary – particularly in case this adversary himself happens to be an empiricist. In the verse 8 it is said that the non-Jaina traditions fail to account for the generally accepted phenomena of the ethico-religious sphere; in a way this criticism is but a corollary of that urged in the verse 7, but it is instructive to note how much attention is paid to ethico-religious matters by an Indian philosopher in his criticism of his rivals.

9-11 Verses

भावैकान्ते पदार्थानामभावानामपह्नवात् ।
सर्वात्मकमनाद्यन्तमस्वरूपमतावकम् ॥९॥

Those of your rivals who attribute to entities the character 'absolute being' while repudiating the reality of all kinds of 'non-being' are forced to conclude that an entity is possessed of the form of every other entity, is beginningless, is endless, and is devoid of a form of its own. (9)

निष्पर्यायद्रव्यैकान्तपक्षे सर्वात्मकत्वादिदोषानुषङ्गः। कुतः पुनर्विशेषान् अपह्नुवीत ?, तत्साधनव्यभिचारात्। संविन्निर्भासभेदात् भावस्वभावभेदः प्रकल्प्यते। स पुनः अभेदेऽप्यात्मनः खण्डशः प्रतिभासनात् तदन्यत्रापि विभ्रमाभावे कोशपानं विधेयम् । तदेकं चक्षुरादि-ज्ञानप्रतिभासभेदवशात् रूपादिव्यपदेशभाक्, ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिवत्। इतरेतराभावविकल्पोऽपि कथमयथार्थो न स्यात् ?, वर्णादिविकल्पवत्। न हि वस्तुव्यतिरिक्तम् असन्नाम, प्रमाण-स्यार्थविषयत्वात् । अभावदृष्टौ हि तदवसानकारणाभावात् भावदर्शनमनवसरं प्राप्नोति । सकलशक्तिविरहलक्षणस्य निरुपाख्यस्य स्वभावकार्यादेरभावात् कुतः तत्प्रमितिः ? वस्तुनानात्वं बुद्ध्यादिकार्यनानात्वात् प्रतीयते। स्वभावाभेदेऽपि विविधकर्मता दृष्टा, युगपत् एकार्थोपनिबद्धदृष्टिविषयक्षणवत्। शक्तिनानात्वे प्रसवविशेषात्। स चेत् व्यभिचारी, कुतः तद्गतिः ? केवलमविद्या स्वभावदेशकालावस्थाभेदान् आत्मनि परत्र वा असतः स्वयमसती मिथ्याव्यवहारपदवीमुपनयति, यतः क्षणभङ्गिनो भिन्नसंततयः स्कन्धा विकल्प्येरन् अन्यथा वेति। प्रतिभासकार्याद्यभेदेऽपि कस्यचिदेकत्वं साधयतीति साध्यसाधनयोरभेदे किं केन कृतं स्यात् ?, पक्षविपक्षादेरभावात्। न क्वचिदसाधना साध्यसिद्धिः, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ॥९॥

कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात् प्रागभावस्य निह्नवे ।
प्रध्वंसस्य च धर्मस्य प्रच्यवेऽनन्ततां व्रजेत् ॥१०॥

If the reality of 'prior non-being' is repudiated a produced entity turns out to be beginningless, if the character 'posterior non-being' is not there the same turns out to be endless. (10)

प्रागभावानभ्युपगमे घटादेरनादित्वप्रसङ्गात् पुरुषव्यापारानर्थक्यं स्यात् । कल्पयित्वापि तदभिव्यक्तिं तस्याः प्रागभावोऽङ्गीकर्तव्यः । तथाहि - सतः शब्दस्य ताल्वादिभिरभिव्यक्तिः

क्रियते, न पुनः शब्द एव, इति स्वरुचिविरचितदर्शनप्रदर्शनमात्रम्। सा यदि श्रवणज्ञानोत्पत्तिः, सैव कथं प्राक् सती यत्नतः कर्तव्या ? योग्यतायां समानश्चर्चः । तदावरणविगमः प्राक् किमभूत् ? भूतौ वा किं यत्नेन ? विशेषाधानमपि तादृगेव, कर्मकर्तृकरणानां प्रागभावाभावात्। न कश्चित् विशेषहेतुः, ताल्वादयो व्यञ्जकाः न पुनश्चक्रादयोऽपीति। न हि व्यञ्जकव्यापृतिर्नियमेन व्यङ्ग्यं सन्निधापयति । नायं दोषः सर्वगतत्वात् वर्णानामित्यपि वार्तम्, अन्यत्रापि तथाभावानुषङ्गात् । इष्टत्वाददोषोऽयम् । न, कारणव्यापारेष्वपि चोद्यानिवृत्तेः । एतेनावस्था प्रत्युक्ता । तद्विशेषैकान्ते तद्वतोऽनुपयोगः, तावतेतिकर्तव्यतास्थानात् । अभेदैकान्ते पूर्ववत् प्रसङ्गः। परिणामेऽप्येष पर्यनुयोगः। तदभिन्नानां क्रमशो वृत्तिर्मा भूत्। भिन्नानां व्यपदेशोऽपि मा भूत्, सम्बन्धासिद्धेरनुपकारकत्वात्। उपकारेऽपि सर्वं समानमनवस्था च। विनाशानभ्युपगमे तस्य किंकृतमश्रवणम् ?, तदा आत्मानमखण्डयतः कस्यचिदावरणत्वायोगात्, आवृतानावृतस्वभावयोरभेदानुपपत्तेः । तयोरभेदे वा शब्दस्य श्रुतिरश्रुतिर्वेत्येकान्तः । तमसाऽपि घटादेरखण्डने पूर्ववत् उपलब्धिः किं न भवितुमर्हति ? स्वसंवित्त्युत्पत्तौ कारणान्तरापेक्षा मा भूत् तत्करणसमर्थस्य । अन्यथा तदसामर्थ्यमखण्डयदकिञ्चित्करं किं सहकारिकारणं स्यात् ? तत्खण्डने वा स्वभावहानिः, अव्यतिरेकात्। व्यतिरेके व्यपदेशानुपपत्तिः, इति पूर्ववत् सर्वम् । वर्णानां व्यापित्वात् नित्यत्वाच्च क्रमश्रुतिरनुपपन्नैव, समानकरणानां तादृशामभिव्यक्तिनियमायोगात् सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वेषां संकुला श्रुतिः स्यात् । वक्तृश्रोतृविज्ञानयोः तत्कारणकार्ययोः क्रमवृत्तिमपेक्ष्य परिणामिनां क्रमोत्पत्तिप्रतिपत्त्योः न किञ्चिद् विरुद्धं पश्यामः । सर्वगतानामेष क्रमो दुष्करः स्यात् । क्षणिकेष्वेव करणाङ्गहारादिषु प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् विरुद्धो हेतुः। तत्क्रियैकत्वेऽपि किमिदानीमनेकं स्यात् ?, सर्ववर्णैकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। शक्यं हि वक्तुम् - अभिव्यञ्जकभेदात् वैश्वरूप्यम्, जलचन्द्रवत् । क्वचित् प्रत्यक्षविरोधे तदन्यत्राप्यविरोधः कुतः ? तदयं ताल्वादिव्यापारजनितश्रावणस्वभावं परित्यज्य विपरीतस्वभावमासादयन्नपि नित्यश्चेन्न किञ्चिदनित्यम् । युगपत् प्रतिनियतदेशमन्द्रतारश्रुतेः कस्यचिदेकत्वे न क्वचिदनेकत्वसिद्धिः । न हि कथञ्चित् क्वचित् प्रत्यवमर्शो न स्यात् वर्णवत् । तच्छेषविशेषबुद्धेरभिव्यञ्जकहेतुत्वप्रक्लृप्तौ सर्वं समञ्जसं प्रेक्षामहे। तदेतेषां पुद्गलानां करणसन्निपातोपनिपाते श्रावणस्वभावः शब्दः पूर्वापरकोटयोरसन् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयको घटाविदवत्। पुद्गलस्वभावत्वे दर्शनविस्तारविक्षेपप्रतिघातकर्णपूरणैकश्रोत्रप्रवेशाद्युपालम्भो गन्धपरमाणुकृतप्रतिविधानतयोपेक्षामर्हति । कर्णशष्कुल्यां कटकटायमानस्य प्रायशः प्रतिघातहेतोर्भवनाद्युपघातिनः शब्दस्य प्रसिद्धिरस्पर्शत्वकल्पनाम् अस्तं गमयति। निश्छिद्रनिर्गमनादयः सूक्ष्मस्वभावत्वात् स्नेहादिस्पर्शादिवत् न विरुध्येरन् । अतो यत्नजनितवर्णाद्यात्मा श्रावणमध्यस्वभावः प्राक् पश्चादपि पुद्गलानां नास्तीति तावानेव ध्वनिपरिणामः । तत्प्राक्प्रध्वंसाभावप्रतिक्षेपे कौटस्थ्यं

क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां स्वाकारज्ञानाद्यर्थक्रियां व्यावर्तयतीति निरुपाख्यमित्यभिप्रायः । तदानुपूर्वीकल्पनां विस्तरेण प्रतिक्षेप्स्यामः ॥१०॥

सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यादन्यापोहव्यतिक्रमे।
अन्यत्र समवाये न व्यपदिश्येत सर्वथा ॥११॥

If the reality of 'mutual non-being' is repudiated an entity turns out to be possessed of the form of every other entity, if an entity resides in what is not its proper locus it can be characterized in no way whatsoever. (11)

Note : Vasunandin reads *anyatra samavāyena for anyatra samavāye na*; on this reading the latter half of the verse should be translated as : "if 'absolute nonbeing' is not there the same (i.e. an entity) can be characterized in an absolutely indiscriminate fashion."

स्वभावान्तरात् स्वभावव्यावृत्तिरन्यापोहः । संविदो ग्राह्याकारात् कथञ्चिद् व्यावृत्तौ अनेकान्तसिद्धिः, अन्यथा सम्बन्धासिद्धिः । अव्यावृत्तौ अन्यतरस्वभावहानेर्न किञ्चित् स्यात्, विषयाकारविकलस्यानुपलब्धेः । संवित्तेः स्वलक्षणप्रत्यक्षवृत्तावपि संवेद्याकार-विवेकस्वभावान्तरानुपलब्धेः स्वभावव्यावृत्तिः । शबलविषयनिर्भासेऽपि परस्परव्यावृत्ति-रभ्युपगमनीया, अन्यथा चित्रप्रतिभासासंभवात् तदन्यतमवत् तदालम्बनस्यापि नीलादेर-भेदस्वभावापत्तेः । तद्वतस्तेभ्यो व्यावृत्तिः, एकानेकस्वभावत्वाद् घटरूपादिवदित्यनु-मानात् । अन्यथा द्रव्यमेव स्यात्, न रूपादयः । स्वभावैकत्वेऽपि निर्भासवैलक्षण्यं करण-सामग्रीभेदमनुविदध्यात्, दूरासन्नैकार्थोपनिबद्धनानादर्शननिर्भासवत् । प्रतिपुरुषं विषयस्वभावभेदो वा, सामग्रीसम्बन्धभेदात् । अन्यथा न केवलं रूपादेरभेदः, कस्यचित् क्रमशः सम्बन्ध्यन्तरोपनिपातोऽपि स्वभावं न भेदयेत्। ततः क्रमवन्त्यपि कार्याणि तत्स्वभावभेदं नानुमापयेयुः । ततो यावन्ति सम्बन्ध्यन्तराणि तावन्तः प्रत्येकं भावस्वभावभेदाः परस्परव्यावृत्ताः । न हि कस्यचित् केनचित् साक्षात् परम्परया वा सम्बन्धो नास्तीति, निरुपाख्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तदेवं प्रतिक्षणमनन्तपर्यायाः प्रत्येकमर्थसार्थाः । क्रमशोऽपि विच्छेदे अर्थक्रियानुपपत्तेः । स्वयमसतः तत्त्वतः क्वचिदुपकारितानुपपत्तेः । स्वकार्यात्मना भवतः प्रतिक्षेपायोगात्, स्वभावान्तरानपेक्षणात् । तस्मादयम् उत्पित्सुरेव विनश्यति, नश्वर एव तिष्ठति, स्थास्नुरेवोत्पद्यते । स्थितिरेवोत्पद्यते, विनाश एव तिष्ठति, उत्पत्तिरेव नश्यति । स्थितिरेव स्थास्यत्युत्पत्स्यते विनङ्क्ष्यति, विनाश एव स्थास्यति उत्पत्स्यते विनङ्क्ष्यति, उत्पत्तिरेवोत्पत्स्यते विनङ्क्ष्यति स्थास्यतीति न कुतश्चिद् उपरमति । भाव एव द्रवति द्रोष्यति अदुद्रुवत् । सत्तैव विशेष्यते द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावात्मना । ततः परस्परव्यावृत्तस्वभावान्

अनन्तगुणपर्यायान् प्रतिक्षणमासादयन्ती सत्तैव तिष्ठतीत्यादि योज्यम् । तथा भेदानेव संद्रवन्तीत्यादि प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अत्यन्ताभावापाकृतौ न क्वचित् किञ्चित् कथञ्चित् न वर्तेत, तथा सर्वं सर्वत्र सर्वथोपलभ्येत । कथं पुनरभावप्रतिपत्तिः ? कथं च न स्यात् ? प्रत्यक्षस्य रूपादिस्वलक्षणविषयत्वात्, प्रमाणान्तरस्यापि स्वकारणविषयत्वात् । असतोऽनुपलब्धेः पर्युदासवृत्त्या वस्तुनि नियमात् । एकस्य कैवल्यमितरस्य वैकल्यमिति ब्रुवन्नपि देवानांप्रियो नावधारयति भावाभावप्रतिपत्तेरभावाभ्युपगमात् । स्वपररूपादिभावाभावलक्षणत्वात् सर्वस्य निःश्रेणीपदबन्धाभ्यामिव भावाभावस्वभावाभ्यां प्रतिबन्धात् न किञ्चित् प्रमाणं सर्वात्मना भावमभावं वा ग्रहीतुमर्हति, अनियमप्रसङ्गात् । भावप्रमेयैकान्तवादिनामभावप्रतिपत्तिर-युक्तिः । अतो न भावनियमप्रतिपत्तिः । तत्प्रमेयतोपसङ्ख्यानं प्रमाणद्वयनियमं विघटयति । भावनैरात्म्यस्य प्रमाणाकारणत्वात् प्रतिबन्धनियमो मा भूत् ॥११॥

Comment on verses 9-11

These three verses can be better understood if they are taken together. Our difficulties in connection with them are two, viz. (i) to determine what is the logic behind Samantabhadra's criticism of the 'doctrine of absolute being', and (ii) to determine who is the alleged proponent of the doctrine in question. The first difficulty is relatively less formidable, for Samantabhadra seems to be clearly arguing that a statement might involve negation in four possible ways while the proponent of the 'doctrine of absolute being' must face four types of undesirable contingencies as a result of his being obliged to deny the possibility of a statement involving negation in any of these four ways. On the other hand, it does not seem to be so easy to identify this proponent of the 'doctrine of absolute being'. Let us tackle our difficulties one by one.

The four possible ways in which a statement might involve negation can be symbolically represented as follows :

(i) x does not possess the property p and can never possess it.

(ii) x does not possess the property p but can possibly possess it.

(iii) x possesses the property p but it did not formerly possess it.

(iv) x does not possess the property p but it formerly possessed it.

Thus, for example, one might say :

(i) This lump of clay does not possess consciousness and can never possess it.

(ii) This lump of clay does not possess jar-hood but can possibly possess it.

(iii) This lump of clay possesses the property jar-hood but it did not formerly possess it.

(iv) This lump of clay does not possess the property jar-hood but it formerly possessed it.

In the technical terminology of Samantabhadra (i) amounts to saying that *x* possesses 'absolute nonbeing' of *p*, (ii) to saying that *x* possesses 'mutual nonbeing' of *p* (rather of a possesser of *p*), (iii) to saying that *x* formerly possessed 'prior nonbeing' of *p* , and (iv) to saying that *x* possessed 'posterior nonbeing' of *p* . Thus Samantabhadra argues that an advocacy of the 'doctrine of absolute being' implies a denial of all these four types of 'nonbeing', a denial which in its turn results in the following absurdities :

(i) Even in case *x* does not possess the property *p* and can never possess it, to say that *x* possesses the property *p* ; e.g. to say about a lump of clay that it is a conscious entity.

(ii) Even in case *x* does not in fact possess the property *p* which it can possibly possess, to say that *x* possesses the property *p* ; e.g. to say about a lump of clay that it is a jar.

(iii) Even in case *x* possesses the property *p* which it did not formerly possess, to say that *x* always possessed the property *p* ; e.g. to say about the lump of clay which is now a jar that it was always a jar.

(iv) Even in case *x* does not possess the property *p* which it formerly possessed, to say that *x* possesses the property *p* ; e.g. to say about the lump of clay which was formerly a jar that it is even now a jar and will always remain a jar.

To generalize and summarize, the first and the second absurdities are each of them tantamount to granting that an entity has got no form of its own as also that an entity has got the form of every other entity, the third absurdity is tantamount to granting that a produced entity is beginningless, while the fourth absurdity is tantamount to granting that a produced entity is endless.

Then comes the question of identifying the proponent of the 'doctrine of absolute being'. No school of Indian empiricism ever taught that a particular phenomenon of our everyday experience is devoid of a form of its own, is beginningless, is endless; for it was only our schools of transcendentalism – ready and eager to repudiate the reality of all empirical phenomena – who could say of their

alleged trans-empirical reality that it is possessed of a single form, is beginningless, is endless. Even the commentators of Samantabhadra who are inclined to put the doctrine in question into the mouth of the Sāṅkhya philosopher are compelled to argue that a consistent upholder of it ought to be the transcendentalist who, while repudiating the reality of all spatio-temporal diversity, declares his alleged trans-empirical reality to be uniform, beginningless and endless. As a matter of fact, both the 'doctrine of absolute being' and the 'doctrine of absolute nonbeing' ought to be attributed to the transcendentalist, the former insofar as he declares his alleged trans-empirical reality to be uniform, beginningless and endless, the latter insofar as he repudiates the reality of all spatio-temporal diversity. But maybe Samantabhadra himself thought that it is the Sāṅkhya philosopher who is guilty of upholding the 'doctrine of absolute being'; in that case we will have to assess the exact import of his criticism of the Sāṅkhya philosopher, an assessment that will have to be kept in mind while following the whole text of Samantabhadra. Samantabhadra's polemics against his rivals may be divided into two groups, one that is directed against the transcendentalist and the other that is directed against the empiricist. In the former group of polemics Samantabhadra is interested in showing how his rival is clearly repudiating the verdict of experience, in the latter group in showing how his rival is playing into the hands of those who clearly repudiate the verdict of experience. A close study of the criticism levelled in the present case by Samantabhadra's commentators against the Sāṅkhya philosopher should enable us to see that this criticism belongs to the second of these groups.

Verse 12

अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भावापह्नववादिनाम् ।
बोधवाक्यं प्रमाणं न केन साधनदूषणम् ॥१२॥

Similarly, those who attribute to entities the character 'absolute nonbeing' while repudiating the reality of 'being' can treat neither a piece of cognition nor an uttered sentence as a case of authentic knowledge; how will then they be able either to establish a thesis or to refute one ? (12)

बहिरन्तश्च परमार्थसत्, तदन्यतरापायेऽपि साधनदूषणप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः, इति प्रकृतार्थ-परिसमाप्तौ किं त्रिलक्षणपरिकल्पनया ? न हि संवृत्या साध्यसाधनव्यवस्था युक्तिमती, शून्यसिद्धेरपरमार्थत्वे पुनरनिराकृतसद्भावस्य सर्वस्याशून्यतानुषङ्गात्। समारोपव्यवच्छेदेऽपि समानम् । हेयोपादेयोपायरहितमयमह्रीकः केवलं विक्रोशति । संवृत्याऽस्तीति स्वरूपेणेत्ययमर्थः। कृतमनुकूलम्, केवलं वक्ता आत्मनो वैयात्यं सूचयति। अथ पररूपेण नास्ति, नाम्नि विवादात् एतदपि तादृगेव। तदेतेनोभयानुभयविकल्पः प्रत्युक्तः। अथ तदस्ति मृषात्मनेति समानश्चर्चः। संवृतिर्विचारानुपपत्तिरित्ययुक्तम्, तदभावात्। तत्परप्रतिपादनार्थं शास्त्रमुपदेष्टारं वा वर्णयन् सर्वं प्रतिक्षिपतीति कथमनुन्मत्तः ? शौद्धोदनेरेव तावत् प्रज्ञापराधोऽयं लोकातिक्रान्तः कथं बभूवेत्यतिविस्मयमास्महे। तन्मन्ये पुनरद्यापि कीर्तयन्तीति किं बत परमन्यत्र मोहनीयप्रकृतेः ? ॥१२॥

Comment on verse 12

This verse presents little difficulty. For in this case the target of criticism is unmistakably the transcendentalist, However, even in this case one might raise two questions, viz. (i) Which particular school of transcendentalism is being attacked here ? (ii) How far is it proper to dub the transcendentalist as an advocate of the 'doctrine of absolute nonbeing' ? To the first question the answer will be that the entire camp of transcendentalism is under fire here inasmuch as this entire camp repudiates the reality of all empirical phenomena. To the second question the answer will be that in the eyes of an empiricist the transcendentalist, simply by virtue of repudiating the reality of all empirical phenomena, becomes an advocate of the 'doctrine of absolute nonbeing', that is, of nihilism pure and simple – this irrespective of how the latter proceeds on to describe the trans-empirical reality substituted for the empirical one. As we shall see, the present criticism has been continued by Samantabhadra in his consideration of the 'doctrine of absolute nondualism' which constitutes 'thesis' in the Section 2.

Verse 13

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥१३॥

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* (i.e. the Jaina doctrine of conditional assertion to be elaborately

described in verses 101 ff.) can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute being' and 'absolute nonbeing') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (13)

भावाभावयोरेकतरप्रतिक्षेपैकान्तपक्षोपक्षिप्तदोषपरिजिहीर्षया सदसदात्मकं सर्वमभ्युपगच्छतोऽपि वाणी विप्रतिषिध्येत, तयोः परस्परपरिहारस्थितिलक्षणत्वात्। न हि सर्वात्मना कश्चिदर्थं सन्तं तथैवासन्तमाचक्षाणः स्वस्थः, स्वाभ्युपेतेतरनिरासविधानकरणात्, शून्यावबोधवत्। त्रैलोक्यं व्यक्तेरपैति, नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधात्। अपेतमप्यस्ति, विनाशप्रतिषेधादिति वा। तदन्यथापेतमन्यथास्तीति स्याद्वादावलम्बनमन्धसर्पबिलप्रवेशन्यायमनुसरति। योऽपि पक्षत्रयोपक्षिप्तदोषजिहासया सर्वथाऽवक्तव्यं तत्त्वमवलम्बेत सोऽपि कथमवक्तव्यं ब्रूयात्? नैष दोषः, 'स्वलक्षणमनिर्देश्यम्' 'प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढम्' इत्यादिवत्। तदप्यसत् यदसतः समुदाहृतम्। यथैवाक्षविषयेऽभिधानं नास्ति तथाक्षज्ञाने विषयो नैवास्ति। ततस्तत्र प्रतिभासमानेऽपि न प्रतिभासेत। न केवलं विषयबलात् दृष्टेरुत्पत्तिः, अपि तु चक्षुरादिशक्तेश्च। तदर्थवत् करणमनुकर्तुमर्हति, न चार्थम्, विशेषाभावात्। दर्शनस्य कारणान्तरसद्भावेऽपि विषयाकारानुकारित्वमेव सुतस्येव पित्राकारानुकरणमित्यपि वार्तम्, स्वोपादानमात्रानुकरणप्रसङ्गात्। उभयाकारानुकरणेऽपि रूपादिवदुपादानस्यापि विषयतापत्तिः, अतिशयाभावात्, वर्णादेर्वा तद्वदविषयत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तज्जन्मरूपाविशेषेऽपि तदध्यवसायनियमात् बहिरर्थविषयत्वमित्यसारम्। दर्शनस्यानध्यवसायात्मकत्वात् अदोषोऽयम्, प्रत्यक्षस्याध्यवसायहेतुत्वात् इत्यनिरूपिताभिधानम्, तत्राभिलापाभावात्। तदभावेऽप्यध्यवसायकल्पनायां प्रत्यक्षं किं नाध्यवस्येत्? यथैव हि प्रत्यक्षस्याभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यता नास्ति तथा तत्समनन्तरभाविनोऽपि विकल्पस्य। तथाहि किञ्चित् केनचित् विशिष्टं गृह्यमाणं विशेषणविशेष्यतत्सम्बन्धव्यवस्थाग्रहणमपेक्षते दण्डिवत्। न चायमियतो व्यापारान् कर्तुं समर्थः, प्रत्यक्षबलोत्पत्तेरविचारकत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षवत्। नैतदेवम्, शब्दार्थविकल्पवासनाप्रभवत्वात् मनोविकल्पस्य ततस्तर्हि कथमक्षबुद्धेः रूपादिविषयत्वनियमः? तदभ्युपगमे वा तदभिलापसंसर्गोऽपि तद्वत् अनुमीयेत। तस्मादयं किञ्चित् पश्यन् तत्सदृशं पूर्वं दृष्टं न स्मर्तुमर्हति, तन्नामविशेषास्मरणात्। तदस्मरन्नैव तदभिधानं प्रतिपद्यते। तदप्रतिपत्तौ तेन तन्न योजयति। तदयोजयन् नाध्यवस्यतीति न क्वचिद् विकल्पः शब्दो वेत्यविकल्पाभिधानं जगत् स्यात्। तथा हि बहिरन्तर्वा गृहीतमप्यगृहीतकल्पं

क्षणक्षयस्वलक्षणसंवेदनादिवत् । तथा चायातमचेतनत्वं जगतः । सहस्मृतिरयुक्तैव, तन्नामाक्षरमात्राणामपि क्रमशोऽध्यवसानात् । अन्यथा संकुला प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । नाम्नो नामान्तरेण विनापि स्मृतौ केवलार्थव्यवसायः किं न स्यात् ? तन्नामान्तरपरिकल्पनायामनवस्था । तदयमशब्दं सामान्यं व्यवस्यन् स्वलक्षणमपि व्यवस्येत्, भेदाभावात् । सामान्यवत् स्वलक्षणमध्यवस्यन् अभिलापेन योजयेत् । ततो न किञ्चित् प्रमेयमनभिलाप्यं नाम । प्रत्यक्षस्यानभिलाप्यत्वे स्मार्तं शब्दानुयोजनं दृष्टसामान्यव्यवसायो यद्यपेक्षेत सोऽर्थो व्यवहितो भवेत् । तदिन्द्रियज्ञानात् सामान्यव्यवसायो न स्यात्, प्रागिवाजनकत्वात् । तदन्तरेणापि दर्शनम् 'अयं गौः' इति निर्णयः स्यात् । अनभिलाप्यस्य विशेषस्यानुभवे कथमभिलाप्यस्य स्मृतिः ?, अत्यन्तभेदात् । शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धस्यास्वाभाविकत्वे कथमर्थमात्रं पश्यन् शब्दमनुस्मरेत् तदर्थं वा ?, यतोऽयं व्यवसायः । चक्षुरादिज्ञानस्य कथञ्चिद् व्यवसायात्मकत्वाभावे दृष्टसजातीयस्मृतिर्न स्यात्, दानहिंसाविरतिचेतसः स्वर्गादिफलजननसामर्थ्यसंवेदनवत् क्षणक्षयानुभवनवत् वा । प्रत्यक्षेऽभिलापसंसर्गविच्छेदे कुतः तद्विकल्पाभिलापसंयोजनं यतः सामान्यमभिलाप्यं स्यात् । न च ग्राहकप्रत्यक्षस्मृतिप्रतिभासभेदात् विषयस्वभावाभेदाभावः, सकृत् एकार्थोपनिबद्धदर्शनप्रत्यासन्नेतरपुरुषज्ञानविषयवत् । तथा च मन्दप्रतिभासिनि तत्सङ्केतव्यवहारनियमकल्पनायामपि कथञ्चिदभिधेयत्वं वस्तुनः सिद्धम् । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन । तस्मादवाच्यतैकान्ते यदवाच्यमित्यभिधानं तदसमञ्जसम्, स्वलक्षणमनिर्देश्यमित्यादिवत् स्ववचनविरोधात् ॥१३॥

Comment on verse 13

This verse – repeated ten times (i.e. once in each section) – is not of much intrinsic importance. But it does throw some indirect light on two typical notions of Jaina philosophy. For by criticizing the 'doctrine of both absolute being and absolute nonbeing' Samantabhadra is suggesting that in any controversy the Jaina synthesis of a thesis and an antithesis is not mere mechanical juxtaposition of this thesis and this antithesis; and by criticizing the 'doctrine of absolute indescribability' he is suggesting that the Jaina characterizes an empirical phenomenon as indescribable in no more than a rather technical sense.

14-16 Verses

कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं कथञ्चिद् असदेव तत् ।
तथोभयमवाच्यं च नययोगान्न सर्वथा ॥१४॥

On your showing, on the other hand, an entity is somehow possessed of the character 'being', somehow

possessed of the character 'nonbeing', somehow possessed of both, while it is somehow indescribable – all these four features characterizing it in accordance with the speaker's intention (alternatively, in accordance with the conditions of assertion) and not in an absolute fashion. (14)

न अवग्रहेहादेरन्योन्यम्, स्वलक्षणविवेकैकान्ते जीवान्तरवत् स्वात्मन्यपि सन्तानभेदप्रसङ्गात् । अहमहमिकयाऽऽत्मा विवर्तान् अनुभवन् अनादिनिधनः स्वलक्षणप्रत्यक्षः सर्वलोकानां क्वचित् चित्रवित्तिक्षणे नीलादिविशेषनिर्भासवत् आत्मभूतान् परस्परतो विविक्तान् सहक्रमभाविनो गुणपर्यायान् आत्मसात्कुर्वन् सन्नेव । तदेकत्वाभावे नीलादिविशेषनियतदर्शननानासन्तानसंवेदनक्षणवत् चित्रसंवेदनं न स्यात् । तथा क्रमवृत्तीनां सुखादीनां मतिश्रुतादीनां वा तादात्म्यविगमैकान्ते सन्ततिरनेकपुरुषवत् । नैरन्तर्यादेरविशेषात् सन्तानव्यतिकरोऽपि किं न स्यात् ? न हि नियामकः कश्चिद् विशेषः अन्यत्राभेदपरिणामात् । असंकरे हर्षविषादादिचित्रप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् । यथैकत्र समनन्तरावग्रहादिसदादिस्वभावसंकरपरिणामः तथैव सर्वत्र चेतनाचेतनेषु संप्रत्यतीतानागतेषु, तत्स्वभावाविच्छित्तेः। अतः कथञ्चित् सदेवेष्टम् । न केवलं जीवाजीवप्रभेदाः सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्तिलक्षणाः, किन्तु बुद्धिक्षणेऽपि क्वचित् ग्राह्यग्राहकयोः सितादिनिर्भासांशपरमाणुसंवित्तयोऽपि, परस्परपरिहारस्थितिलक्षणत्वात्, अन्यथा स्थूलशबलावलोकनाभावात् तदेकांशवत् । तथा च सकलचेतनेतरक्षणपरिणामलवविशेषाः परस्परविविक्तात्मानः । तदन्योन्याभावमात्रं जगत् । अन्यथा सर्वथैकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, अन्वयस्य विशेषापेक्षणादभावो वा । तदिष्टमसदेव कथञ्चित् । न हि भावाभावैकान्तयोः निष्पर्यायमङ्गीकरणं युक्तम्, यथैवास्ति तथैव नास्तीति विप्रतिषेधात् । कथञ्चित् सदसदात्मकं द्रव्यपर्यायनयापेक्षया, विपर्यये तथैवासंभवात् । सर्वथा जात्यन्तरकल्पनायां वा तदंशनिबन्धनविशेषप्रतिपत्तेरत्यन्ताभावप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वथोभयरूपत्वे वा जात्यन्तरप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् तथा चानवस्थादिदोषानुषङ्गः । तदिष्टं स्यादुभयम् । सद्भावेतराभ्यामनभिलाप्ये वस्तुनः केवलं मूकत्वं जगतः स्यात्, विधिप्रतिषेधव्यवहारायोगात् । न हि सर्वात्मना अनभिलाप्यस्वभावं बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति । न चानध्यवसेयं प्रमितं नाम, गृहीतस्यापि तादृशस्यागृहीतकल्पत्वात् मूर्छाचैतन्यवत् । सर्वात्मना अभिधेयत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षेतराविशेषप्रसङ्गात् । तथानभिधेयत्वेऽपि सत्येतरयोरभेदः स्यात् । स्वपक्षविपक्षयोस्तत्त्वातत्त्वप्रदर्शनाय यत्किञ्चित् प्रणयन् वस्तु सर्वथानभिधेयं प्रतिजानातीति किमप्येतत् महाद्भुतम् । तत्कृतां वस्तुसिद्धिमुपजीवति, न च तद्वाच्यतां चेति स्वदृष्टिरागमात्रम्, अनवस्थानुषङ्गात् ॥१४॥

सदेव सर्वं को नेच्छेत् स्वरूपादिचतुष्टयात् ।
असदेव विपर्यासान्न चेन्न व्यवतिष्ठते ॥१५॥

Certainly, who will not allow that an entity is possessed of the character 'being' so far as its own form etc. (i.e. form, place, time, root-substance) are concerned while it is possessed of the character 'nonbeing' so far as opposite is the case (i.e. so far as the form etc. of the remaining entities are concerned) ? For if that be not so this entity will not be being viewed as having a fixed nature of its own. (15)

स्यात् सदसदात्मकाः पदार्थाः सर्वस्य सर्वाकरणात् । न हि पटादयो घटादिवत् क्षीराद्याहरणलक्षणामर्थक्रियां कुर्वन्ति घटादिज्ञानं वा । तदुभयात्मनि दृष्टान्तः सुलभः । शाब्देतरप्रत्यययोः एकवस्तुविषययोः एकात्मसमवेतयोः कारणविशेषवशात् परिवृत्तात्मनोः स्वभावभेदेऽपि कथञ्चिदेकत्वम् अस्त्येव, विच्छेदानुपलब्धेः । उपादानस्य कार्यकालमात्मानं कथञ्चिदनयतः चिरतरनिवृत्ताविव अविशेषात् कार्योत्पत्तावपि व्यपदेशानुपपत्तेः तादृशां स्वरूपैकत्वम् अस्त्येव, विशेषापेक्षया तु नास्त्येव । न हि पौरस्त्यः पाश्चात्यः स्वभावः पाश्चात्यो वा पौरस्त्यः निरपेक्षः । तत्र क्रमोऽपि प्रतिभासविशेषवशात् प्रकल्प्येत तदेकत्वादक्रमः किं न स्यात् ? तदेकमनेकाकारम् अक्रमक्रमात्मकम् अन्वयव्यतिरेकरूपं सामान्यविशेषात्मकं सदसत्परिणामं स्थित्युत्पत्तिविनाशात्मकं स्वप्रदेशनियतं स्वशरीरव्यापिनं त्रिकालगोचरम् आत्मानं परं वा कथञ्चित् साक्षात्करोति परोक्षयति वा केशादिविवेकव्यामुग्धबुद्धिवत् । तादृशैकचैतन्यं सुखादिभेदं वस्तु स्वतोऽन्यतः सजातीयविजातीयात् विविक्तलक्षणं बिभर्ति । अन्यथा अनवस्थानात् क्वचित् कथञ्चित् अनियमः स्यात् ॥१५॥

क्रमार्पितद्वयाद् द्वैतं सहावाच्यमशक्तितः ।
अवक्तव्योत्तराः शेषास्त्रयो भङ्गाः स्वहेतुतः ॥१६॥

Again, an entity is possessed of the characters 'being' as well as 'nonbeing' insofar as these are proposed to be asserted successively, while it is indescribable insofar as they are proposed to be asserted simultaneously – this latter being an impossible proposition. Lastly, three more forms of assertion – each made possible by its specific circumstance – arise when an entity is held out to be possessed of the character 'being' as also to be indescriba-

ble, when it is held out to be possessed of the character 'nonbeing' as also to be indescribable, when it is held out to be possessed of the characters 'being' as well as 'nonbeing' as also to be indescribable.

स्वपररूपाद्यपेक्षं सदसदात्मकं वस्तु, न विपर्यासेन, तथादर्शनात् । कल्पयित्वापि तज्जन्मरूपाध्यवसायान् स्वानुपलम्भव्यावृत्तिलक्षणं दर्शनं प्रमाणयितव्यम् । तथाहि - बुद्धिरियं यया प्रत्यासत्त्या कस्यचिदेवाकारमनुकरोति तया तमेवार्थं नियमेनोपलभेत, नान्यथा पारम्पर्यपरिश्रमं परिहरेत्। त्रिलक्षणस्यापि विभ्रमहेतुफलविज्ञानैर्व्यभिचारात्। तदनभ्युपगमे स्वाभ्युपगमासिद्धेः किंसाधनः परमुपालभेत ? तदेकोपलम्भनियमः स्वपरलक्षणाभ्यां भावाभावात्मनं प्रसाधयति । तदभावे न प्रवर्तेत नापि निवर्तेत प्रमाणान्तरवत् । निष्पर्यायं भावाभावौ अभिधानं नाञ्जसैव विषयीकरोति, शब्दशक्तिस्वाभाव्यात्। वचनसूचनसामर्थ्य-विशेषानतिलङ्घनात्। सङ्केतानुविधानेऽपि कर्तृकर्मणोः शक्त्यशक्त्योः अन्यतरव्यपदेशार्ह-त्वात्, अयोदारुवज्रलेखनवत् । अन्यथा अचाक्षुषत्वादयः शब्दादिधर्मा न भवेयुः । अतो यावन्ति पररूपाणि तावन्त्येव प्रत्यात्मं स्वभावान्तराणि, तथा परिणामात् । द्रव्यपर्यायौ व्यस्तसमस्तौ समाश्रित्य चरमभङ्गत्रयव्यवस्थानम् । न खलु सर्वात्मना सामान्यं वाच्यम्, तत्प्रतिपत्तेरर्थक्रियां प्रत्यनुपयोगात् । न हि गोत्वं वाहदोहादौ उपयुज्यते । लक्षितलक्षणया वृत्तिः कथञ्चिदतादात्म्ये न भवेत्, सम्बन्धान्तरासिद्धेः कार्मुकादिवत्। तादृशोऽनुपलम्भात् सङ्केतोऽपि न सिद्ध्येत् । सतापि तादृशान्यव्यावृत्त्यात्मना भवितव्यम्, अन्यथा विशेषवत् स्वभावहानिप्रसङ्गात् विशेषाणां वा तद्वत् ततो व्यावृत्तेः । न चान्यापोहः सर्वथार्थः शब्दस्य विकल्पस्य वा । साधनवचनेन नित्यत्वसमारोपव्यवच्छेदे स्वलक्षणस्यानित्यत्वासिद्धौ साधनवचनानर्थक्यात्। विकल्पाभिधानयोर्वस्तुसंस्पर्शाभावे स्वलक्षणदर्शनस्याकृतनिर्णयस्य वस्तुसन्निधेरविशेषात् किं केन प्रमितं स्यात् ? न हि मिथ्याध्यवसायेन तत्त्वव्यवस्थापनम् । वस्तुदर्शनसमारोपव्यवच्छेदयोः अन्यतरस्यापि स्वतस्तत्त्वापरिनिष्ठितौ इतरेतराश्रयदोषः । समयादर्शिनोऽपि क्वचित् अन्वयबुद्ध्यभिधानव्यवहारोऽतत्कार्यकारणव्यतिरेकव्यवस्थायां गुडूच्याद्युदाहरणप्रक्लृप्तिं विपर्यासयति ॥१६॥

Comment on verses 14-16

These three verses taken together give a fairly clear idea of the Jaina position on the question of being and nonbeing; (the forthcoming verses 17-23 simply elucidate this very idea and hardly bring to the fore any new one that is of basic importance). In these verses Samantabhara offers the precise Jaina definition of four most fundamental ontological notions, viz.

'being', 'nonbeing', 'both being and nonbeing', 'indescribable'. Thus we are told that the Jaina seeks to understand an empirical phenomenon in terms of its four coordinates, viz. its form, its root-substance, its place of occurrence, its time of occurrence. Here the concept 'root-substance' needs a special clarification and as follows. According to the Jaina the world of root-substances is divided into two broad groups, viz. (i) numerous physical atoms which are not further divisible but which can combine to form bigger composite bodies, and (ii) numerous individual souls which are neither further divisible nor capable of combining to form bigger composite units. [For the sake of convenience the composite physical bodies might be called 'composite substances' to be contradistinguished from atoms that are being called 'root-substances (of the physical type)'. In theory, every particular empirical phenomenon is describable as a particular conglomeration of certain root-substances each of which is found to manifest a particular form at a particular place and a particular time; but in practice it is described as a particular composite substance found to manifest a particular form at a particular place and a particular time. This explains why the distinction between a root-substance and a composite substance is often obliterated in practice, but it has to be kept in mind in the interest of theoretical clarification.] Now Samantabhadra tells us that an empirical phenomenon is describable as 'being' insofar as it is of the nature of a particular root-substance manifesting a particular form at a particular place and a particular time, while the same is describable as 'nonbeing' insofar as it is not of the nature of another particular root-substance, or of a root-substance manifesting another particular form, or of one manifesting a form at another particular place, or of one manifesting a form at another particular time. This statement is most crucial for a correct estimate of the Jaina position on the question; for it makes it crystal-clear that the Jaina does not describe a phenomenon as 'being' in exactly the same respect in which he describes it as 'nonbeing'. A minor – though in some sense quite crucial – point of clarification has been supplied in the form of the distinction drawn between the character called 'both being and nonbeing' and the one called 'indescribable (=not both being and nonbeing)'. Thus the Jaina will describe a phenomenon as 'indescribable' only in the sense that it is impossible to simultaneousely describe it as both 'being' and 'nonbeing'; on the other hand, he will describe it as 'both being and nonbeing' in the sense that it is possible to describe it first as 'being' and then as 'nonbeing'. Lastly, Samantabhadra tells us that the Jaina will describe an empirical phenomenon not only as 'being', 'nonbeing',

'both being and nonbeing' and 'indescribable' but also as 'being and indescribable', 'nonbeing and indescribable' and 'both being and nonbeing and indescribable'. It is easy to see what he means even if what he means is not of any vital significance.

17-18 Verses

अस्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि।

विशेषणत्वात् साधर्म्यं यथा भेदविवक्षया ॥१७॥

In the body of one and the same entity (-possessed-of-attributes) the character 'being' is invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'nonbeing'), the reason for it being that 'being' is a qualifier ; this is just as in the body of one and the same probans the (noticed) character 'presence-in-homologues' is found to be invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'absence-in-a-heterologue') as soon as the speaker intends to bring to light the dissimilarity obtaining between this probans and certain other objects (viz. its heterologues). (17)

सर्वमित्थमनित्थं वेति प्रतिज्ञायाभिप्रेत्य वा प्रमेयत्वादिहेतूपादानेऽपि व्यतिरेकोऽस्त्येव, प्रमेयत्वस्य वस्तुधर्मत्वात्। खपुष्पादयोऽपि तत्र व्यवहारमिच्छंता प्रमेयाः प्रतिपत्तव्या इति न किञ्चित् प्रमाणम्, प्रमेयाभावस्यापि तथाभावानुषङ्गेणाव्यवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। न चैतद् विरुद्धम्, स्वलक्षणमनिर्देश्यमित्यादिवत्। दर्शने स्वाकारमनर्पयतां स्वभावकार्यप्रतिबन्धाभावे प्रमेयत्वं प्रमाणान्तरमवश्यमाकर्षति। ततो विप्रतिषिद्धमेतत्। न च स्वलक्षणमेवान्यापोहः, सर्वथा विधिनियमयोरेकतानत्वासंभवात्। तत्स्वभावभेदाभावे च सङ्केतविशेषानुपपत्तेरभिधान-प्रत्ययविशेषोऽपि मा भूत्, तदन्यतरवत्। ततो यावन्ति पररूपाणि प्रत्येकं तावन्तस्ततः परावृत्तिलक्षणाः स्वभावभेदाः प्रतिक्षणं प्रत्येतव्याः। यदि सम्बन्ध्यन्तराणि भावस्वभाव-भेदकानि न स्युः तदा नित्यत्वेऽपि कस्यचित् सम्बन्ध्यन्तरेषु कादाचित्केषु क्रमशोऽर्थक्रिया न वै विप्रतिषिध्येत। शक्यं हि वक्तुम् - क्रमवर्तीनि कारणानि तत्तन्निर्वर्तनात्मकानि इति नित्यं स्वभावं न वै जहाति, क्षणिकसामग्रीसन्निपतितैकतमवत्। तदेतत् तदा तत्तत् कर्तुं समर्थमेकं स्वभावमविचलितं बिभ्राणं सहकारिकारणानि स्वभावस्याभेदकानि नानाकार्यनिबन्धनानि कादाचित्कानि प्रतीक्षते इति। तदिमेऽर्था विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां संप्रतिबद्धा न प्रतिबन्धमतिवर्तन्ते वस्तुत एव। ततो न संवृतिः तद्व्यहाराय भेदमावृत्य तिष्ठतीति युक्तम्। तदनेकस्वभावाभावे विनिर्भासासंभवात् आत्मनि परत्र चासंभविनमाकारमादर्शयतीति मुग्धयाते, सर्वत्रा-

सहायरूपानुपलब्धेः । तदियं संवृतिः सामान्यसामानाधिकरण्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावादि-व्यवहारनिर्भासान् बिभ्रती स्वयमनेकरूपतां प्रतिक्षिपन्तं व्यवस्थापयति। तद्वत् भावान्तराणाम-नेकान्तात्मकत्वे वास्तवी साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यादिस्थितिरविशेषेण विकल्पबुद्धेर्मिथ्यात्वं प्रतिजानन्तं प्रतिक्षिपत्येव । यत् पुनरेतत् अन्यतो व्यावृत्तिरनात्मिकैवेति तन्न, चक्षुरादिज्ञानस्य निर्व्यवसायात्मकस्य स्वयमभूताविशेषात्, निर्णयस्य भावस्वभावासंस्पर्शिनः सर्वथा वस्तुतत्त्वापरिच्छेदात् इदमित्थमेवेति स्वयमेकान्तानुपपत्तेः । अतोऽयं भावः स्वभावभेदान् विधिप्रतिषेधविषयान् बिभ्राणः प्रत्यक्षेतरप्रमाणसमधिगतलक्षणः प्रतीयेत । तस्मात् यत् विशेषणं तत् प्रतिषेध्याविनाभावि क्वचित् धर्मिणि, यथा साधर्म्यं भेदविवक्षया कृतकत्वादौ, विशेषणं चास्तित्वम्, ततः प्रतिषेध्यधर्मप्रतिबन्धि ॥१७॥

नास्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि ।
विशेषणत्वाद् वैधर्म्यं यथाऽभेदविवक्षया ॥१८॥

Likewise, in the body of one and the same entity (-possessed-of-attributes) the character 'nonbeing' is invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'being'), the reason for it being that 'nonbeing' is a qualifier ; this is just as in the body of one and the same probans the (noticed) character 'absence-in-a-heterologue' is found to be invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'presence-in-homologues') as soon as the speaker intends to bring to light the similarity obtaining between this probans and certain other objects (viz. its homologues). (18)

भेदाभेदविवक्षयोरवस्तुनिबन्धनत्वे विपर्यासोऽपि किं न स्यात् ? ततः समञ्जसमेतत् - यत् किञ्चित् विशेषणं तत् सर्वमेकत्र प्रतिपक्षधर्माविनाभावि, यथा वैधर्म्यभेदविवक्षया हेतौ, तथा च नास्तित्वं विशेषणम्, अन्यथा व्यवहारसंकरप्रसङ्गात् । न हि स्वेच्छाप्रक्लृप्तधर्म-धर्मिव्यवस्थायां परमार्थावतारः स्यात् । तदसमीक्षिततत्त्वार्थैः लोकप्रतीतिवशात् भेदाभेद-व्यवस्थितिः तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तये समाश्रीयते इति बालाभिलापकल्पम्, भावस्वभावो-परोधात् ॥१८॥

Comment on Verses 17-18

In these verses Samantabhadra employs two illustrations with a view to demonstrating how an entity can be described as 'being' and also as 'nonbeing'. The verse 17 tells us how 'being' quâ the character

of an entity implies 'nonbeing', the verse 18 how 'nonbeing' quâ the character of an entity implies 'being'; the conclusion ought to be that the two characters are "equivalent" (in the terminology of modern logic).[1] This should explain why there is virtually no difference between the empiricist Buddhist's position that 'nonbeing' is not a character over and above 'being' and the Jaina's position that 'being' and 'nonbeing' are two such characters as imply each other. Samantabhadra's illustrations point in the same direction. For he argues that 'being' quâ the character of an entity implies 'nonbeing' just as 'presence-in homologues' quâ the character of a probans implies 'absence-in-a-heterologue'; similarly, he argues that 'nonbeing' quâ the character of an entity implies 'being' just as 'absence-in-a-heterologue' quâ the character of a probans implies 'presence-in-homologues'. Now the students of Logic know that when precisely formulated the two characters in question of a probans turn out to be equivalent. At any rate, these verses should make it further clear that the Jaina's ascription of both 'being' and 'nonbeing' to an entity is not a case of self-contradiction.

Verse 19

विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा विशेष्यः शब्दगोचरः ।
साध्यधर्मो यथा हेतुरहेतुश्चाप्यपेक्षया ॥१९॥

Whatever is a qualificand amenable to verbal utterance is possessed of the characters 'being' as well as 'nonbeing' (lit. is capable of being posited as well as negated), just as an attribute belonging to the locus-of-probandum will be a probans or not a probans depending on conditions (i.e. depending on what happens to be the probandum in a particular case). (19)

किञ्चित् केनचित् विशिष्टं गृह्यमाणं विशेषणविशेष्यतत्सम्बन्धलोकस्थितिसंकलनेन गृह्येत नान्यथेत्यभिनिवेशोऽपि वस्तुनो विधिप्रतिषेधस्वभावयोः प्रत्येकं दर्शनमवश्यंभावि । ततो विधिप्रतिषेधौ आत्मानौ विशेषस्य सविकल्पकत्वं साधयतः । ततः सामान्यविशेषात्मकं

1. As a matter of fact, the characters 'being' and 'nonbeing' here spoken of are equivalent in an even more intimate sense. For if the former of these be represented as 'being x' the latter will be represented as 'not being not-x', and it is easy to see that 'being x' and 'not being not-x' are well-nigh equivalent even in the ordinary sense of the term.

वस्तु स्वलक्षणम् । अस्तित्वनास्तित्वयोर्धर्मी सामान्यम् । तत्र तादात्म्यलक्षणः सम्बन्धः, सम्बन्धान्तरकल्पनायामनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। तन्नैतत् सारम् - जात्यादिमताम् एतन्न संभवत्येवेति, तदभावे एवासंभवात् । तथा सति नैकान्तेन दर्शनविकल्पाभिधानानां विषयभेदोऽस्ति, कथञ्चित् प्रतिभासभेदेऽपि प्रत्यासन्नेतरपुरुषदर्शनवत् । तथा हि - धूमादयः कृतकत्वादयो वा क्वचित् अग्निसलिलयोर्विनाशेतरयोर्वा साधनेतरस्वभावाभ्यां साक्षात्क्रियेरन्, इतरथा विशेष्यप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् । अनपेक्षायां तु विरोधः । तस्मात् यत् अभिधेयं तत् विशेष्यम्, यत् वा विशेष्यं तत् अभिलाप्यम्, यत् वा वस्तु तत् सर्वं विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मकम्, यथोत्पत्त्यादिः। अपेक्षया हेतुरहेतुश्च साध्येतरयोः, तथा च विमत्यधिकरणं सत्त्वाभिधेयत्वादि ॥१९॥

Comment on verse 19

In this verse Samantabhadra employs another illustration with a view to demonstrating how an entity can be described as 'both being and nonbeing'; (it is immaterial whether he is said to be demonstrating how an entity is 'both being and nonbeing' or to be demonstrating how it is both 'being' and 'nonbeing'). Samantabhadra says that the same entity is 'being' in one respect and 'nonbeing' in another just as the same character might be a proper probans in relation to one probandum and not a proper probans in relation to another, an argument which should further convince the reader that the Jaina involves himself in no self-contradiction by describing an entity as 'both being and nonbeing'.

Verse 20

शेषभङ्गाश्च नेतव्या यथोक्तनययोगतः ।
न च कश्चिद् विरोधोऽस्ति मुनीन्द्र ! तव शासने ॥२०॥

The remaining forms of assertion (out of the seven formulated earlier) are to be understood in the same manner as those described just before; O Lord of Sages ! there certainly is no self-contradiction in the doctrine taught by you. (20)

स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्तीति भङ्गद्वयमुपयुक्तम् । तदपेक्षया शेषत्वं भङ्गत्रयापेक्षं वा । **यथोक्तनययोगत** इति विशेषणत्वादीनाक्षिपति । तदनभिलाप्यादयोऽपि क्वचित् धर्मिणि प्रत्यनीकस्वभावाविनाभाविनः प्रतीयन्ते, विशेषणत्वादिभ्यः । पूर्वोक्तमुदाहरणम् । न चैवं सति किञ्चित् विप्रतिषिद्धम्, अन्यथैव विरोधात् ॥२०॥

Comment on verse 20

In this verse Samantabhadra expects the reader to formulate for himself the rest of the seven forms of assertion accepted in the Jaina tradition; (on one interpretation of the verse 19 Samantabhadra has explicitly formulated three of these forms, on another interpretation just two of them). He also makes bold proclamation that Jaina position on the question involves no self-contradiction.

Verse 21

एवं विधिनिषेधाभ्यामनवस्थितमर्थकृत् ।

नेति चेन्न यथा कार्यं बहिरन्तरुपाधिभिः ॥२१॥

Thus that entity is alone capable of performing a function which is neither exclusively possessed of the character 'being' nor exclusively possessed of the character 'nonbeing'; for otherwise it will be impossible for a well-known cause to produce the effect concerned depending on the appropriate intrinsic and extrinsic factors (alternatively, it will be impossible for a well-known cause to produce the effect concerned which it in fact does quâ the possesser of certain intrinsic and extrinsic features). (21)

Note : Vasunandin reads *yathākāryaṁ* for *yathā kāryaṁ*, but the reading will give no different meaning.

सप्तभङ्गीविधौ स्याद्वादे विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां समारूढं वस्तु सदसदात्मकमर्थक्रियाकारि, कथञ्चित् सत एव सामग्रीसन्निपातिनः स्वभावातिशयोत्पत्तेः सुवर्णस्येव केयूरादिसंस्थानम् । **नेति चेदि**त्यादिना एकान्तेऽर्थक्रियां प्रतिक्षिपति । न तावत् सतः पुनरुत्पत्तिरस्ति । न चानुत्पन्नस्य स्थितिविपत्ती, खपुष्पवत् । नाप्यसतः सर्वथोत्पत्त्यादयः, तद्वत् । यदि पुनः सामग्र्याः प्रागविद्यमानस्य जन्म स्यात् को दोषः स्यात् ? तस्या निरन्वयविनाशे निष्कारणस्य तथैवोत्पत्तिर्न स्यात् । न हि निराधारा उत्पत्तिर्विपत्तिर्वा, क्रियारूपत्वात्, स्थितिवत् । नैतत् मन्तव्यम् 'नोत्पत्त्यादिः क्रिया, क्षणिकस्य तदसंभवात्, ततोऽसिद्धो हेतुः' इति, प्रत्यक्षादि-विरोधात् । प्रादुर्भावादिमतः चक्षुरादिबुद्धौ प्रतिभासनात् । अन्यथा तद्विशिष्टविकल्पोऽपि मा भूत् । न हि दण्डपुरुषसम्बन्धादर्शने दण्डीति विकल्पः स्यात् । तस्मात् सूक्तम् 'यदेकान्तेन सदसद्वा तन्नोत्पत्तुमर्हति, व्योमवन्ध्यासुतवत्' इति । कथमिदानीमनुत्पन्नस्य गगनादेः स्थिति-रिति चेत्, न, अनभ्युपगमात् । द्रव्यनयापेक्षया परप्रसिद्ध्या वा उदाहरणम् ॥२१॥

Comment on verse 21

In this verse Samantabhadra claims that the phenomenon of causation remains unexplained both on accepting the doctrine of absolute being and on accepting the doctrine of absolute nonbeing. Now the very fact that the reality of the phenomenon of causation was deliberately repudiated by the transcendentalists and by them alone should lead us to expect that neither the doctrine of absolute being nor the doctrine of absolute nonbeing is to be attributed to an empiricist school. Let us however wait till Samantabhadra explicitly charges an empiricist school with tending to repudiate the reality of the phenomenon of causation – and with consequent playing into the hands of the transcendentalists.

Verse 22

धर्मे धर्मेऽन्य एवार्थो धर्मिणोऽनन्तधर्मणः ।

अङ्गित्वेऽन्यतमान्तस्य शेषान्तानां तदङ्गता ॥२२॥

Thus the pointing out of each new attribute in an entity serves a new purpose; for when in an entity possessed of innumerable attributes one particular attribute is treated as primary the remaining ones become secondary. (22)

Note : Vasunandin says that an alternative reading for *dharme dharme'nya evārthaḥ* is *bhaṅge bhaṅge'nya evārthaḥ*; on this new reading the translation should be: "Thus each new form of assertion serves a new purpose; for when etc."

यदि पुनः प्रत्युपाधि परमार्थतः स्वभावभेदो न स्यात् तदा दृष्टेऽभिहिते वा प्रमाणान्तर-मुक्त्यन्तरं वा निरर्थकं स्यात्, गृहीतग्रहणात् पुनरुक्तेश्च स्वभावातिशयाभावात्। सदुत्पत्ति-कृतकत्वादेः प्रत्यनीकस्वभावविशेषाभावात् यावन्ति पररूपाणि तावन्त्यः ततस्ततो व्यावृत्तयः प्रत्येकमित्येषापि कल्पना मा भूत् । सतां हि स्वभावानां गुणप्रधानभावः स्यात् । ततः परिकल्पितव्यावृत्त्या धर्मान्तरव्यवस्थापनं परिफल्गुप्रायम्, वस्तुस्वभावाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तथेन्द्रियबुद्ध्योऽपि स्वलक्षणविषया मा भूवन्, केवलं व्यावृत्तिं पश्येयुः, अदृष्टे विकल्पायोगात् अतिप्रसङ्गात् च ॥२२॥

Comment on verse 22

In this verse Samantabhadra seems to be answering the charge of redundancy that might be levelled against the Jaina doctrine of 'seven

forms of assertion.' Now so far as the first three 'forms of assertion' are concerned the defence can be well made but the same is not true of the remaining four forms. For certainly it is one thing to be told that an entity is of such and such a description, another thing to be told that it is not of such and such a description, and a third thing to be told that it is of such and such a description and not of such and such other description. But the forms of assertion attributing 'indescribability' to the entity described seem to serve no vital purpose and are on the whole technical.

Verse 23

एकानेकविकल्पादावुत्तरत्रापि योजयेत् ।

प्रक्रियां भङ्गिनीमेनां नयैर्नयविशारदः ॥२३॥

While following our subsequent treatment of the contrasted characters – e.g. the characters 'one' and 'many' – one well-versed in the doctrine of *naya* (i.e. the Jaina doctrine of conditional assertion) should himself apply the technique of multi-formed assertion by offering suitable arguments. (23)

स्यादेकं सद्द्रव्यनयापेक्षया। यद्यपि ते विशेषाः परस्परव्यावृत्तपरिणामाः कालादिभेदेऽपि सद्रूपाविशिष्टाः, चित्रज्ञाननीलादिनिर्भासवत् । स्यादनेकत्वमास्कन्दन्ति । न हि सङ्ख्या-सङ्ख्यावतोर्भेदेनादृष्टौ विशेषणविशेष्यविकल्पः कुण्डलिवत् क्षीरोदकवत् अतद्भेदिनि । न च भेदैकान्ते तद्वत्ता अस्ति, व्यपदेशनिमित्ताभावात् अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् च । तस्मादयं कथञ्चिदेव सङ्ख्यासङ्ख्यावतोः स्वभावभेदं पश्यति, तद्विशिष्टविकल्पनात्, क्वचित् निर्णयेऽपि अन्यत्र संशयात् वर्णरसादिवत् इति ॥२३॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां प्रथमः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on verse 23

In this verse Samantabhadra tells his reader that in the subsequent sections of his text he will show how different pairs of mutually contradictory characters are to be attributed to an entity but that he will not explicitly apply to his findings the doctrine of seven forms of assertion. This is a welcome revelation, for now the reader can expect Samantabhadra to concentrate his attention on points that are of really material importance. As for the task of explicitly applying to Samantabhadra's findings the doctrine of seven forms of assertion, it is rather mechanical and can be performed by an average reader for himself.

SECTION II
ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS

24-27 Verses

अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते।
कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वस्मात् प्रजायते ।।२४।।

If one maintains that things are possessed of the character 'absolute non-duality', then too one would be contradicting the observed distinction between an act and the various factors-of-action connected with this act (in their capacity as the doer, object, instrument etc. of this act); for certainly, a thing cannot be produced out of itself. (24)

अथ द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

सदाद्येकान्तेषु दोषोद्भावनमभिहितम् । अद्वैतैकान्ताभ्युपगमात् न तावता अनेकान्तसिद्धिरिति चेत्, न, प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात्। न हि कस्यचिदभ्युपगममात्रं प्रमाणसिद्धं क्रियाकारकभेदं प्रतिरुणद्धि, क्षणिकाभ्युपगमवत्। न स्वतो जायते परतो वा। अपि तु जायते एवेति सुषुप्तायते, प्रतिपत्त्युपायाभावात् । तस्मात् यत् दृष्टविरुद्धं तत् न समञ्जसम्, यथा नैरात्म्यम्। विरुद्धचये च तथैव अद्वैतं क्रियाकारकभेदप्रत्यक्षादिभिः ।।२४।।

कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं च नो भवेत्।
विद्याऽविद्याद्वयं न स्याद् बन्धमोक्षद्वयं तथा ।।२५।।

(On maintaining the position in question) there will be no duality of the types of act (in the form of good and evil types), no duality of the types of fruit yielded by an act (in the form of happy and unhappy types), no duality of the planes of existence (in the form of this world and the world beyond), no duality of knowledge and ignorance, no duality of bondage and liberation (*mokṣa*). (25)

प्रमाणप्रत्यनीकं स्वमनीषिकाभिरद्वैतमन्यद्वा किञ्चित् फलमुद्दिश्यारचयेत्, अन्यथा तत्प्रति प्रवर्तनायोगात् प्रेक्षावृत्तेः । तथाहि पुण्यपापसुखदुःखेहपरलोकविद्येतरबन्धमोक्ष-विशेषरहितं प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिरनाश्रयणीयम् । यथा नैरात्म्यदर्शनं तथा च प्रस्तुतम् ॥२५॥

हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद् द्वैतं स्याद्धेतुसाध्ययोः ।
हेतुना चेद् विना सिद्धिर्द्वैतं वाङ्मात्रतो न किम् ॥२६॥

If the doctrine of nondualism is established with the help of a probans there ought to be there the duality of probans and probandum; if the doctrine is established without the help of a probans why the (rival) doctrine of dualism should not be established through a mere movement of lips (alternatively, on the mere authority of scriptural texts) ? (26)

यदसिद्धं तत् न हितेप्सुभिरहितजिहासुभिर्वा प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । यथा शून्यतैकान्तः तथा चासिद्धमद्वैतम् । अत्र नासिद्धो हेतुः । तत्सिद्धिर्यदि साधनात्, साध्यसाधनयोस्तर्हि द्वैतं स्यात् । अन्यथा अद्वैतसिद्धिवत् द्वैतसिद्धिः कथं न स्यात् ? स्वाभिलापमात्रादर्थसिद्धौ सर्वं सर्वस्य सिद्धयेत् ॥२६॥

अद्वैतं न विना द्वैतादहेतुरिव हेतुना ।
संज्ञिनः प्रतिषेधो न प्रतिषेध्याद् ऋते क्वचित् ॥२७॥

There can be no non-dualism without dualism being already there, just as there can be no pseudo-probans without a probans being already there; certainly, the denial of a word-denoted entity never makes sense except when the entity sought to be denied is a real something. (27)

'अद्वैत' शब्दः स्वाभिधेयप्रत्यनीकपरमार्थापेक्षः, नञ्पूर्वाखण्डपदत्वात्, अहेत्वभिधानवत्, इत्यनुमानात् । नात्र किञ्चित् अतिप्रसज्यते, तादृशो नञो वस्तुप्रतिषेधनिबन्धनत्वात् । सर्वत्र प्रतिषेध्यात् ऋते संज्ञिनः प्रतिषेधाभावः प्रत्येतव्यः ॥२७॥

Comment on verses 24-27

These verses should be read together, for they constitute Samantabhadra's most exhaustive criticism against the transcendentalist; (the same criticism in a germ form was levelled in the verse 12 dealing with the 'doctrine of absolute nonbeing' while partly at least it was levelled

also in verses 9-11 dealing with the 'doctrine of absolute being'). The crux of the doctrine of absolute nondualism lies in maintaining that some one trans-empirical reality – call it *śūnya, vijñāna, brahman* or whatever you like – is alone real while the diversity exhibited by the empirical world existing in space-time is but an illusory appearance. Against this doctrine Samantabhadra chiefly urges two difficulties, one (expressed in the verse 24) that on its acceptance the phenomenon of causation becomes an impossibility, the other (expressd in the verse 26) that on its acceptance the phenomenon of inferential cognition becomes an impossibility; in other words, Samantabhadra feels that the doctrine is incompatible with an empirical ontology and all logic whatsover. And certainly there can be no worse condemnation of a philosophical position. However, the criticism urged by Samantabhadra against the doctrine in question in the verse 25 is more rhetorical than material while the one urged in the verse 27 is even fallacious. To take the verse 25, the problem of virtue and sin, that of worldly bondage and liberation, that of this world and the world beyond are but so many cases of the problem of empirical causation, a problem basic to all treatment of empirical ontology; similarly, the problem of knowledge and ignorance is basic to all treatment of logic. To take the verse 27, it is difficult to follow Samantabhadra when he in effect argues : "Nondualism cannot be a reality unless dualism is, because 'dualism' is a word, just as pseudo-probans cannot be a reality unless probans is (because 'probans' is a word)"; let us however wait till Samantabhadra develops an analogous argument at a later stage (to be precise, in verses 84-85).

Verses 28-31

इष्टमद्वैतैकान्तापवारणम्, पृथक्त्वैकान्ताङ्गीकरणात्, इति माऽवदीधरत् ॥

पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि पृथक्त्वादपृथक् तु तौ ।
पृथक्त्वे न पृथक्त्वं स्यादनेकस्थो ह्यसौ गुणः ॥२८॥

On the other hand, if one maintains that things are possessed of the character 'absolute separateness', then there arises the following difficulty. Two things (sought to be declared separate) ought to be non-separate from separateness itself (which will be an undesirable contingency for one who is out to repudiate all non-separateness). Certainly, if separateness is separate from

the things in question it should not be genuine separateness which is conceived as a quality residing in more than one object (and hence nonseparate from the objects acting as its seat). (28)

Note : Vasunandin reads *apṛthakkṛtau* for *apṛthak tu tau,* but the reading will give no different meaning.

पृथग्भूतपदार्थेभ्यः पृथक्त्वस्य पृथग्भावे तेषामपृथक्त्वप्रसङ्गात्। तद्गुणगुणिनोरतादात्म्ये घटपटवत् व्यपदेशोऽपि मा भूत्, सम्बन्धनिबन्धनान्तराभावात्। पृथक्त्वमन्यद्वा पृथग्भूतमनंशमनेकस्थेषु निष्पर्यायं वर्तते इति दुरवगाहम् ॥२८॥

सन्तानः समुदायश्च साधर्म्यं च निरङ्कुशः ।
प्रेत्यभावश्च तत् सर्वं न स्यादेकत्वनिह्नवे ॥२९॥

If the reality of oneness (as characterizing many things) is repudiated one cannot legitimately speak of the phenomena – all genuine without a shadow of doubt – like series (of successive entities), aggregate (of simultaneous entities), similarity (between any two entities), re-birth. (29)

कार्यकारणयोः पृथक्त्वैकान्ते कार्यकालमात्मानमनयतः कारणत्वासंभवात् तदनुत्पत्तेः कुतः सन्ततिः ? पूर्वापरकालभाविनोरपि हेतुफलव्यपदेशभाजोः अतिशयात्मनोः अन्वयः सन्तानः । क्वचित् क्षणान्तरे नीललोहितादिनिर्भासचित्रैकसंवेदनवत् कथञ्चित् एकत्वमेव भवितुमर्हति । तदवयवपृथक्त्वकल्पनायां चित्रनिर्भासो मा भूत्, पृथग्वर्णान्तरविषयानेकसन्तानैकक्षणवत् । तत्र प्रत्यासत्तिविशेषः कथञ्चिदैक्यात् कोऽपरः स्यात् ? अन्यथा वेद्यवेदकाकारयोरपि पृथक्त्वैकान्तप्रसङ्गात् । स्वभावभेदेऽपि सहोपलम्भनियमात् कथञ्चिदभेदाभ्युपगमे कथमेकसन्तानसंविदां समनन्तरोपलम्भनियमात् कथञ्चिदैक्यं न स्यात् ? तत्र यया प्रत्यासत्त्या सन्तानः समुदायश्च तयैव कथञ्चिदैक्यमस्तु । न हि तादृशां साधर्म्यम् अन्यत् अन्यत्रात्मसाङ्कर्यात् । एकज्ञाननिर्भासविशेषाणां मिथः स्वभावभेदेऽपि यथैकत्वपरिणामः स्वभावतोऽनङ्कुशः तथा प्रेत्यभावादिषु सन्तानोऽन्वयः परमार्थैकत्वमात्मसत्त्वजीवादिव्यपदेशभाजनं स्वभावभेदानाक्रम्य स्वामिवदनन्यत्र वर्तयति ॥२९॥

सदात्मना च भिन्नं चेज्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाद् द्विधाऽप्यसत् ।
ज्ञानाभावे कथं ज्ञेयं बहिरन्तश्च ते द्विषाम् ॥३०॥

If cognition does not share with the thing cognized even the universal character 'being', both cognition and the thing cognized turn out to be something nonentitative. Certainly, in the absence of cognition how can our opponent speak of the thing cognized – whether external or internal ? (30)

विषयिणो विषयात् कथञ्चित् स्वभावभेदेऽपि सदाद्यात्मना तादात्म्यं बोधाकारस्येव विषयाकारात्, विशेषाभावात्। अन्यथा ज्ञानमवस्तु एव खपुष्पवत्। तदभावे बहिरन्तर्वा ज्ञेयमेव न स्यात्, तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥३०॥

सामान्यार्था गिरोऽन्येषां विशेषो नाभिलप्यते।

सामान्याभावतस्तेषां मृषैव सकला गिरः ॥३१॥

Certain other people are of the view that words denote universal characters without possessing the capacity to describe a real particular object (distinguished by its own specific characters); and since they (on the other hand) declare the universal characters to be something nonentitative they are forced to conclude that all verbal utterance whatsoever is a falsity. (31)

विशेषाणामशक्यसमयत्वात्, असंकेतितानभिधानात्, विशेषदर्शनवत् तद्बुद्धौ अप्रतिभासनात्, अर्थसन्निधानानपेक्षणाच्च स्वलक्षणमनभिधेयम्। सामान्यमवस्तु उच्यते इति वस्तु नोच्यते इति स्यात्। ततः किं शब्दोच्चारणेन सङ्केतेन वा ? 'गो'शब्दोऽपि गां नाभिधत्ते यथा 'अश्व'शब्दः। तथा च वस्तुनोऽनभिधाने मौनं यत्किञ्चिद्वा वचनमाचरेत्, विशेषाभावात्। अथास्ति विशेषः, कथं स्वार्थं नाभिदधीत ? न वै परमार्थैकतानत्वात् अभिधाननियमः किन्तु उपादानविशेषात् इत्यपि वार्तम्, अविकल्पेऽपि तथैव प्रसङ्गात्। तदेवमवधारितात्मकं वस्तु स्वलक्षणमापनीपद्येत। नावश्यमिन्द्रियज्ञानमर्थसन्निधानमपेक्षते, विप्लवाभावप्रसङ्गात्। नापि विशदात्मकमेव, दूरेऽपि तथा प्रतिभासप्रसङ्गात्, यथाऽऽरात्। क्षणभङ्गादिसाधनवचनमन्यद्वा न किञ्चित् सत्यं स्यात्, वक्त्रभिप्रेतमात्रसूचितत्वात्, प्रधानेश्वरादिसाधनवाक्यवत्। सदर्थाप्रतिपादनाद्वा न क्षणभङ्गादिसाधनवचनं विपक्षदूषणवचनं वा सत्यम्, प्रसिद्धालीकवचनवत्। दृश्यविकल्प्यार्थाकारयोः कथञ्चिदप्यतादात्म्ये स्वलक्षणं सर्वथानवधारितलक्षणं दानादिचेतोधर्मादिक्षणवत् कथं संशीतिमतिवर्तेत ?, विकल्पानां चावधास्नुविषयत्वात्। सोऽयमविकल्पेतरराश्योः अर्थेतरविषयत्वमन्यद्वा स्वांशमात्रा-

वलम्बिना विकल्पान्तरेण प्रत्येतीति सुपरिबोधप्रज्ञो देवानांप्रियः । स्वत एव विकल्पसंविदां निर्णये स्वलक्षणविषयोऽपि विकल्पः स्यात् । परतश्चेत्, अनवस्थानात् अप्रतिपत्तिः । अतोऽर्थविकल्पोऽपि मा भूत् इत्यन्धकल्पं जगत् स्यात् । न चायं परोक्षबुद्धिवादमतिशेते । स्वयमनिर्णीतेन नामात्मना बुद्धिरर्थं व्यवस्थापयतीति सुव्यवस्थितं तत्त्वम् । न वै स्वरूपं पररूपं वा बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति, निर्विषयत्वात् भ्रान्तेः । इदमतो भ्रान्ततरम्, बहिरन्तश्च सद्भावासिद्धेः । स्वपरस्वभावप्रतिपत्तिशून्येन स्वपरपक्षसाधनदूषणव्यवस्थां प्रत्येतीति किमपि महाद्भुतम् ॥३१॥

Comment on verses 28-31

These verses containing Samantabhadra's criticism of the doctrine of absolute separateness are important because they are unmistakably directed against two prominent schools of Indian empiricism. To be more concrete, the verse 28 is directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika empiricist, verses 29-31 against the Buddhist empiricist. Let us take them one by one.

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology a quality and the substance in which it resides are two different entities while separateness is one among the 24 qualities here posited. Against this position Samantabhadra argues that since a quality cannot be absolutely different from the substance in which it resides and since separateness is regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a quality of two (mutually separate) substances separateness cannot be absolutely different from these two substances – the implication being that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is forced to give up the doctrine of absolute separateness when he attempts to account for the relationship obtaining between separateness on the one hand and the substances that are separate on the other. A simplified version of Samantabhadra's present criticism against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika will be that a quality – be it separateness or any other – cannot be absolutely different from the substance of which it is the quality. And then an impartial reader should note that the very same fact which the Jaina recognizes by saying that a quality is not absolutely different from the substance of which it is the quality is recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by saying that a quality resides by *samavāya*-relation in the substance of which it is the quality – so that the difference between the two positions virtually amounts to choosing two different terminologies to express one and the same fact.

The verse 29 summarily narrates Samantabhadra's four most telling criticisms against the Buddhist empiricist, the first three pertaining to ontology, the fourth to ethics. Thus he argues that the

Buddhist fails to account for (i) the fact of certain empirical phenomena exhibiting a serial order, (ii) the fact of certain empirical phenomena forming a composite whole, (iii) the fact of certain empirical phenomena exhibiting mutual similarity, and (iv) the fact of transmigration. An impartial reader will however find that each of these four facts is recognized by the Buddhist empiricist even if his explanation of it is couched in a terminology different from that resorted to by the Jaina. The following is how the Buddhist empiricist and the Jaina polemicized against each other. The Jaina says that certain empirical phenomena, even while mutually different, are also somehow mutually one – either quâ the modes of the same substance or quâ the component-parts of the same composite whole or quâ mutually similar. The Buddhist empiricist thinks that the Jaina is contradicting himself when he says that the empirical phenomena in question are mutually different as also mutually one; he, therefore, comes out with the suggestion that these phenomena, even while mutually different, are called one. The Jaina on his part thinks that by talking thus the Buddhist empiricist is repudiating the veracity of all verbal usage on man's part; he, therefore, argues against the latter's position in the manner of Samantabhadra. In passing let us note that the Jaina's or the Buddhist empiricist's position on the question of transmigration is but a corollary of his position on the general question of 'serial order' or 'substance-hood.' In the verse 30 Samantabhadra draws an inconvenient conclusion from the Buddhist empiricist's alleged position on the question of similarity. Samantabhadra presumes that the Buddhist will deny all similarity between any two empirical phenomena; this means – so proceeds on Samantabhadra – that the latter will deny that a piece of knowledge and its object are similar insofar as both are real, and that in its turn will mean that in the latter's eyes knowledge is not a real phenomenon. But then Samantabhadra asks how one who repudiates the reality of all knowledge whatsover can vindicate the reality of anything whatsover – everything whatsover being a possible object of knowledge. It is difficult to see what Samantabhadra is driving at. In the verse 31 we find Samantabhadra spelling out his basic criticism against the Buddhist – viz. that the latter's understanding of the facts under consideration amounts to repudiating the veracity of all verbal usage on man's part. In the subsequent parts of his discussion Samantabhadra will further elaborate his criticism of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist positions on the questions of ontology.

Verse 32

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ।।३२।।

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute non-duality' and 'absolute separateness') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (32)

अस्तित्वनास्तित्वैकत्वानेकत्ववत् पृथक्त्वेतरपरस्परप्रत्यनीकस्वभावद्वयसंभवोऽपि मा भूत्, विप्रतिषेधात्। न खलु सर्वात्मना विरुद्धधर्माध्यासोऽस्ति, तदन्योन्यविधि-प्रतिषेधलक्षणत्वात्, वन्ध्यासुतवत्। सर्वथानभिलाप्यतत्त्वाधिगमेऽपि यदेतदनभिलाप्यं तत्त्वमिति तत् व्याहन्यते, पूर्ववत् ।।३२।।

Comment on verse 32

This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first.

verses 33-36

अनपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ह्यवस्तु द्वयहेतुतः।
तदेवैक्यं पृथक्त्वं च स्वभेदैः साधनं यथा ।।३३।।

Oneness and separateness as unrelated to each other are both something fictitious on account of the two sets of considerations (that have already been offered). As a matter of fact, one and the same phenomenon is characterized by both oneness and separateness just as one and the same probans is characterized by a number of essential features (enumerated by the logicians). (33)

Note : The 'essential features of a probans' here meant are (i) presence in the locus-of-probandum, (ii) presence in homologues, and (iii) absence in a heterologue.

एकत्वपृथक्त्वे नैकान्ततः स्तः, प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात्, इति स्पष्टयति। पृथक्त्वैकत्वे तथाभूते न स्ताम्, एकत्वपृथक्त्वरहितत्वात्, व्योमकुसुमादिवत्। सापेक्षत्वे हि तदेवैक्यं

पृथक्त्वमित्यविरुद्धम्, सपक्षविपक्षयोर्भावाभावाभ्याम् साधनवत्, स्वभेदैर्वा संवेदनवत्, स्वारम्भकावयवैर्वा घटादिवत्। तादृशं हि साधनं स्वार्थक्रियायाः। तदन्तरेणापि पाठान्तरमिदं बहु संगृहीतं भवति ॥३३॥

सत्सामान्यात् तु सर्वैक्यं पृथग्द्रव्यादिभेदतः ।

भेदाभेदविवक्षायामसाधारणहेतुवत् ॥३४॥

All the phenomena of the world are one with each other insofar as they all share the universal character 'being' while they are separate from each other insofar as each of them has got its own root-substance etc. (i.e. its own root-substance, place, time, form); this is just as the speaker sometimes intends to emphasize the identity of an effect with its appropriate cause while sometimes he intends to emphasize their mutual difference (alternatively, this is just as the speaker sometimes intends to emphasize the oneness of a valid probans while sometimes he intends to emphasize its numerous essential features). (34)

Note : *Pṛthagdravyādibhedataḥ* might also mean 'they are separate from each other insofar as they share the universal characters substance-hood etc. (i.e. substance-hood, quality-hood etc.)

कश्चिदाह - सर्वार्थानां समानपरिणामेऽपि कथमैक्यम् ?, भेदानां स्वभावसाङ्कर्यानुपपत्तेः। यथैकभेदस्य स्वभावविच्छेदाभावात्। अन्यथैकं सदन्यदसत् स्यात्। ततः समञ्जसं सर्वमेकं सदविशेषादिति। तस्यैव सतो द्रव्यादिभेदात् पृथक्त्वम्, उदाहरणं पूर्ववत् ॥३४॥

विवक्षा चाविवक्षा च विशेष्येऽनन्तधर्मिणि ।

सतो विशेषणस्यात्र नासतस्तैस्तदर्थिभिः ॥३५॥

It is only in the case of the existing qualifications – and not the nonexisting ones – of a qualificand-possessed-of-innumerable-attributes that those who are so desirous (that is, who are desirous of emphasizing this qualification rather than that) intend to speak of this qualification and not to speak of that. (35)

विधिप्रतिषेधधर्माणां सतामेव विवक्षेतराभ्यां योगस्तदर्थिभिः क्रियेत, अन्यथा

अर्थनिष्पत्तेरभावात् । उपचारमात्रं तु स्यात् । न चाग्निर्माणवक इत्युपचारात् पाकादौ उपयुज्यते । तदेकैकशः परस्परव्यावृत्तयोऽपि परिणामविशेषाः ॥३५॥

प्रमाणगोचरौ सन्तौ भेदाभेदौ न संवृती ।
तावेकत्राविरुद्धौ ते गुणमुख्यविवक्षया ॥३६॥

Difference and non-difference that are taken cognizance of by the authentic sources of knowledge are verily real and no mere appearances. On your showing, they coexist in one and the same body without coming in conflict with each other while they become primary or secondary depending on the speaker's intention.

प्रमाणम् अविसंवादि ज्ञानम्, अनधिगतार्थाधिगमलक्षणत्वात् । तदेवं सति भेदमभेदं वा नान्योन्यरहितं विषयीकरोति प्रमाणम् । न हि बहिरन्तर्वा स्वलक्षणं सामान्यलक्षणं वा तथैवोपलभामहे यथैकान्तवादिभिराम्नायते, सूक्ष्मस्थूलाकाराणां स्थूलसूक्ष्मस्वभावव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यक्षादौ अप्रतिभासनात् । तत्र स्वभावान्तरस्य प्राधान्यविवक्षायामाकारान्तरस्य गुणभावः स्यात्, घटोऽयं परमाणवो रूपादयो वेति ॥३६॥

॥ इति आप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on verses 33-36

In these verses Samantabhadra offers a positive formulation of the Jaina position on the question of identity and difference. His aim is to show (i) how certain phenomena constitute the different modes of the same substance, (ii) how certain phenomena constitute the different component-parts of the same compsite whole, (iii) how certain mutually different phenomena are also mutually similar. And he feels that in none of these three cases is a proper demonstration possible unless the phenomena concerned are treated as somehow mutually different and somehow mutually identical; he further feels that in his explanation of each of these cases the transcendentalist is blind to the aspect of difference, the empiricist Buddhist to that of identity. However, it is very necessary for an impartial reader to distinguish between the nature of the Jaina's dissatisfaction with the transcendentalist and that of his dissatisfaction with the empiricist Buddhist. For the transcendentalist is interested in explaining away the facts under consideration while the empiricist Buddhist in offering in connection with them an alternative explanation to that acceptable to a Jaina – nay,

in offering virtually the same explanation as is acceptable to a Jaina but one that is couched in a different terminology. Thus the world of empirical happenings is viewed by the Jaina in the form of numerous (physical and psychical) root-substances each of which assumes a new mode each moment, a mode which is more or less similar to the past and future modes of its own proper root-substance and to the past, present and future modes of the remaining root-substances; the same is viewed by the empiricist Buddhist in the form of numerous (physical and psychical) events (Skt. *svalakṣaṇas*) each of which is replaced by a new event each moment, a new event which is more or less similar to the remaining events – past, present, future. The Jaina's world-picture has to face the difficulties that arise from an insistence on speaking in the language of unchanging substances and their momentary modes, the empiricist Buddhist's world-picture has to face difficulties that arise from an insistence on speaking in the language of momentary events (without an unchanging substratum of any sort). But it will be misleading to suggest that they differ from each other as fundamentally as either of them does from the transcendentalist's world-picture. Let us however wait till Samantabhadra pointedly raises the problem of identity and change, that of the formation of a composite whole out of its component-parts, that of similarity.

SECTION III

PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE

37-40 Verses

नित्यत्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि विक्रिया नोपपद्यते।
प्रागेव कारकाभावः क्व प्रमाणं क्व तत्फलम् ।।३७।।

If one maintains that the things are possessed of the character 'absolute permanence', then too one cannot account for the process of transformation. And when there is already an absence (i.e. an impossibility) of agentship, how can one thing be treated as an authentic source of knowledge and another thing the result yielded by this source ? (37)

अथ तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

सदसदेकत्वपृथक्त्वैकान्तप्रतिषेधानन्तरं नित्यत्वैकान्तप्रतिक्षेपः । पूर्वापरस्वभाव-परिहारावाप्तिलक्षणाम् अर्थक्रियां कौटस्थ्येऽपि ब्रुवाणः कथमनुन्मत्तः ?, कारकज्ञापक-हेतुव्यापारासंभवात्, परिणामविवर्तधर्मावस्थाविकाराणां स्वभावपर्यायत्वात् । तदेतद् विनाशोत्पत्तिनिवारणम् अबुद्धिपूर्वकम्, प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात्, क्षणिकैकान्तवत् ।।३७।।

प्रमाणकारकैर्व्यक्तं व्यक्तं चेदिन्द्रियार्थवत् ।
ते च नित्ये विकार्यं किं साधोस्ते शासनाद् बहिः ।।३८।।

It might be maintained that an authentic source of knowledge or an agent reveals the *vyakta* (lit. manifest – meaning the manifest phenomena allegedly the products of a root-substance called *prakṛti* which is therefore alternatively designated *avyakta* or non-manifest) just as a sense-organ does its object and that this source of knowledge and this agent are both something permanent. But what thing can be treated as capable of undergoing

a transformation on the showing of those who have not embraced the doctrine taught by you ? (38)

Note : An authentic source of knowledge reveals an entity in the sense of bringing it to light, an agent reveals it in the sense of bringing it into existence. In a way, a sense-organ revealing its object is itself a case of an authentic source of knowledge revealing an entity. Yaśovijaya is very emphatic that the reading *pramāṇakārakair vyaktam* should be replaced by *pramāṇakārakavyaktaṁ;* the replacement ensures a verbal facility but does not affect meaning.

अथ मतम् - प्रमाणकारकाणि व्यवस्थितमेव भावं व्यञ्जयन्ति चक्षुरादिवत् स्वार्थम्, ततो न किञ्चित् विप्रतिषिद्धम्। विषयविशेषविज्ञानादेः शाश्वतत्वात् न किञ्चित् व्यक्त्यर्थं पश्यामः। कथञ्चित् अपूर्वोत्पत्तौ तदेकान्तविरोधात्। तदभावे विकार्यानुपपत्तेः। न वै किञ्चित् विरुद्धम्, कार्यकारणभावाभ्युपगमात्, इत्यनालोचितसिद्धान्तम् ॥३८॥

यदि सत् सर्वथा कार्यं पुंवन्नोत्पत्तुमर्हति।
परिणामप्रक्लृप्तिश्च नित्यत्वैकान्तबाधिनी ॥३९॥

If an effect is something absolutely existent it cannot be a produced entity – just as *puruṣa,* i.e. soul (on the Sāṅkhya philosopher's showing) is not. On the other hand, to posit the possibility of a thing undergoing transformation goes counter to the thesis that things are possessed of the character 'absolute permanence'. (39)

न तावत् सतः कार्यत्वं चैतन्यवत्। नाप्यसतः, सिद्धान्तविरोधात्, गगनकुसुमादिवत्। नापरम् एकान्तप्रकारान्तरमस्ति, विवर्तादिः पूर्वोत्तरस्वभावप्रध्वंसोत्पत्तिलक्षणत्वात्। तदेतत् त्रैलोक्यं व्यक्तेरपैति नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधात्, अपेतमप्यस्ति विनाशप्रतिषेधात्, इति अनेकान्तोक्तिः अन्धसर्पबिलप्रवेशन्यायमनुसरति ॥३९॥

पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात् प्रेत्यभावः फलं कुतः।
बन्धमोक्षौ च तेषां न येषां त्वं नासि नायकः ॥४०॥

Those who do not accept your (spiritual) leadership are incapable of accounting for the virtuous and sinful acts, for re-birth, for the fruits of the acts performed, for worldly bondage and liberation (*mokṣa*). (40)

नैतत् प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिराश्रयणीयम्, पुण्यपापप्रेत्यभावबन्धमोक्षविकल्परहितत्वात्, नैरात्म्यादिवत्। न चैतत् क्वचित् एकान्ते संभवति ॥४०॥

Comment on verses 37-40

These verses contain Samantabhadra's criticism of the doctrine of absolute permanence. The difficulty is that he has chosen Sāṅkhya to be the representative rival system in this connection. For as a matter of fact, the Sāṅkhya can be said to be an upholder of the doctrine of absolute permanence only insofar as his view of the psychical phenomena is concerned; as for the physical phenomena the Sāṅkhya position is not much different from that of the Jaina himself, the only significant difference between the two being that the former views the world of physical phenomena as the series of modifications undergone by one permanent root-substance called *prakṛti* while the latter views it as the series of modifications undergone by numerous permanent root-substances called atoms. Samantabhadra seems to be aware of the anomaly of his present criticism, but he submits that the Sāṅkhya's attempt to do justice to the aspect of change (exhibited by the world of physical phenomena) is inconsistent with the latter's advocacy of absolute permanence. The submission is unfair to the Sāṅkhya whose only fault seems to be his using a language that tends to suggest as if an effect lies hidden in its cause in a ready-made form. In any case, Samantabhadra's disagreement with the Sāṅkhya should be treated as an inner-family disagreement between two empiricists. The verses 37-39 pertain to ontological and epistemological matters, the verse 40 to the ethical ones.

Verses 41-54

क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि प्रेत्यभावाद्यसम्भवः ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यभावान्न कार्यारम्भः कुतः फलम् ॥४१॥

If one maintains that things are possessed of the character 'absolute momentariness', then too re-birth etc. remain an impossibility. Certainly, in the absence of the phenomena like recognition etc. how can there be the production of an effect and (consequently) how can there be the reaping of fruits of the acts performed ? (41)

क्षणक्षयैकान्तदर्शनम् अहितम्, असंभवत्प्रेत्यभावादित्वात्, उच्छेदैकान्तवत् ध्रौव्यैकान्ताभ्युपगमवत् वा। भिन्नकालक्षणानाम् असंभवद्वासनत्वात् अकार्यकारणवत्।

न विनष्टं कारणम्, असत्त्वात्, चिरतरातीतवत्। समनन्तरत्वेऽपि अभावाविशेषात्। न च पूर्वस्योत्तरं कार्यम्, तदसत्येव हि भावात्, वस्त्वन्तरवत् अतिक्रान्ततमवत् वा। न हि समर्थेऽस्मिन् सति स्वयमनुत्पित्सोः पश्चात् भवतः तत्कार्यत्वं समनन्तरत्वं वा नित्यवत्। कारणाभावाविशेषेऽपि कार्योत्पत्तिसमयनियमावक्लृप्तौ कस्यचित् कौटस्थ्येऽपि तत्करण-समर्थसद्भावाभेदेऽपि कार्यजन्मनः कालनियमः किं न स्यात् ?, विशेषाभावात्। तथा च आकस्मिकत्वं स्यात्। उभयत्राविशेषेण कथञ्चिदनुपयोगेऽपि क्वचित् व्यपदेशकल्पनायाम् अन्यत्रापि किं न भवेत् ? क्षणस्थितिः एकोऽपि भावः अनेकस्वभावः, चित्रकार्यत्वात्, नानार्थवत्। न हि कारणशक्तिभेदमन्तरेण कार्यनानात्वं युक्तम्, रूपादिज्ञानवत्। अन्यथा रूपादेर्नानात्वं न सिद्ध्येत्, चक्षुरादिसामग्रीभेदात् तज्ज्ञाननिर्भासभेदः अवकल्प्येत। युगपदेकार्थोपनिबद्धदृष्टीनामपि भवितव्यमेव प्रतिभासभेदेन, कारणसामग्रीभेदात्। अन्यथा दर्शनभेदोऽपि मा भूत्, प्रत्यासन्नेतरयोर्वैशद्येतरनिर्भासोपलब्धेः। सेयमुभयतः पाशारज्जुः। सकृत् कारणस्वभावभेदमन्तरेण यदि कार्यनानात्वम्, क्रमशोऽपि कस्यचित् अपेक्षित-सहकारिणः कार्यसन्ततिः किं न स्यात् ? सहकारिणः तद्धेतुस्वभावमभेदयन्तोऽपि कार्य-भेदहेतवः स्युः क्षणक्षयवत्। न हि कादाचित्कानि तत् तत् कर्तुं समर्थानीति स्थिरोऽर्थः तत्करणस्वभावं जहाति, तद्बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वाभावात्, क्षणिकसामग्रीसन्निपतितैककारणान्तर-वत्। कल्पयित्वापि स्वहेतुप्रकृतिं भावानां स्वप्रकृतिरवश्यमन्वेष्या, तत्स्वभाववशात् तत्कारणप्रकृतिव्यवस्थापनात्। तदयमकारणोऽपि स्वभावनियतोऽर्थः स्यात्। यत् यत् भावं प्रति अनपेक्षं तत् तद्भावनियतम्। यथा विनाशं प्रति अनपेक्षं विनश्वरं तथैव स्थितिं प्रति अनपेक्षं स्थास्नु। तद्धेतोरकिञ्चित्करत्वात् तद्व्यतिरिक्ताव्यतिरिक्ताकारणात् इत्यादि सर्वं समानम्। आदौ स्थितिदर्शनात् शब्दविद्युत्प्रदीपादेः अन्तेऽपि स्थितेरनुमानं युक्तम्। अन्यथा अन्ते क्षयदर्शनात् आदौ तत्प्रतिपत्तिः असमञ्जसैव। तादृशः कारणादर्शनेऽपि कथञ्चि-दुपादानानुमानवत् तत्कार्यसन्तानस्थितिः अदृष्टाऽपि अनुमीयेत। तस्मात् कथञ्चन स्थितिमतः प्रतिक्षणं विवर्तोऽपि नान्यथा। प्रभवादेरयोगात् कुतः प्रेत्यभावादिः ? सत्यपि हेतुफलभावेऽ-कारणकार्यान्तरवत् सन्ततिर्न स्यात्, अतादात्म्याविशेषात्। तत्स्वभावविशेषावक्लृप्तौ तादात्म्ये कोऽपरितोषः ?, विरोधस्य सर्वथाऽपि अपरिहार्यत्वात्। तत्सन्तानापेक्षया प्रेत्यभावादि मा मंस्त, ज्ञानज्ञेययोः प्रतिक्षणं विलक्षणत्वात्। न वै प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिः पुरुषान्तरवत् अर्थान्तरवच्च। ततः कर्मफलसम्बन्धोऽपि नानासन्तानवत् अनियमात् न युक्तिमवतरति। तत् सूक्तम् 'क्षणिकपक्षो बुद्धिमद्भिरनादरणीयः, सर्वथा अर्थक्रियाविरोधात्, नित्यत्वै-कान्तवत्'। सत्येव कारणे यदि कार्यं, त्रैलोक्यमेकक्षणवर्ति स्यात्, ततः सन्तानाभावात् पक्षान्तरासंभवाच्च। इति स्थितम् ॥४१॥

यद्यसत् सर्वथा कार्यं तन्मा जनि खपुष्पवत् ।
मोपादाननियमो भून्माश्वासः कार्यजन्मनि ॥४२॥

If an effect is absolutely non-existent, then it should rather never be produced just as sky-flower is never produced, then there should rather be no fixed rule that this material cause will bring about that effect, then there should rather be no confident feeling that this effect will be forthcoming out of that cause. (42)

कथञ्चित् सतः कार्यत्वम्, उपादानस्योत्तरीभवनात्, सकृदपि विरुद्धधर्माध्यासा-निराकृतेः । तथा चान्वयव्यतिरेकप्रतीतेः भावस्वभावनिबन्धनायाः किं फलमपलापेन ? तदन्यतरनिराकृतौ उभयनिराकृतिः, अभेदात् । तन्न असत् कार्यम्, सर्वथानुत्पादप्रसङ्गात्, खपुष्पवत् । न तादृक् कारणवत्, सर्वथाऽभूतत्वात् वन्ध्यासुतवत्, कथञ्चिदस्थितानुत्पन्नत्वात् इति योज्यम् । सत्यपि प्रभवलक्षणे पूर्वपूर्वस्योत्तरीभवनं मृत्पिण्डस्थासकोशकुशूलादिषु सकललोकसाक्षिकं सिद्धम् । स्वमनीषिकाभिः सदृशापरापरोत्पत्तिविप्रलम्भानवधारणा-वक्लृप्तिम् आरचयतां मा उपादाननियमो भूत्, कारणान्तरवत्, तदन्वयाभावाविशेषात् सर्वथा वैलक्षण्यात् । निरन्वयस्यापि तादृशी प्रकृतिरात्मानं कारणान्तरेभ्यो यया विशेषयतीति चेत्, न, अत्यन्तविशेषानुपलब्धेः । तदविशेषादर्शी सर्वथा आन्ध्यं स्यात् । तस्मात् इयमस्य प्रकृतिर्यया पूर्वोत्तरस्वभावहानोपादानाधिकरणस्थितिं प्रतिक्षणं बिभर्ति यतः अयमुपादाननियमः सिद्धः । अथापि कथञ्चित् उपादाननियमः कल्प्येत, कार्यजन्मनि कथमाश्वासः ? तदत्यन्तासतः कार्यस्योत्पत्तेः तन्तुभ्यः पटादिरेव न घटादिरिति निर्हेतुको नियमः स्यात् । पूर्वपूर्वविशेषात् उत्तरोत्तरनियमकल्पनायाम् अनुपादानेऽपि स्यात् । तथाऽदर्शनम् अहेतुः, अत्रैव विचारात् । कथञ्चिदाहितविशेषतन्तूनां पटस्वभावप्रतिलम्भोपलम्भात् तदन्यतरविधिप्रतिषेधनियमनिमित्तात्ययात् प्रतीतेरलमपलापेन । तस्मात् उपलब्धिलक्षण-प्राप्तानुपलब्धिः अनन्वयस्यैव, न पुनरुभयरूपस्य । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन ॥४२॥

न हेतुफलभावादिरन्यभावादनन्वयात् ।
सन्तानान्तरवन्नैकः सन्तानस्तद्वतः पृथक् ॥४३॥

There can obtain no relationship of cause-effect etc. between two entities that are (utterly) separate from one another, their mutual separateness in its turn being due to the absence of a persistent element running through the two; this is just as there is (on the momentarist's own

showing) no relationship of cause-effect etc. between two entities that belong to two different series. Moreover, there is in fact nothing like a 'series' apart from the members constituting this series. (43)

विलक्षणानामत्यन्तभेदेऽपि स्वभावतः किलासंकीर्णाः सन्ततयः कर्मफलसम्बन्धादि-निबन्धनं शशविषाणस्येव वर्तुलत्वमारचितं कश्चेतनः श्रद्दधीत ? ॥४३॥

अन्येष्वनन्यशब्दोऽयं संवृतिर्न मृषा कथम् ।
मुख्यार्थः संवृतिर्न स्याद् विना मुख्यान्न संवृतिः ॥४४॥

It might be pleaded that 'series' is just a word which has been attributed in common to things that are in fact different and that therefore its employment is a case of mere usage. But why should a meaning yielded by mere usage be not a falsity ? Moreover, the chief meaning of a word cannot be dubbed as a meaning yielded by mere usage, while there can be no occasion for usage unless the word concerned has got a chief meaning.

सन्तानिभ्योऽनन्यः सन्तानः - अन्यथा आत्मनो नामान्तरकरणात् - , नित्यानित्यविकल्पानुपपत्तेः । अपि तु संवृत्या अन्येषु अनन्यव्यवहारात् एकत्वमुपचरितमिति । व्यलीकव्यवहारेऽपि विशेषानुपपत्तेः सम्बन्धनियमाभावस्तदवस्थः । उपचारस्तु न ऋते मुख्यात्, यथा 'अग्निर्माणवकः' इति । स्खलति हि तत्रानन्यप्रत्ययः, परीक्षाऽक्षमत्वात् । अत एवामुख्यार्थः प्रस्तुतासाधनम् ॥४४॥

चतुष्कोटेर्विकल्पस्य सर्वान्तेषूक्त्ययोगतः ।
तत्त्वान्यत्वमवाच्यं चेत् तयोः सन्तानतद्वतोः ॥४५॥
अवक्तव्यचतुष्कोटिविकल्पोऽपि न कथ्यताम् ।
असर्वान्तमवस्तु स्यादविशेष्यविशेषणम् ॥४६॥

One might argue : "It is the case with any and every alleged characteristic of an entity that we are not entitled to give verbal expression to any of the following four alternatives as to the relationship between this characteristic and this entity : (i) this characteristic belongs to this entity, (ii) this characteristic does not belong to this

entity, (iii) this characteristic both belongs and does not belong to this entity, (iv) this characteristic neither belongs nor does not belong to this entity. Consequently, we can also not say about a series whether it is one with its members or different from them (or both or neither)''. To this we reply : ''In that case you can make assertion not even to the effect that we are not entitled to give verbal expression to the four alternatives in question. Moreover, an entity that is allegedly devoid of all characteristics whatsover is really a nonentity, for such an entity can act neither as a qualificand nor as a qualifier''. (45-46)

सत्त्वैकत्वादिषु सर्वधर्मेषु सदसदुभयानुभयचतुष्कोटेः अभिधातुमशक्यत्वात् सन्तानतद्वतोरपि भेदाभेदोभयानुभयचतुष्कोटेः अनभिलाप्यत्वम्। सत्त्वे तदुत्पत्तिविरोधात्, असत्त्वे पुनरुच्छेदपक्षोपक्षिप्तदोषात्, उभये चोभयदोषप्रसङ्गात्, अनुभयपक्षेऽपि विकल्पानुपपत्तेः, इत्यादि योज्यम् ॥४५॥

न हि सर्वथा अनभिलाप्यत्वे अनभिलाप्यचतुष्कोटेः अभिधेयत्वं युक्तम्, कथञ्चिदभिलाप्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अपि चैवं सति सर्वविकल्पातीतम् अवस्तु एव स्यात्, अन्यत्र वाचोयुक्तेः ॥४६॥

द्रव्याद्यन्तरभावेन निषेधः संज्ञिनः सतः ।
असद्भेदो न भावस्तु स्थानं विधिनिषेधयोः ॥४७॥

It is only a really existing entity-denoted-by-a-word which – when proposed to be a possesser of the root-substance etc. (i.e. root-substance, place, time, form) that are not its own root-substance etc. – can be subjected to a negative assertion. On the other hand, an alleged entity which is really but a nonentity can be subjected neither to a positive assertion nor to a negative one. (47)

द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावान्तरैः प्रतिषेधः संज्ञिनः सतः क्रियते, न पुनरसतः, तद्विधिप्रतिषेधाविषयत्वात् । न चैतत् विरुद्धम्, स्वलक्षणमनिर्देश्यमित्यादिवत् । अभावोऽनभिलाप्य इत्यपि भावाभिधानात् एकान्तवृत्तौ एव दोषः, भावाभिधानैरपि कथञ्चिदभावाभिधानात् ॥४७॥

अवस्त्वनभिलाप्यं स्यात् सर्वान्तैः परिवर्जितम् ।
वस्त्वेवावस्तुतां याति प्रक्रियाया विपर्ययात् ॥४८॥

What is devoid of all characteristics whatsover, let that be an indescribable nonentity (as posited by our rival). On the other hand, a real entity (as posited by us), too, can be treated as a nonentity when the procedure (of attributing characteristics to it) is reversed (i.e. when it is proposed that this entity possesses characteristics that are not in fact its own characteristics). (48)

भावव्यतिरेकवाचिभिरपि वाक्यतामापन्नैर्भावाभिधानात् नात्र किञ्चित् विरुद्धम् । अतः सूक्तम् 'यदवस्तु तदनभिलाप्यं यथा न किञ्चित् । यत् पुनरभिलाप्यं तत् वस्त्वेव यथा खपुष्पाभावः ।' अन्यस्य कैवल्यमितरस्य वैकल्यम्, स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां भावाभावव्यवस्थितेर्भावस्य ॥४८॥

सर्वान्ताश्चेदवक्तव्यास्तेषां किं वचनं पुनः ।
संवृतिश्चेन्मृषैवैषा परमार्थविपर्ययात् ॥४९॥

If all characteristics whatsover are indescribable why is it that our rival himself goes on to speak of certain characteristics (which according to him belong to reality) ? If it is replied that this kind of talk is but a mere usage, it turns out to be but a falsity, for such a thing (i.e. what is a mere usage) is just the opposite of truth. (49)

पुनरपि अवक्तव्यवादिनं पर्यनुयुञ्ज्महे - सर्वे धर्मा यदि वाग्गोचरातीताः, कथमिमेऽभिलप्यन्ते ? इति । संवृत्या इति चेत्, न, विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । स्वरूपेण चेत्, कथमनभिलाप्याः ? पररूपेण चेत्, तत् तेषां स्वरूपं स्यात्, केवलं वाचः स्खलनं गम्येत । उभयपक्षेऽपि उभयदोषानुषङ्गः । तत्त्वेन चेत्, कथमवक्तव्याः ? मृषात्वेन चेत्, कथमुक्ताः ? तदलमप्रतिष्ठितमिथ्याविकल्पौघैः ॥४९॥

अशक्यत्वादवाच्यं किमभावात् किमबोधतः ।
आद्यन्तोक्तिद्वयं न स्यात् किं व्याजेनोच्यतां स्फुटम् ॥५०॥

We ask whether the reality is thus (being declared to be) indescribable because our rival is incapable of describing it, or because it does not exist, or because our

rival has no knowledge about it. Of these the first and third alternatives should not be acceptable to our rival. Why then does he resort to camouflage and not clearly state his position (viz. that the reality is indescribable because it does not exist) ? (50)

अर्थस्यानभिलाप्यत्वम् अभावात् वक्तुरशक्तेः अनवबोधात् वा ?, प्रकारान्तरासंभवात् । बुद्धिकरणपाटवापेक्षत्वात् । न च सर्वत्र तदभावो युक्तः । ततो नैरात्म्यान्न विशेष्येत, मध्यमपक्षावलम्बनात् । अशक्यसमयत्वात् अनभिलाप्यम् अर्थरूपमिति चेत्, न, कथञ्चित् शक्यसङ्केतत्वात्, दृश्यविकल्प्यस्वभावत्वात् परमार्थस्य प्रतिभासभेदेऽपीत्युक्तम् । विषयविषयिणोर्भिन्नकालत्वं प्रत्यक्षेऽपि समानम् । अविपरीतप्रतिपत्तिरन्यात्रापि । दर्शनविकल्पयोः परमार्थैकतानत्वाभावे न किञ्चित् सिद्धम्, दृष्टस्य अनिर्णयात् अदृष्टकल्पत्वात्, अदृष्टनिर्णयस्य प्रधानादिविकल्पाविशेषात् ॥५०॥

हिनस्त्यनभिसन्धातृ न हिनस्त्यभिसन्धिमत् ।
बध्यते तद्द्वयापेतं चित्तं बद्धं न मुच्यते ॥५१॥

On our rival's position the mind that kills has not willed to kill, one that has willed to kill does not kill, one that suffers bondage has neither willed to kill nor killed, one that attains liberation (*mokṣa*) has not suffered bondage. (51)

सन्तानादेरयोगात्, इतिकर्तव्यतासु चिकीर्षोः विनाशात्, कर्तुरचिकीर्षुत्वात्, तदुभयविनिर्मुक्तस्य बन्धात्, तदविनिर्मुक्तेश्च यमनियमादेरविधेयत्वम्, कुर्वतो वा यत्किञ्चनकारित्वम् ॥५१॥

अहेतुकत्वान्नाशस्य हिंसाहेतुर्न हिंसकः ।
चित्तसन्ततिनाशश्च मोक्षो नाष्टाङ्गहेतुकः ॥५२॥

Since it is our rival's position that destruction is causeless, he should be ready to concede that the killer is not the cause of killing and that the (celebrated) eightfold path is not the cause of liberation *(mokṣa)* conceived (by our rival himself) in the form of a destruction of the series of mental states. (52)

अहेतुं विनाशमभ्युपगम्य कस्यचित् यदि हिंसकत्वं ब्रूयात् कथमविक्लवः ?, तथा निर्वाणं सन्तानसमूलतलप्रहाणलक्षणं सम्यक्त्वसंज्ञासंज्ञिवाक्कायकर्मान्तव्यायामाजीवस्मृतिसमाधिलक्षणाष्टाङ्गहेतुकम्, अन्योन्यं विप्रतिषेधात् ॥५२॥

विरूपकार्यारम्भाय यदि हेतुसमागमः ।
आश्रयिभ्यामनन्योऽसावविशेषादयुक्तवत् ॥५३॥

It might be maintained that the activity of a cause is required in order to bring into existence a dissimilar effect (i.e. an effect dissimilar from the one that had occurred at the same place but at the immediately preceding moment). But then the relation of this cause should be the same to both the coming into existence of the effect in question and the going out of existence of the effect of the preceding moment, for the two processes (viz. the coming into existence of the effect in question and the going out of existence of the effect of the preceding moment) are not different from one another; this is just as the entities that are internally connected do not have different causes. (53)

Note : By 'internally connected' entities are meant entities that cannot but go together; different schools of philosophy will illustrate them differently but in every case the concerned pair of entities should be jointly caused.

विसभागसन्तानोत्पादनाय हेतुसन्निधिर्न प्रध्वंसाय, पूर्वस्य स्वरसतो निवृत्तेः इति चेत्, स पुनरुत्तरोत्पादः स्वरसतः किं न स्यात् ?, विनाशहेतुवत्। स्वरसोत्पन्नमपि तदनन्तरभावित्वात् तेन व्यपदिश्यते इति चेत्, इतरत्र समानम्। परमार्थतः तदहेतुकत्वे प्रतिपत्त्रभिप्रायाविशेषेऽपि स्वतःप्रहाणवादी न शक्नोति आत्मानं न्यायमार्गम् अनुकारयितुम्। सर्वदा विरूपकार्यत्वात् सभागविसभागावक्लृप्तिं प्रतिपत्त्रभिप्रायवशात् समनुगच्छन् सहेतुकं विनाशं ततः किं नानुजानीयात् ? न च समनन्तरक्षणयोर्नाशोत्पादौ पृथग्भूतौ मिथः स्वाश्रयतो वा यौ समं सहेतुकेतरौ स्ताम्, प्रतिपत्त्यभिधानभेदेऽपि ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारवत्, स्वभावप्रतिबन्धात् । संज्ञाच्छन्दमतिस्मृत्यादिवत् सत्यपि भेदे समकालभाविनोः कथं सहकारी पुनरन्यतरस्यैव हेतुरहेतुर्वा, कार्यरूपादेरिव कारणम्। तस्मात् कार्यकारणयोरुत्पादविनाशौ न सहेतुकाहेतुकौ, सहभावात्, रसादिवत्। 'न तस्य किञ्चित् भवति, न भवत्येव केवलम्' इति चेत्, 'भवत्येव केवलम्' इति समानम् । तस्मादयं विनाशहेतुर्भावमभावीकरोतीति न पुनरकिञ्चित्करः । कार्योत्पत्तिहेतुर्वा यद्यभावं न भावीकुर्यात् भावं करोतीति कृतस्य करणायोगात् अकिञ्चित्करः । तदतत्करणादिविकल्पसंहतिः उभयत्र सदृशी ॥५३॥

स्कन्धसन्ततयश्चैव संवृतित्वादसंस्कृताः ।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिव्ययास्तेषां न स्युः खरविषाणवत् ।।५४।।

Thus on our rival's position the series and the aggregates, being mere usages, trun out to be something nonentitative (strictly speaking, un-originated); of such alleged entities there can certainly be no continuation, origination and cessation, just as there can be no continuation etc. of the horns of a donkey. (54)

रूप-वेदना-विज्ञान-संज्ञा-संस्कारस्कन्धसन्ततयः असंस्कृताः, संवृतित्वात् । यत् पुनः संस्कृतं तत् परमार्थसत्, यथा स्वलक्षणम् । न तथा स्कन्धसन्ततयः । ततः स्थित्युत्पत्तिविपत्तिरहिताः । ततो विसभागसन्तानोत्पत्तये विनाशहेतुरिति पोप्लूयते ।।५४।।

Comment on verses 41-54

These verses contain Samantabhadra's important criticism of the doctrine of absolute momentarism attributed to the empiricist Buddhist. The criticism is divided into three parts, viz. (i) the verses 41-44 where basic difficulties have been urged against the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of the phenomenon of causation, (ii) the verses 45-50 where difficulties have been urged against the doctrine of absolute indescribability (which is in fact upheld by the transcendentalist but is here attributed to the empiricist Buddhist), and (iii) the verses 51-54 where difficuties have been urged against the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of certain miscellaneous ontological and ethical phenomena. We take up these parts one by one.

(i) Samantabhadra's criticism of the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of causal phenomena occurs in the verses 42-44; the verse 41 only contains an application of this criticism to the question of transmigration. Samantabhadra urges the following three difficulties against the Buddhist : (a) if an effect is utterly non-existent before its production, there can be no necessity why it should be produced out of one cause rather than any other; (b) if an effect is utterly different from its alleged cause there can be no necessity why it should be produced out of this cause rather than any other; (c) to say that an effect, even if utterly different from its cause, belongs to the same 'series' as this cause, does not save the situation inasmuch as the Buddhist concept of 'series' is logically untenable. An impartial reader can see that the first of these difficulties is almost verbal – just like the opposite difficulty earlier urged

against the Sāṅkhya; he can also see that the second difficulty loses force if the third is met. And a closer study reveals that the third difficulty can be met inasmuch as the Buddhist concept of 'series' serves the same purpose – and serves it as well – as the Jaina concept of 'root-substance'. In this connection it is necessary to pay serious attention to the empiricist Buddhist's notion of *saṁvṛti* or usage; for when he calls a phenomenon *saṁvṛti* he only means to emphasize that it is not to be cognized by bare senses but by senses assisted by thought. Samantabhadra, on the other hand, will like the empiricist Buddhist to equate *saṁvṛti* with illusion pure and simple, but he knows that the latter does not oblige him – at least does not do so straightway. Hence the complexity of the argument of the verse 44. There were no doubt Buddhists who equated *saṁvṛti* with illusion, but these were the advocates of transcendentalism, not empiricism. Hence the doctrine of absolute indescribability which Samantabhadra criticizes by way of continuing his criticism of the empiricist Buddhist's notion of *saṁvṛti* is to be treated not as a doctrine preached by the empiricist Buddhist who attaches due worth to thought-activity but as one preached by the transcendentalist who would dub all thought-activity as an illusion-creating agency.

(ii) The occasion for Samatabhadra's criticism of the doctrine of absolute indescribability is noteworthy. Samantabhadra finds that the empiricist Buddhist refuses to call a 'series' a real entity in the sense in which he calls the members of this series real entities but that he at the same time refuses to dismiss a 'series' as an illusory appearance. This reminds him of the teaching of certain Buddhists who maintain that reality is describable neither as existent nor as nonexistent nor as both nor as neither, and he goes on to criticize it under the impression that it is also the teaching of the empiricist Buddhist. The criticism is illuminating in its own way, for it clearly enables us to grasp the sense in which a real entity cannot be indescribable according to the Jaina – himself a believer in indescribability of some sort. Samantabhadra argues that since a real entity is describable both as existent and as non-existent and since the Buddhist characterises a real entity as indescribable on the ground that it is describable neither as existent nor as non-existent what the latter is characterizing as indescribable is not a real entity but a nonentity; (we are not here informed about the sense in which the Jaina himself characterizes a real entity as indescribable, but the argument should help us in appreciating the Jaina's characterization in question).

(iii) The following are the difficulties urged by Samantabhadra against the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of certain miscellaneous ontological and ethical phenomena : (a) if an effect is utterly different from its cause the mind which performs a good or bad act must be utterly different from the mind which allegedly reaps the fruits of this act; this means that the empiricist Buddhist is forced to explain away the causation in question; (b) the empiricist Buddhist's thesis on destruction being uncaused is particularly vulnerable; (c) since the empiricist Buddhist reduces all empirical phenomena into certain series and certain aggregates and since all series and all aggregates are according to him mere *saṁvṛtis* or usages he is bound to explain away all empirical phenomena. Now, in view of what has already been said in connection with the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of causal phenomenon in general it should be easy to see how the first and the third of these difficulties can be met. But something remains to be said about the empiricist Buddhist's thesis on destruction being uncaused. The thesis was a rather intriguing way of expressing the idea that each and every empirical phenomenon is momentary by nature, an idea essentially acceptable also to the Jaina who would however precisely formulate his position by saying that each and every mode-aspect of each and every empirical phenomenon is momentary. An essentially different position was adopted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who was of the view that an empirical phenomenon need not be momentary either in its substance-aspect or in its mode-aspect. Samantabhadra's anti-Buddhist arguments on the present question would better befit a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika than a Jaina.

verses 55

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥५५॥

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute permanence' and 'absolute momentariness') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossiblity on their part. (55)

नित्यत्वेतरैकान्तद्वयमपि अयुक्तम् अङ्गीकर्तुम्, विरोधात्, युगपत् जीवितमरणवत्। नित्यत्वानित्यत्वाभ्यामत एवानभिलाप्यम् इति अयुक्तम्, तदेकान्ते अनभिलाप्योक्तेः अनुपपत्तेः ।।५५।।

Comment on verse 55

This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first.

Verses 56-60

नित्यं तत् प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नाकस्मात् तदविच्छिदा।
क्षणिकं कालभेदात् ते बुद्ध्यसञ्चरदोषतः ।।५६।।

A real is something permanent, because it is subject to recognition while the (indispensable) uninterruptedness of an object of recognition cannot be accidental; at the same time, a real is something momentary because it is different at different times. In the absence of these features (viz. permanence and momentariness) in a real there would arise the undesirable contingency of one state of cognition never being replaced by another one. This is your position. (56)

Note : If there is no change, there cannot at all arise a new state of cognition; if there is no permanence, there cannot arise a new state of cognition of the form of recognition.

तदेकान्तद्वयेऽपि परामर्शप्रत्यायानुपपत्तेः अनेकान्तः। स्थित्यभावे हि प्रमातुरन्येन दृष्टं नापरः प्रत्यभिज्ञातुमर्हति, सम्बन्धविशेषेऽपि पित्रेव दृष्टं पुत्रः। सन्नप्यतिशयः पृथक्त्वं न निराकरोति। तदेव अन्यत्रापि प्रत्यवमर्शाभावनिबन्धनम्। एकसन्तत्या प्रत्यभिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानबलाच्चैकसन्ततिरिति व्यक्तमितरेतराश्रयणमेतत्। न च पक्षान्तरे समानम्, स्थितेरनुभवनात्। तद्विभ्रमकल्पनायाम् उत्पादविनाशयोरनाश्वासः, तथानुभवनिर्णयानुपलब्धेः यथा स्वलक्षणं परिगीयते। तत्रैतत् स्यात् स्वभावाविनिर्भागेऽपि न सङ्कलनम्, दर्शनक्षणान्तरवत्। सत्यम्, एकान्ते एवायं दोषः। ततः क्षणिकम्, कालभेदात्। दर्शनप्रत्यभिज्ञानसमययोरभेदे तदुभयाभावप्रसङ्गात्। किञ्च पक्षद्वयेऽपि ज्ञानासञ्चारानुषङ्गात् अनेकान्तसिद्धिः। अपोद्धारकल्पनया कथञ्चित् जात्यन्तरेऽपि वस्तुनि प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिनिबन्धने स्थित्यादयो व्यवस्थाप्येरन्। न च स्वभावभेदोपलम्भेऽपि नानात्वविरोधसंकरानवस्थानुषङ्गः, चेतसि ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारवत् ।।५६।।

न सामान्यात्मनोदेति न व्येति व्यक्तमन्वयात् ।
व्येत्युदेति विशेषात् ते सहैकत्रोदयादि सत् ॥५७॥

An entity neither originates nor ceases so far as its universal character is concerned, for the continuation of this universal character is an obvious fact; on the other hand, an entity originates as well as ceases so far as its particular characters are concerned. This is how on your position a real entity is characterized by the co-existence of origination etc. (i.e. of origination, cessation, continuation). (57)

Note : That is to say, 'universal character' is equivalent to the 'substance-aspect' of an empirical phenomenon, 'particular character' to its 'mode-aspect'. However, it is more usual to speak of 'universal character' and 'particular character' in the case of two (or more) independent empirical phenomena each of which has got its own 'substance-aspect' and its own 'mode-aspect'; in ordinary language these empirical phenomena are said to possess mutual similarity of some sort or other, a similarity that is technically assigned the title 'universal character' (or just 'universal').

चलाचलात्मकं वस्तु, कृतकाकृतकात्मकत्वात् । न हि चेतनस्य अन्यस्य वा सर्वथोत्पत्तिः, सदादिसामान्यस्वभावेन सत एवातिशयान्तरोपलम्भात् घटवत् कथञ्चित् उत्पादविगमात्मकत्वात् इत्यादि योज्यम् ॥५७॥

कार्योत्पादः क्षयो हेतोर्नियमाल्लक्षणात् पृथक् ।
न तौ जात्याद्यवस्थानादनपेक्षाः खपुष्पवत् ॥५८॥

The production of an effect is the same thing as the destruction of the cause of this effect, for the two (i.e. the production of an effect and the destruction of the cause of this effect) are invariably found to go togather even if they are mutually distinguishable through their respective definitions. And inasmuch as there is here a continuation of the concerned universal character etc. (i.e. of the concerned universal character, the concerned numerical identity, the concerned inherent capacity, and so forth) the two are not independent of each other, an

independence that would have reduced them to the status of (a nonentity like) sky-flower. (58)

कार्यकारणयोरुत्पादविनाशौ कथञ्चित् भिन्नौ, भिन्नलक्षणसम्बन्धित्वात्, सुखदुःखवत्। स्यादभिन्नौ, तदभेदस्थितजातिसङ्ख्याद्यात्मकत्वात्, पुरुषवत् । उत्पादविगमध्रौव्यलक्षणं स्याद्भिन्नम्, अस्खलन्नानाप्रतीतेः, रूपादिवत्। उत्पादः केवलो नास्ति स्थितिविगमरहितत्वात् वियत्कुसुमवत्। तथा स्थितिविनाशौ प्रतिपत्तव्यौ ॥५८॥

घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम् ।
शोकप्रमोदमाध्यस्थ्यं जनो याति सहेतुकम् ॥५९॥

When there occur three phenomena – viz. that of destruction (of a jar), that of production (of potsherds), and that of continuation (of gold) – three persons, viz. one desirous of getting a jar, one desirous of getting potsherds, and one desirous of getting gold – respectively experience three feelings – viz. that of sorrow, that of joy, and that of neutrality; and such a behaviour on their part is well-established. (59)

Note : That is to say, one and the same event has got an aspect of destruction, one of production, and one of continuation.

प्रतीतिभेदम् इत्थं समर्थयते - घटं भङ्क्त्वा मौलिनिर्वर्तने घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी तन्नाशोत्पादस्थितिषु विषादहर्षौदासीन्यस्थितिमयं जनः प्रतिपद्यते इति, निर्हेतुकत्वे तदनुपपत्तेः ॥५९॥

पयोव्रतो न दध्यत्ति न पयोऽत्ति दधिव्रतः ।
अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्मात् तत्त्वं त्रयात्मकम् ॥६०॥

One who has taken a vow to feed himself on nothing save milk does not partake of curd, one who has taken a vow to feed himself on nothing save curd does not partake of milk, while one who has taken a vow not to partake of any dairy-product partakes of neither milk nor curd; hence it follows that a real entity is possessed of three characters (viz. origination, cessation and continuation). (60)

Note : That is to say, the event called 'production of curd' can at the same time be called 'destruction of milk' or 'continuation of a dairy-product', just as in the earlier example the event called 'production of

potsherds' can at the same time be called 'destruction of jar' or 'continuation of gold'.

लोकोत्तरदृष्टान्तेनापि तत्र प्रतीतिनानात्वं विनाशोत्पादस्थितिसाधनं प्रत्याययति। दधिपयोऽगोरसव्रतानां क्षीरदध्युभयवर्जनात् क्षीरात्मना नश्यत् दध्यात्मना उत्पद्यमानं गोरसस्वभावेन तिष्ठतीति। ततः तत्त्वं त्रयात्मकम् ॥६०॥

॥ इति आप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां तृतीयः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on verses 56-60

In these verses Samantabhadra defends the Jaina position according to which a real entity is somehow permanent and somehow momentary. He seems to base his defence on the fact that we often recognize a thing to be the same as that seen at an earlier occasion. The fact may suffice to prove that there are things that reveal both a changing and an unchanging aspect but it is difficult to see how it can prove that everything reveals both a momentary and a permanent aspect. Really speaking, the Jaina should substantially endorse the entire Buddhist case on momentarism – only formulating the same in the language of 'modes' and 'substances' rather than in that of 'events' and 'series'. In this connection we should particularly take note of the distinction the Jaina is logically bound to draw between a 'root-substance' and a 'composite substance'. For just as the empiricist Buddhist maintains that an apparently unitary and stationary object of our everyday experience is but a conglomeration of numerous momentary 'events' the Jaina will maintain that the same (to be called a 'composite substance') is but a conglomeration of numerous 'root-substances' each exhibiting a new mode every moment. Thus the difference between the empiricist Buddhist and the Jaina is not that the former is repudiating the findings of plain experience and the latter honouring them but that the former is explaining these findings with the help of one set of terminologies and the latter with the help of another set. In any case, we have to distinguish between the occasion when the Jaina is conducting his argument in terms of the absolutely permanent 'root-substances' and their respective momentary modes and the occasion when he is doing so in terms of the relatively permanent 'composite-substances' and their relatively changing respective modes; the distinction is necessary in order to correctly assess the Jaina's theoretical analysis of the situation under consideration as also in order to compare and contrast it with the corresponding analysis undertaken by the empiricist Buddhist.

SECTION IV

DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY

61-66 Verses

कार्यकारणनानात्वं गुणगुण्यन्यताऽपि च।
सामान्यतद्वदन्यत्वं चैकान्तेन यदीष्यते ॥६१॥

If one maintains that an effect is absolutely distinct from its cause, a quality is absolutely distinct from the thing qualified by this quality, and a universal is absolutely distinct from the particular possessing this universal (one would be faced with the following difficulties). (61)

अथ चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः

अवयवगुणसामान्यतद्वतां व्यतिरेकैकान्तम् आशङ्क्य प्रतिविधत्ते ॥६१॥

एकस्यानेकवृत्तिर्न भागाभावाद् बहूनि वा।
भागित्वाद् वाऽस्य नैकत्वं दोषो वृत्तेरनार्हते ॥६२॥

An effect cannot reside in what are many, for it is possessed of no parts; alternatively, one would be forced to concede that this effect is itself of the form of a number of entities (which is an undesirable contingency). Or one might concede that this effect is possessed of parts, but then it will no more be a single entity (which again is an undesirable contingency). These are the difficulties that a certain non-Jaina position has to face on the question of the mode of an effect's residence in its cause. (62)

Note : It should be useful to remember that 'effect' here stands for a composite body and 'cause' for the component-parts of this body.

तत्र एकमनेकत्र वर्तमानं प्रत्यधिकरणं न तावदेकदेशेन, निष्प्रदेशत्वात्। नापि सर्वात्मना, अवयव्यादिबहुत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अथापि कथञ्चित् प्रदेशवत्त्वम्, तत्रापि वृत्तिविकल्पोऽनवस्था च। तदेकमेव न स्यादिति। नायं प्रसङ्गोऽनेकान्ते, कथञ्चित् तादात्म्यात्, वेद्यवेदकाकारज्ञानवत् ॥६२॥

देशकालविशेषेऽपि स्याद् वृत्तिर्युतसिद्धवत्।
समानदेशता न स्यान्मूर्तकारणकार्ययोः ॥६३॥

On the rival's position it should be possible for an effect to occupy a place and a time that are different from those of its cause, just as two externally connected physical substances may occupy two different places and two different times. Nay, since an effect as well as its cause are corporeal entities it should never be possible for them to occupy one and the same place. (63)

Note : In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology an external connection – to be contradistinguished from *samavāya* which may be called an 'internal connection' – can obtain only between two independent substances and not (say) between a quality and the thing qualified by this quality or between a universal and the thing possessing this universal. But the relation conceived to obtain between a composite body and its component parts is also *samavāya*, a position against which Samantabhadra argues that since in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology a composite body is one substance and its component parts another group of substances the relation between a composite body and its component parts ought to be not *samavāya* but 'external connection' which is the relation obtaining between two independent substances.

तस्मात् अङ्गाङ्ग्यादेः अत्यन्तभेदात् तद्देशकालविशेषेणापि वृत्तिः प्रसज्येत, घटवृक्षवत्। वर्णादिभिरनैकान्तिकत्वमिति अयुक्तम्, तद्व्यतिरेकैकान्तानभ्युपगमात्। अवयवावयविनोः समानदेशे वृत्तिर्न भवेत्, मूर्तिमत्त्वात्, खरकरभवत् ॥६३॥

आश्रयाश्रयिभावान्न स्वातन्त्र्यं समवायिनाम्।
इत्ययुक्तः स सम्बन्धो न युक्तः समवायिभिः ॥६४॥

It might be pleaded that there obtains the relation of substratum-superstratum between two entities that are related through *samavāya*-relation and that therefore they

cannot exist in independence from each other. To this we reply that it is not proper to posit a relation which is supposed to relate two entities by existing alongside them but which is itself not related to them (a description that fits the *samavāya*-relation posited by the rival in question). (64)

कार्यकारणादीनां परस्परं प्रतिबन्धात् कुतः स्वातन्त्र्यं यतो देशकालादिभेदेन वृत्तिरिति चेत्, समवायस्य समवायान्तरेण वृत्तौ अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्, स्वतो वृत्तौ द्रव्यादेस्तथोपपत्तेः। असम्बद्धः समवायः कथं द्रव्यादिभिः सह वर्तेत यतः पृथक्सिद्धिर्न स्यात् ? ॥६४॥

सामान्यं समवायश्चाप्येकैकत्र समाप्तितः।
अन्तरेणाश्रयं न स्यान्नाशोत्पादिषु को विधिः ॥६५॥

Since a particular universal as well as the *samavāya*-relation exist in their entirety in some one entity (acting as their substratum) it follows that they ought to exist nowhere else inasmuch as an entity to act as their substratum can be available nowhere else; but then what happens (to the universal in question and to the *samavāya*-relation) when an old entity perishes or when a new entity comes into existence ? (65)

प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तेः आश्रयाभावे सामान्यसमवाययोः असंभवात् उत्पत्तिविपत्तिमत्सु कथं वृत्तिः ? 'उत्पित्सुप्रदेशे प्राक् नासीत्, नान्यतो याति, स्वयमेव पश्चात् भवति, आश्रय-विनाशे च न नश्यति, प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तं च' इति व्याहतमेतत् ॥६५॥

सर्वथाऽनभिसम्बन्धः सामान्यसमवाययोः।
ताभ्यामर्थो न सम्बद्धस्तानि त्रीणि खपुष्पवत् ॥६६॥

On the rival's position there obtains absolutely no relation between a universal and the *samavāya*-relation, nor is the entity alleged to be the substratum of both related to either; thus all these three (viz. the universal in question, the *samavāya*-relation and the entity in question) turn out to be nonentities like sky-flower. (66)

सामान्यसमवाययोः परस्परतः सम्बन्धासम्भवात् ताभ्यामर्थोऽपि न सम्बद्धः। ततः त्रीण्यपि नात्मानं बिभृयुः, कूर्मरोमादिवत् ॥६६॥

Comment on verses 61-66

In these verses Samantabhadra criticizes the doctrine upholding absolute distinctness between an effect and its cause, between a quality and the thing qualified by this quality, between a universal and the particular thing possessing this universal. The details of the criticism make it abundantly clear that the representative rival system in this connection is Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Let us moreover note that Samantabhadra here does not discuss the general problem of cause-effect relationship but the particular problem of the relationship between a composite substance and its component parts, the former being, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an effect of the latter; (again, the problem of the relationship between a quality and the thing qualified has not at all been specifically raised in the present section – perhaps because it is going to be taken up in the next). Samantabhadra raises difficulties against the following three theses of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika :

(i) A composite substance is an entity quite different from the component parts that go to constitute (and thus cause) it while the relation obtaining between the two is a third entity called *samavāya.*

(ii) A universal is an eternal entity residing in several particular entities while the relation obtaining between a universal and a corresponding particular entity is again *samavāya.*

(iii) *Samavāya* is one and eternal.

A closer study however reveals that the relation called *samavāya* serves in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology essentially the same purpose as the relation called 'identity-cum-difference' does in its Jaina counterpart. Thus almost the same fact which the Jaina describes by saying that the relation between a substance and its modes is that of identity-cum-difference is described by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by saying that the qualities and the actions of a substance reside in it by *samavāya*-relation; similarly, almost the same fact which the Jaina describes by saying that the relation between a composite substance and its component parts is that of identity-cum-difference is described by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by saying that a composite substance resides in its component parts by *samavāya*-relation; lastly, almost the same fact which the Jaina describes by saying that two similar things are somehow (i.e. qualitatively) identical and somehow (i.e. numerically) different is described by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by saying that two similar things

are the seats of a common universal that resides in both by *samavāya*-relation. Even then, to the extent that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tends to talk as if qualities, actions, universals and *samavāya*-relation are substance-like entities (while universal and *samavāya*-relation not only substance-like but also eternal) Samantabhadra's criticism seems to be in place.

verses 67-69

अनन्यतैकान्तेऽणूनां सङ्घातेऽपि विभागवत्।
असंहतत्वं स्याद् भूतचतुष्कं भ्रान्तिरेव सा ॥६७॥

If one maintains that an effect is absolutely non-distinct from atoms (that are to act as its cause), then there arises the difficulty that these atoms should remain as much unrelated after their mutual conjunction (that is to give rise to the effect in question) as they were in the early state of mutual disjuction; moreover, in that case the four basic elements (viz. earth, water, fire, air) will turn out to be but illusory appearances. (67)

Note : That is to say, since on the rival's showing earth etc. ought to be of the form of atoms and since they are not visible in the form of atoms, the rival should conclude that the visible form of earth etc. is an illusory appearance.

कार्यकारणादेरभेदैकान्ते धारणाकर्षणादयः परमाणूनां सङ्घातेऽपि मा भूवन्, विभागवत्। नाहितोऽपि विशेषो तेषां विभागैकान्तं निराकरोति। तत एवान्यत्रापि तत् नेष्यते। पृथिव्यादिभूतचतुष्टयस्थितिरेवं विभ्रममात्रं प्राप्नोति। इष्टत्वात् अदोष इति चेत्, न, प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात्॥६७॥

कार्यभ्रान्तेरणुभ्रान्तिः कार्यलिङ्गं हि कारणम्।
उभयाभावतस्तत्स्थं गुणजातीतरच्च न ॥६८॥

And when their effects (viz. the basic elements earth, water, fire, air) thus turn out to be illusory appearances, these atoms themselves follow suit, for the nature of cause is inferred from that of its effect. Again, in the absence of all cause and all effect there also do not exist qualities, universals etc. supposedly residing in a cause or an effect. (68)

चक्षुरादिबुद्धौ स्थूलैकाकारः प्रतिभासमानः परमाणुभेदैकान्तवादं प्रतिहन्ति तद्विपरीतानुपलब्धिर्वा। तत्रैतत् स्यात् भ्रान्तैकत्वादिप्रतिपत्तिरिति चेत्, न, पारमाणूनां चक्षुरादिबुद्धौ स्वभावमनर्पयतां कार्यलिङ्गाभावात् तत्स्वभावाभ्युपगमानुपपत्तेः। तद्द्वयाभावात् तद्वृत्तयो जातिगुणक्रियादयो न स्युः, व्योमकुसुमसौरभवत् ॥६८॥

एकत्वेऽन्यतराभावः शेषाभावोऽविनाभुवः ।
द्वित्वसङ्ख्याविरोधश्च संवृतिश्चेन्मृषैव सा ॥६९॥

If an effect and its cause are declared to be one, then either of them must be non-existent; but then the other partner too must be non-existent inasmuch as the two invariably go together. Moreover, in that case (i.e. if an effect and its cause are declared to be one) the twoness of an effect and its cause will remain unaccounted for; and if it is said that this twoness is a mere usage, it turns out to be but a falsity. (69)

Note : Aṣṭasahasrī (particularly as elucidated by Yaśovijaya) understands the first half of this verse in a slightly different fashion; on its understanding the translation will be : "When two things (e.g. an effect and its cause) that are invariably found to go together are declared to be one, then either of them must be non-existent – which in its turn will mean that the other partner too is non-existent."

आश्रयाश्रयिणोरेकत्वे तदन्यतराभावः। ततः शेषाभावः, तत्स्वभावाविनाभावित्वात्, वन्ध्यासुतरूपसंस्थानवत्। तथा च सति द्वित्वसङ्ख्यापि न स्यात्। तत्र संवृतिकल्पना शून्यत्वं नातिवर्तते, परमार्थविपर्ययात्, व्यलीकवचनार्थवत् ॥६९॥

Comment on verses 67-69

In these verses Samantabhadra criticizes a position according to which nothing new whatsoever happens to atoms when they go to constitute a composite substance; this he calls the doctrine of absolute non-distinction contrasted to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of absolute distinctness. It is difficult to see who is the upholder of the position in question. Both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina posit eternal atoms, but they differ in that the former considers a composite substance to be absolutely distinct from the atoms which go to constitute it while the latter considers it to be identical with yet distinct from these atoms; however, no school of Indian philosophy posits eternal atoms while

maintaining that a composite substance is absolutely identical with the atoms which go to constitute it. From the tenor of Samantabhadra's criticism we can plausibly surmise that his target is the empiricist Buddhist; but then let us also be clear that the position here attributed to the latter is not his real position. The empiricist Buddhist no doubt maintains that a composite substance is nothing over and above the atoms that go to constitute it, but since by 'atom' he understands a momentary event his position is virtually the same as that of the Jaina who maintains that a composite substance comes into existence as a result of its constituent atoms undergoing a new (momentary) modification.

Verse 70

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ।।७९।।

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute distinctness' and 'absolute non-distinctness') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (70)

अवयवेतरादीनां व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकैकान्तौ न वै यौगपद्येन संभविनौ, विरोधात् । तथा अनभिलाप्यतैकान्ते स्ववचनविरोधः, तदभिलाप्यत्वात् । स्याद्वादाभ्युपगमे तु न दोषः, कथञ्चित् तथाभावोपलब्धेः ।।७०।।

Comment on verse 70

This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the persent section the same purpose as the latter does in the first.

Verses 71-72

द्रव्यपर्याययोरैक्यं तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।

परिणामविशेषाच्च शक्तिमच्छक्तिभावतः ।।७१।।

संज्ञासङ्ख्याविशेषाच्च स्वलक्षणविशेषतः ।

प्रयोजनादिभेदाच्च तन्नानात्वं न सर्वथा ।।७२।।

A substance and its mode are one with each other insofar as they are invariably found to go together, insofar as a substance is found to undergo transformation that is peculiar to itself, insofar as a substance is a possessor of such capacities as it is found to exercise. On the other hand, they are also different from each other insofar as they have got different designations, different numerical properties, different definitions, different utilities, and so on and so forth; however, they are not different from each other in an absolute fashion. (71-72)

Note : The translation follows Vasunandin. According to the Aṣṭasahasrī, the only reason why a substance and its mode are one with each other is that they are invariably found to go together; all the rest are, according to it, the reasons why they are different from each other. Moreover, the Aṣṭasahasrī takes the phrase *'pariṇāmaviśeṣāt'* to mean 'insofar as a substance is characterized one way, its mode another way'.

यत् प्रतिभासभेदेऽपि अव्यतिरिक्तं तत् एकम्, यथा वेद्यवेदकज्ञानं रूपादिद्रव्यं वा मेचकज्ञानं वा । तथा च द्रव्यपर्यायौ न व्यतिरिच्येते, तदन्यतरापाये अर्थस्यानुपपत्तेः । उपयोगविशेषात् रूपादिज्ञाननिर्भासभेदः स्वविषयैकत्वं न वै निराकरोति, सामग्रीभेदे युगपदेकार्थोपनिबद्धविशदेतरज्ञानवत् । तदेवं सति विरोधाद्युपालम्भः चतुरस्रधियां मनो मनागपि न प्रीणयति, वर्णादिरप्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । एकत्वानेकत्वैकान्तौ नान्योन्यं विजयेते, भावस्वभावप्रतिबन्धात् । यत् परस्परविविक्तस्वभावपरिणामसंज्ञासङ्ख्याप्रयोजनादिकं तत् भिन्नलक्षणम्, यथा रूपादि, तथा च द्रव्यपर्यायौ । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासास्खलद्बुद्धिप्रतिभासभेदाभ्यां वस्तुस्वभावभेदसिद्धेः । अन्यथाऽनानैकं जगत् स्यात्, तदभ्युपगमे प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् ॥७१-७२॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on verses 71-72

In these verses Samantabhadra puts forward the Jaina position on the question of (i) the relation between a cause and its effect, (ii) the relation between a thing and its quality, (iii) the relation between a thing's universal features and its particular features. The point to be noted is that one and the same concept – viz. the concept of substance-mode relationship – is here made the basis of the explanation of all the three relations in question. Thus (i) in the case of the relation between

a cause and its effect the suggestion has been made that the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon also represents the aspect of 'cause' while its mode-aspect also the aspect of 'effect', (ii) in the case of the relation between a thing and its quality the suggestion has been made that the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon also represents the aspect of 'thing' while its mode-aspect also the aspect of 'quality', and (iii) in the case of the relation between a thing's universal features and its particular features the suggestion has been made that the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon also represents the aspect of 'a thing's universal features' while its mode-aspect also the aspect of 'a thing's particular features'. This possession of a universal mode of ontological explanation is a particularly strong point of the Jaina, just as the possession of a somewhat different but equally universal mode of ontological explanation is a particularly strong point of the empiricist Buddhist; (the lack of such a universal mode of ontological explanation is one great weakness of the otherwise powerful Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system while the possession of it serves no worthwhile purpose in the case of the transcendentalist systems). However, that only means that 'substance' and 'mode' are but two precisely defined concepts in terms of which the Jaina offers his ontological explanations and not that there can be no other such concepts in terms of which one might choose to offer one's ontological explanations.

SECTION V
DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE

Verse 73

ततः कारिकाद्वयेन (७१-७२) सामान्यविशेषात्मानमर्थं संहृत्य तत्रापेक्षानपेक्षैकान्तप्रतिक्षेपाय आह -

यद्यापेक्षिकसिद्धिः स्यान्न द्वयं व्यवतिष्ठते ।
अनापेक्षिकसिद्धौ च न सामान्यविशेषता ।।७३।।

If an entity and its attribute are absolutely dependent on each other, then neither of them succeeds in retaining its identity; on the other hand, if they are absolutely independent of each other, then the fact of there being universal as well as particular characters remains unaccounted for. (73)

Note : That is to say, the universal character of an empirical phenomenon represents its 'substance-aspect' and its particular character its 'mode-aspect', and hence to maintain that a substance and its mode are absolutely independent of each other is to maintain that the universal character of an empirical phenomenon is absolutely independent of its particular character; but as a matter of fact, the universality of a universal character and the particularity of a corresponding particular character are mutually determined – so that on the second rival's understanding a universal character will be no real universal character and a particular character no real particular character.

अथ पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः

धर्मधर्मिणोः आपेक्षिकी सिद्धिः, प्रत्यक्षबुद्धौ तदनवभासनात्, दूरेतरादिवत् । तयोरन्योन्यापेक्षैकान्ते स्वभावतः प्रतिष्ठितस्य एकतरस्यापि अभावे अन्यतराभावात् उभयं न प्रकल्प्येत । दूरासन्नभावयोरपि स्वभावविवर्तविशेषाभावे समानदेशादेरपि प्रसङ्गात् । तदिमौ स्वभावतः स्ताम्, अन्यथा इतरेतराश्रयदोषानुषङ्गात् । अनपेक्षापक्षेऽपि नान्वयव्यतिरेकौ स्याताम्, भेदाभेदयोः अन्योन्यापेक्षात्मकत्वात् विशेषेतरभावस्य ।।७३।।

Comment on verse 73

In this verse Samantabhadra comes out against two doctrines which he considers to be extremist. They are (i) the doctrine that an entity and an attribute of it are absolutely dependent on each other, and (ii) the doctrine that an entity and an attribute of it are absolutely independent of each other. Really speaking, Samantabhadra here has in mind the empiricist Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the former insofar as he maintains that to distinguish in an empirical phenomenon an entity and an attribute of it is a mere usuage, the latter insofar as he maintains that to distinguish in an empirical phenomenon an entity and an attribute of it is to distinguish two independent realities. An impartial reader will however feel that in this connection the empiricist Buddhist, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina are maintaining a virtually identical position even if each uses a set of terminologies that is peculiar to himself. In any case, in view of Samantabhadra's earlier polemics against the empiricist Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it should not be much difficult to follow his present arguments urged against the same opponents.

Verse 74

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ।।७४।।

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute dependence' and 'absolute independence') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (74)

अनन्तरेकान्तयोः युगपत् विवक्षा मा भूत्, विप्रतिषेधात्, सदसदेकान्तवत् । तथाऽनभिधेयत्वैकान्तेऽपि । इति कृतं विस्तरेण ।।७४।।

Comment on verse 74

This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first.

Verse 75

धर्मधर्म्यविनाभावः सिद्ध्यत्यन्योन्यवीक्षया ।
न स्वरूपं स्वतो ह्येतत् कारकज्ञापकाङ्गवत् ॥७५॥

The fact that an entity and its attribute require each other just proves that the two invariably go togather, but it does not prove that the nature of each of them is exhausted by the fact that it requires the other. For certainly each of them has got a nature of its own. All this should be understood on the analogy of the factors operative in production-situation, or of those operative in knowledge-situation (which factors doubtless require one another but each of which is possessed of an independent nature of its own). (75)

न केवलं सामान्यविशेषयोः स्वलक्षणम् अपेक्षितपरस्पराविनाभावलक्षणं स्वतः-सिद्धलक्षणम्, अपि तु धर्मधर्मिणोरपि, कर्तृकर्मबोध्यबोधकवत् ॥७५॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on verse 75

In this verse Samantabhadra explicitly formulates the Jaina position on the question of entity-attribute relationship. He rightly submits that the concepts 'entity' and 'attribute' (better known as 'substance' and 'mode') are correlate, for in his system of ontology both of them – and they alone – are required to explain the nature of an empirical phenomenon. But his implied suggestion that the concepts chosen in this connection by the empiricist Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are hopelessly inadequate seems unjustified.

SECTION VI

REASON AND SCRIPTURE

Verses 76-78

सिद्धं चेद्धेतुतः सर्वं न प्रत्यक्षादितो गतिः ।

सिद्धं चेदागमात् सर्वं विरुद्धार्थमतान्यपि ॥७६॥

If one maintains that every proposition has to be established with the help of a probans (i.e. with the help of inference), then knowledge gained through perception etc. becomes an impossibility; if one maintains that every proposition has to be established on the basis of scriptural authority, then even such theses as are mutually contradictory will stand established.

अथ षष्ठः परिच्छेदः

उपेयतत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्य उपायतत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्यते। युक्त्या यत् न घटामुपैति तत् अहं दृष्ट्वापि न श्रद्दधे इत्यादेः एकान्तस्य बहुलं दर्शनात् प्रत्यक्षतदाभासयोरपि व्यवस्थितिः अनुमानात्, अन्यथा सङ्करव्यतिकरोपपत्तेः । कथञ्चित् साक्षात्करणमन्तरेण न क्वचित् अनुमानम्, किं पुनः शास्त्रोपदेशाः ? न चैते युक्तिनिरपेक्षाः, परस्परविरुद्धार्थतत्त्वसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। न हि प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामन्तरेण उपदेशं ज्योतिर्ज्ञानादिप्रतिपत्तिः ॥७६॥

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥७७॥

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute authoritativeness of inference' and 'absolute authoritativeness of the scripture') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for that will be a self-contradictory position. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescrib-

able, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part.

युक्तीतरैकान्तद्वयाभ्युपगमोऽपि मा भूत्, विरुद्धयोरेकत्र सर्वथा असंभवात् । तदवाच्यत्वेऽपि पूर्ववत् ।।७७।।

वक्तर्यनाप्ते यद्धेतोः साध्यं तद्धेतुसाधितम् ।

आप्ते वक्तरि तद्वाक्यात् साध्यमागमसाधितम् ।।७८।।

When the speaker happens to be not an authority on the subject-matter concerned what he establishes with the help of a probans should be called 'something established with the help of a probans'; when the speaker happens to be an authority on the subject-matter concerned what he establishes on the basis of his mere utterance should be called 'something established on the basis of scriptural authority.' (78)

यो यत्र अविसंवादकः स तत्र आप्तः । ततोऽपरः अनाप्तः । तत्त्वप्रतिपादनम् अविसंवादः, तदर्थज्ञानात् । तेनातीन्द्रिये **जैमिनिः** अन्यो वा श्रुतिमात्रावलम्बी नैव आप्तः, तदर्थापरिज्ञानात्, तथागतवत् । न हि तादृशोऽतीन्द्रियार्थज्ञानमस्ति, दोषावरणक्षयातिशयाभावात् । श्रुतेः परमार्थवित्त्वम्, ततः श्रुतेरविसंवादनम्, इति अन्योन्यसंश्रितम् । स्वतः श्रुतेर्न वै प्रामाण्यम्, अचेतनत्वात्, घटवत् । सन्निकर्षादिभिः अनैकान्तिकत्वम् अयुक्तम्, तत्प्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमात् । अथापि कथञ्चित् तत्प्रमाणत्वं स्यात्, अविसंवादकत्वात् । श्रुतेः अयुक्तमेव, तद-भावात् । तेनोपचारमात्रमपि न स्यात्, तदर्थबुद्धिप्रामाण्यासिद्धेः । आप्तवचनं तु प्रमाणव्यपदेशभाक्, तत्कारणकार्यत्वात् । तदतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शनोत्पत्तेः तदर्थज्ञानोत्पादनाच्च । नैतत् श्रुतेः संभवति, सर्वथा आप्तानुक्तेः, पिटकत्रयवत् । वक्तृदोषात् तादृशोऽप्रामाण्यम्, तदभावात् श्रुतेः प्रामाण्यमिति चेत्, कुतोऽयं विभागः सिद्ध्येत् ? अभ्युपगमानभ्युपगमाभ्यां क्वचित् पौरुषेयत्वमन्यद्वा व्यवस्थापयतीति सुव्यवस्थितं तत्त्वम् । एतेन कर्तृस्मरणाभावादयः प्रत्युक्ताः, वेदेतरयोरविशेषात् । इतरत्र बुद्धो वक्तेति चेत्, तत्र कमलोद्भवादिरिति कथं न समानम् ? सुदूरमपि गत्वा तदङ्गीकरणेतरमात्रे व्यवतिष्ठेत । वेदाध्ययनवदितरस्यापि सर्वदाध्ययनपूर्वाध्ययनत्वप्रक्लृप्तौ न वक्त्रं वक्रीभवति, तदतिशयान्तराणां च शक्यक्रियत्वात् इतरत्रापि, मन्त्रशक्तेरपि दर्शनात् । सिद्धेऽपि तदनादित्वे पौरुषेयत्वाभावे वा कथम् अविसंवादकत्वं प्रत्येतव्यम् ?, म्लेच्छव्यवहारादेः तादृशो बहुलमुपलम्भात् । कारणदोषनिवृत्तेः कार्यदोषाभावकल्पनायां पौरुषेयस्यैव वचनस्य दोषनिवृत्तिः, कर्तुः

वीतदोषस्यापि संभवात् । तदध्येतृव्याख्यातृश्रोतृणां रागादिमत्त्वात् नेतरस्येति निःशङ्कं नः चेतः । वक्तृगुणापेक्षं वचनस्याविसंवादकत्वं चक्षुर्ज्ञानवत्, तद्दोषानुविधानात् । ततः अनाप्तवचनात् न अर्थज्ञानम्, अन्धरूपदर्शनवत् । तत्र यदेव युक्तियुक्तं तदेव प्रतिपत्तुं प्रतिपादयितुं वा शक्यम्, 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्' इत्यादिवत्, नाग्निहोत्रादिवाक्यसाधनम् । सिद्धे पुनः आप्तवचनत्वे यथा हेतुवादः तथा आज्ञावादः अपि प्रमाणम् । ननु चापौरुषेयत्ववत् आप्तशासनमपि अशक्यव्यवस्थम् । उक्तमत्र सर्वथैकान्तवादानां स्याद्वादप्रतिहतत्वादिति । तत्र आप्तिः साक्षात्करणादिगुणः संप्रदायाविच्छेदो वा, अन्यथा अन्धपरम्परया अप्रतिपत्तेः ॥७८॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां षष्ठः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः ॥

Comment on verses 76-78

In these verses Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of Logic. His argument is simple, but precisely because of its simplicity it makes one point clearer than was possible uptil now. Here we can see how the Jaina, when he comes across two mutually opposite solutions of a problem neither of which is wholly to his liking, does not rest content with a lethargic declaration to the effect that both the solutions are somehow satisfactory and somehow not but endeavours to define the precise limit within which either is satisfactory.

SECTION VII
PAN-INTERNALISM AND PAN-EXTERNALISM

Verses 79-80

अन्तरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते बुद्धिवाक्यं मृषाऽखिलम् ।
प्रमाणाभासमेवातस्तत् प्रमाणादृते कथम् ॥७९॥

If it is maintained that the internal entities are alone real (i.e. that all cognition is a mere manipulation of one's subjective states), then all cognitions and all propositions will turn out to be a falsity and hence a piece of pseudo-authentic knowledge. But how can there be pseudo-authentic knowledge without there being authentic knowledge ? (79)

अथ सप्तमः परिच्छेदः

तज्जन्मकार्यप्रभवादि वेद्यवेदकलक्षणम् अनैकान्तिकम् आदर्श्य संवित्तिरेव खण्डशः प्रतिभासमाना व्यवहाराय कल्प्यते इति अभिनिवेशेऽपि प्रमाणं मृग्यम् । क्षणिकत्वम् अनन्यवेद्यत्वं नानासन्तानत्वमिति स्वतः तावत् न सिद्धयति, भ्रान्तेः । तथा आत्मसंवेदनेऽपि व्यवसायवैकल्ये प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षया अनुपलम्भकल्पत्वात् । न हि तथा बुद्धयः संविदन्ते यथा व्यावर्ण्यन्ते । नापि परतः, सम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् । स्वांशमात्रावलम्बिना मिथ्याविकल्पेन प्रकृततत्त्वव्यवस्थापने बहिरर्थेष्वपि अविरोधात् । कथञ्चित् अत्र वेद्यलक्षणं यदि व्यवतिष्ठेत प्रकृतं कृतं स्यात्, नान्यथा । न चानुक्तदोषं लक्षणमस्ति । तत्संभवे नान्यत्र तदसंभवोऽभिधेयः। तत्स्वपरपक्षयोः सिद्धयसिद्धयर्थं किञ्चित् कथञ्चित् कुतश्चित् अवितथज्ञानमादरणीयम्, अन्याऽशेषविभ्रमासिद्धेः । एतेन यत् ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारं तत् सर्वं विभ्रान्तम्, यथा स्वप्नेन्द्रजालादिज्ञानम्, तथा च प्रत्यक्षादिकमिति प्रतिविहितं वेदितव्यम् ॥७९॥

साध्यसाधनविज्ञप्तेर्यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रता ।
न साध्यं न च हेतुश्च प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदोषतः ॥८०॥

If it is on the basis of the cognition of a thesis and a probans that the rival seeks to prove that cognition is alone real, then his thesis will not be a genuine thesis nor his probans a genuine probans; for the former will then be vitiated by the typical defects of a thesis, the latter by those of a probans. (80)

'सहोपलम्भनियमात् अभेदो नीलतद्धियोः द्विचन्द्रदर्शनवत्' इति अत्र अर्थसंविदोः सहदर्शनमुपेत्य एकत्वैकान्तं साधयन् कथमवधेयाभिलापः ? स्वाभिलापाभावं वा स्ववाचा प्रदर्शयन् कथं स्वस्थः ? पृथक् अनुपलम्भात् भेदाभावमात्रं साधयेत् । तच्चासिद्धम्, सम्बन्धासिद्धेरभावयोः, खरशृङ्गवत् । एतेनासहानुपलम्भात् अभेदसाधनं प्रत्युक्तम्, भावाभावयोः सम्बन्धासिद्धेः, तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्त्योः अर्थस्वभावनियमात् । सिद्धेऽपि प्रतिषेधैकान्ते विज्ञप्तिमात्रं न सिद्ध्येत्, तदसाधनात् । तत्सिद्धौ तदाश्रयं दूषणमनुषज्येत । तदेकोपम्भनियमोऽपि असिद्धः, साध्यसाधनयोरविशेषात् । तथा एकज्ञानग्राह्यत्वं द्रव्यपर्यायपरमाणुभिः अनैकान्तिकम् । अनन्यवेद्यत्वम् असिद्धम् । एकक्षणवर्तिसंवित्तीनां साकल्येन सहोपलम्भनियमात् व्यभिचारी हेतुः, तथोत्पत्तेरेव संवेदनत्वात् । दृष्टान्तोऽपि साध्यसाधनविकलः, तथोपलम्भाभेदयोरर्थे प्रतिनियमात् भ्रान्तौ तदसंभवात् । ननु चासहानुपलम्भमात्रात् अभेदमात्रम । कथञ्चित् अर्थस्वभावानवबोधप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वविज्ञानस्वलक्षणक्षणक्षयविविक्तसन्ततिविभ्रमस्वभावानुमितेः साकल्येनैकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एकार्थसंगतदृष्टयः परचित्तविदो वा नावश्यं तद्बुद्धिं तदर्थं वा संविदन्तीति हेतोः असिद्धिः । सहोपलम्भनियमश्च स्यात् भेदश्च स्यात् । किं विप्रतिषिध्येत ?, स्वहेतुप्रतिनियमसंभवात् । तस्मात् अयं मिथ्यादृष्टिः परप्रत्यायनाय शास्त्रं विदधानः परमार्थतः संविदानो वा वचनं तत्त्वज्ञानं च प्रतिरुणद्धीति न किञ्चित् एतत्, असाधनाङ्गवचनात् अदोषोद्भावनाच्च निग्रहार्हत्वात् ॥८०॥

Comment on verses 79-80

In these verses Samantabhadra criticizes the epistemological doctrine according to which all cognition is a mere subjective happening, that is, a happening to which there correspondes nothing in the world of objective realities. Samantabhadra rightly argues that since a piece of authentic knowledge is that knowledge which is true of its object and since the doctrine in question posits no objective reality, it is deprived of all title to talk of authentic or non-authentic knowledge – nay, of all title to prove or disprove anything, his own theses not excluded. The doctrine can be attributed to all schools of

transcendentalism, but Samantabhadra here specially seems to have in mind the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism which was notorious for its pan-subjectivism.

Verse 81

बहिरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते प्रमाणाभासनिह्नवात् ।
सर्वेषां कार्यसिद्धिः स्याद् विरुद्धार्थाभिधायिनाम् ॥८१॥

If it is maintained that the external entities are alone real (i.e. that all cognition is the reflection of an objective state of affairs), then since there should no more arise a piece of pseudo-authentic knowledge the successful execution of an operation should be possible on the part of even such persons as uphold mutually contradictory positions (which possibility is an undesirable contingency). (81)

यत् किञ्चित् चेतः तत् सर्वं साक्षात् परम्परया वा बहिरर्थप्रतिबद्धम्, यथा अग्निप्रत्यक्षेतरवेदनम् । स्वप्नदर्शनमपि चेतः, तथा विषयाकारनिर्भासात् । साध्यदृष्टान्तौ पूर्ववत् इति । अत्रापि लोकसमयप्रतिबद्धानां परस्परविरुद्धशब्दबुद्धीनां स्वार्थसम्बन्धः परमार्थतः प्रसज्येत ॥८१॥

Comment on verse 81

In this verse Samantabhadra criticizes the epistemological doctrine according to which all cognition is true of some objective reality. In all probability Samantabhadra here has in mind the Prabhākarite Mīmāṁsaka who would diligently seek to prove that even the clearest cases of illusory cognition are somehow the cases of valid cognition. Samantabhadra's point is that if this doctrine is accepted everybody will be free to prove whatever he fancies.

Verse 82

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥८२॥

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'pan-subjectivism' and 'pan-objectivism') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely

indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (82)

अन्तर्बहिर्ज्ञेयैकान्तयोः सहाभ्युपगमो विरुद्धः। तदवाच्यतायाम् उक्तिविरोधः पूर्ववत्॥८२

Comment on verse 82

This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first.

Verses 83-87

भावप्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणाभासनिह्नवः।

बहिष्प्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणं तन्निभं च ते॥८३॥

If it is maintained that all knowables are of a subjective character, then there results the repudiation of all possibility of pseudo-authentic knowledge. But on your position, which grants the reality of the knowables of an objective character, both authentic knowledge and pseudo-authentic knowledge remain a possibility. (83)

Note : Here *bahisprameya* means 'knowable of an objective character (be it external or internal)' and not 'knowable of an external character'. As contrasted to *bahisprameya* is *bhāvaprameya* meaning 'knowable of a subjective character'.

सर्वसंवित्तेः स्वसंवेदनस्य कथञ्चित् प्रमाणत्वोपपत्तेः तदपेक्षायां सर्वं प्रत्यक्षम्, न कश्चित् प्रमाणाभासः। तथा अनभ्युपगमेऽन्यत एव बुद्धेरनुमानं स्यात्। तत्रार्थज्ञानम् अलिङ्गम्, तदविशेषेणासिद्धेः। विशेषे वा तदन्यतरेणार्थपरिसमाप्तेः किं द्वितीयेन ? यत् चेदमर्थज्ञानं तत् चेत् अर्थस्वलक्षणम्, स्यात् व्यभिचारात् अहेतुः। एतेन इन्द्रियादिप्रत्यक्षं प्रत्युक्तम्। ततः प्रत्यक्षेतरबुद्ध्यवभासस्य स्वसंवेदनात् प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धम्। सुखदुःखादिबुद्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वे हर्षविषादादयोऽपि न स्युः, आत्मान्तरवत्। एतेन प्रतिक्षणं निरंशं संवेदनं प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्युक्तम्, यथाप्रतिज्ञमनुभवाभावात्, यथानुभवमनभ्युपगमात्, सर्वत्र सर्वदा भ्रान्तेः अप्रत्यक्षत्वाविशेषात्, कथञ्चित् भ्रान्तौ एकान्तहानेः, विकल्पस्वसंवेदनेऽपि विकल्पानतिवृत्तेः। तस्मात् स्वसंवेदनापेक्षया न किञ्चित् ज्ञानं सर्वथा प्रमाणम्। बहिरर्थापेक्षया तु प्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्था, तत्संवादकविसंवादकत्वात्, क्वचित् स्वरूपे केशमशकादिज्ञानवत्॥८३॥

जीवशब्दः सबाह्यार्थः संज्ञात्वाद्धेतुशब्दवत्।

मायादिभ्रान्तिसंज्ञाश्च मायाद्यैः स्वैः प्रमोक्तिवत्॥८४॥

The word 'soul', inasmuch as it is a designation, must have a corresponding object just as the word 'probans' has a corresponding object. Even the words like 'deception' etc., which designate illusory cognition, have got respective corresponding objects in the form of deception etc. just as the words designating authentic knowledge have got a corresponding object (in the form of authentic knowledge). (84)

स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तेन शरीरेन्द्रियादिकलापेन 'जीव'शब्दः अर्थवान् । अतो न कृतः प्रकृतः स्यादिति विक्लवोल्लापमात्रम्, लोकरूढेः समाश्रयणात् । यत्रायं व्यवहारः 'जीवो गतस्तिष्ठति' इति वा । नात्र संज्ञा अभिप्रेतमात्रं सूचयति, ततोऽर्थक्रियायां नियमायोगात्, करणप्रतिपत्तीनां तदभावे अनादरणीयत्वात्, साधनतदाभासयोः अन्यथा विशेषासंभवात् । परम्परयाऽपि परमार्थैकतानत्वं वाचः प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । क्वचित् व्यभिचारदर्शनात् अनाश्वासे चक्षुरादिबुद्धेरपि, तदाभासोपलब्धेः । कुतो धूमादेः अग्न्यादिप्रतिपत्तिः ?, कार्यकारणभावस्य व्यभिचारदर्शनात्, काष्ठादिजन्मनः अग्नेरिव मणिप्रभृतेरपि भावात् । तद्विशेषपरीक्षायाम् इतरत्रापि, विशेषाभावात् । अभिसन्धिवैचित्र्यात् अभिधानव्यभिचारोपलम्भे तदितराध्यक्षानुमानकारणसामग्रीशक्तिवैचित्र्यं पश्यतां कथमाश्वासः स्यात् ? तस्मात् अयम् अक्षलिङ्गसंज्ञादोषाविशेषेऽपि क्वचित् परितुष्यत् अन्यतमप्रद्वेषेण ईश्वरायते, परीक्षाक्लेशलेशासहनात् । भावोपादानसंभवे हि समाख्यानामितरोपादानप्रक्लृप्तिः । भावश्चात्र हर्षविषादाद्यनेकाकारविवर्तः, प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयः, प्रतिशरीरं भेदात्मकः, अप्रत्याख्यानार्हः प्रतिक्षिपन्तम् आत्मानं प्रतिबोधयति, इति कृतं प्रयासेन । न हि मायादिसमाख्याः स्वार्थरहिताः, विशिष्टप्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वात्, प्रमाणसमाख्यावत् ॥८४॥

बुद्धिशब्दार्थसंज्ञास्तास्तिस्रो बुद्ध्यादिवाचिकाः ।
तुल्या बुद्ध्यादिबोधाश्च त्रयस्तत्प्रतिबिम्बकाः ॥८५॥

The designations are of three kinds – viz. those designating a piece of cognition, those designating a word, those designating an object – and they are respectively denotative of a piece of cognition etc. (i.e. of a piece of cognition, a word, an object). And the three kinds of knowledge (yielded by a designation) pertaining to a piece of cognition etc. (i.e. to a piece of cognition, a word, an object) equally reflect the respective corresponding objects (i.e. the corresponding piece of cognition, the corresponding word, the corresponding object). (85)

हेतुव्यभिचाराशङ्कां प्रत्यस्तमयति, तिसृणामपि स्वव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुसम्बन्धदर्शनात् तद्बुद्धीनां च तन्निर्भासनात् तद्विषयतोपपत्तेः ॥८५॥

वक्तृश्रोतृप्रमातृणां बोधवाक्यप्रमाः पृथक् ।
भ्रान्तावेव प्रमाभ्रान्तौ बाह्यार्थौ तादृशेतरौ ॥८६॥

The three operations – viz. the speaker having a piece of cognition (that is sought to be given verbal expression), the hearer having the auditory perception of the sentence, the expert on the problems of authentic knowledge seeking to gain a piece of authentic knowledge – are different from each other. However, if it is maintained that all (alleged) authentic knowledge (insofar as it is the knowledge of a corresponding object) is but illusory, then all corresponding object of a piece of cognition turns out to be illusory – irrespective of whether it is in fact illusory or otherwise. (86)

Note : Vasunandin reads *vākyabodhapramā* for *bodhavākyapramā*. On this reading the translation would be "The three operations – viz. the speaker uttering a sentence, the hearer having cognition (i.e. auditory perception) of a sentence, the expert on the problems of authentic knowledge etc."

बहिरर्थाभावात् वक्त्रादित्रयं न बुद्धेः पृथग्भूतम् । ततोऽसिद्धतादिदोषः साधनस्येति, तन्न, रूपादेर्ग्राहकस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तविज्ञानसन्तानकलापस्य च स्वांशमात्रावलम्बिनः प्रमाणस्य विभ्रमकल्पनायां साकल्येनासिद्धेः अन्तर्ज्ञेयाभ्युपगमविरोधात् । तौ हि ग्राहकापेक्षया बाह्यार्थौ भ्रान्तौ एव । कुतस्तत्र हेयोपादेयविवेकः ? ॥८६॥

बुद्धिशब्दप्रमाणत्वं बाह्यार्थे सति नासति ।
सत्यानृतव्यवस्थैवं युज्यतेऽर्थाप्त्यनाप्तिषु ॥८७॥

A piece of cognition or a verbal utterance can possibly claim to be a case of authentic knowledge if there exist objects corrsponding to the pieces of cognition and the verbal utterances – not if there exist no such objects. For then it becomes possible to speak of the truth or falsity (of the pieces of cognition and the verbal utterances) by applying the criterion of the attainability or otherwise of the concerned corresponding objects. (87)

स्वपरप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं साधनं बुद्धिशब्दात्मकम्, स्वसंवित्त्यैव परप्रतिपादनायोगात्। तस्य च सति बहिरर्थे प्रमाणत्वम् अर्थप्राप्तितः सिद्ध्येत्, असति प्रमाणाभासत्वम् अर्थानाप्तितः, इति। तदेवं परमार्थतः सन् बहिरर्थः, साधनदूषणप्रयोगात्। अन्यथा स्वप्नेतराविशेषात् किं केन साधितं दूषितं च ? इति कुतः सन्तानान्तरम् अन्यत् वा। तैमिरिकद्वयद्विचन्द्रदर्शनवत् भ्रान्तः सर्वो व्यवहार इति अत्रापि तत्त्वज्ञानं शरणम्, अन्यथा बहिरर्थवत् अभिसंहितस्यापि निराकरणापत्तेः। तथा परमाण्वादिदूषणेऽपि प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, अन्यथा तत्कृतम् अकृतं स्यादिति सर्वत्र योज्यम्। तदिमे विज्ञानसन्तानाः सन्ति न सन्ति इति तत्त्वाप्रतिपत्तेः दृष्टापह्नुतिः अनिबन्धनैव, दृश्येन आत्मना कथञ्चित् अदृश्यानामपि परमाणूनां बहिरपि समवस्थाने विप्रतिषेधाभावात् अन्तर्ज्ञेयवत्। तत्र पूर्वादिदिग्भागभेदेन षडंशादिकल्पनया वृत्तिविकल्पेन वा परपक्षोपालम्भे स्वपक्षाक्षेपात्, कथञ्चित् विरोधपरिहारस्य पुनः आयासतामपि अशक्तेः। तत् साक्षात् परम्परया वा विमत्यधिकरणभावापन्नं ज्ञानम्, स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनम्, ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारत्वात्, सन्तानान्तरसिद्धिवत्। न हि व्यापारव्याहारनिर्भासोऽपि विप्लुतो नास्ति। तदन्यत्रापि वासनाभेदो गम्येत, न सन्तानान्तरम्॥८७॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां सप्तमः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on verses 83-87

In these verses Samantabhadra works out his own positive position on the question of subjectivity or otherwise of cognition. The steps taken by him in the verses 83, 86 and 87 are clear and make sense, for here he in effect lays down both the definition of valid cognition and the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of cognition – neither of which is possible on accepting either of the two doctrines earlier criticized. Thus following Samantabhadra's lead we can say that valid cognition is that cognition which is true of its object and that the validity of a piece of cognition can be tested by seeing whether it enables us to undertake successful practice in relation to what happens to be its object. But it is difficult to follow what Samantabhadra says in the verses 84 and 85. Here he seems to be arguing that each and every word has got a corresponding object in the world of reality, his illustration being the word 'soul' (as also the words 'illusion', 'knowledge' etc.); but if that be Samantabhadra's argument it is fallacious as it stands. For what a word must have is an intelligible definition and not a real object satisfying this definition. As a matter of fact, to say that each and every word has got a corresponding object in the world of reality is almost to commit the same mistake as the Prabhākarite does when he says that all cognition is valid cognition.

SECTION VIII

FATE AND PERSEVERANCE

Verses 88-91

दैवादेवार्थसिद्धिश्चेद् दैवं पौरुषतः कथम्।
दैवतश्चेदनिर्मोक्षः पौरुषं निष्फलं भवेत्॥८८॥

If it is maintained that all attainment of desirable objects is due to fate, then the question arises how it somehow happens that perseverance creates (i.e. decisively influences) fate. And if it is replied that fate is always a creation of fate it follows that a man should never attain liberation (*mokṣa*) and that all his endeavour should always prove futile. (88)

अथ अष्टमः परिच्छेदः

योग्यता पूर्वकर्म वा दैवम्, उभयमदृष्टम्। पौरुषं पुनः इहचेष्टितम् दृष्टम्। ताभ्याम् अर्थसिद्धिः, तदन्यतरापायेऽघटनात्। पौरुषमात्रेऽर्थादर्शनात्, दैवमात्रे वा समीहानर्थक्य-प्रसङ्गात्॥८८॥

पौरुषादेव सिद्धिश्चेत् पौरुषं दैवतः कथम्।
पौरुषाच्चेदमोघं स्यात् सर्वप्राणिषु पौरुषम्॥८९॥

If it is maintained that all attainment of objects is due to perseverance, then the question arises how it sometimes happens that fate creates perseverance. And if it is replied that perseverance is always a creation of perseverance it follows that the endeavour of all people should always prove a success. (89)

तद्धि पौरुषं विना दैवसंपदा न स्यात्। तदुक्तम् -

तादृशी जायते बुद्धिर्व्यवसायश्च तादृशः।
सहायास्तादृशाः सन्ति यादृशी भवितव्यता॥ इति

तत् सर्वं पौरुषापादितमिति चेत्, तद्व्यभिचारदर्शिनो न वै श्रद्दधीरन्॥८९॥

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥९०॥

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'omnipotence of fate' and 'omnipotence of perseverance') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (90)

दैवेतरयोः सहैकान्ताभ्युपगमे व्याघातात्, अवाच्यतायां च स्ववचनविरोधात् स्याद्वादनीतिः ॥९०॥

अबुद्धिपूर्वापेक्षायामिष्टानिष्टं स्वदैवतः ।
बुद्धिपूर्वव्यपेक्षायामिष्टानिष्टं स्वपौरुषात् ॥९१॥

The happy and unhappy circumstances available to one that involve no premeditation on one's part are said to be dut to one's fate, the happy and unhappy circumstances available to one that involve a premeditation on one's part are said to be due to one's perseverance. (91)

ततः अतर्कितोपस्थितमनुकूलं प्रतिकूलं वा दैवकृतम्, तद्विपरीतं हि पौरुषापादितम्, अपेक्षाकृतत्वात् तद्व्यवस्थायाः ॥९१॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां अष्टमः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on verses 88-91

In these verses Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of ethical studies. The problem under discussion is well known and Samantabhadra's argument fairly simple. We have only to remember that India's theological systems – and Jainism was one of them – used to equate a soul's fate with the stock of karmas accumulated by this soul in beginningless series of births and rebirths; (the supposition was that each good and bad act performed by a soul remains stuck to it in the form of karma so long as – and only so long as – its fruit has not been reaped by the soul in question).

SECTION IX

'INJURY DONE TO OTHERS A SIN, PLEASURE GIVEN TO OTHERS VIRTUE' AND 'INJURY DONE TO ONESELF A VIRTUE, PLEASURE GIVEN TO ONESELF SIN'

Verses 92-95

पापं ध्रुवं परे दुःखात् पुण्यं च सुखतो यदि।
अचेतनाकषायौ च बध्येयातां निमित्ततः ॥९२॥

If it is maintained that sin is necessarily accumulated as a result of causing pain to others while virtue as a result of causing pleasure to others, then even an inanimate entity and even a personage free from all spiritual defilement should possibly suffer bondage inasmuch as both can somehow be instrumental in causing pain and pleasure to others. (92)

अथ नवमः परिच्छेदः

परत्र सुखदुःखोत्पादनात् पुण्यपापबन्धैकान्ते कथमचेतनाः क्षीरादयः न बध्येरन् वीतरागा वा ?, तन्निमित्तत्वात् ॥९२॥

पुण्यं ध्रुवं स्वतो दुःखात् पापं च सुखतो यदि।
वीतरागो मुनिर्विद्वांस्ताभ्यां युञ्ज्यान्निमित्ततः ॥९३॥

If it is maintained that virtue is necessarily accumulated as a result of causing pain to oneself while sin as a result of causing pleasure to oneself, then even a sage free from all attachment should possibly acquire a stock of sins and virtues inasmuch as even such a sage can somehow be instrumental in causing to himself some kind of pain and some kind of pleasure. (93)

आत्मसुखदुःखाभ्यां पापेतरैकान्तकृतान्ते पुनः अकषायस्यापि ध्रुवमेव बन्धः स्यात्। ततो न कश्चित् मोक्तुमर्हति, तदुभयाभावासंभवात् ॥९३॥

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥९४॥

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'causing pain and pleasure to others' and 'causing pain and pleasure to oneself') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position is self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (94)

प्रस्तुतैकान्तद्वयसिद्धान्ते व्याहतेः, अनभिधेयतायाम् अनभिधेयाभिधानविरोधात्, कथञ्चिदेव इति युक्तम् ॥९४॥

विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गं चेत् स्वपरस्थं सुखासुखम्।
पुण्यपापास्रवो युक्तो न चेद् व्यर्थस्तवार्हतः ॥९५॥

Whether an act be of the form of pleasure or of pain and whether it be experienced by others or by oneself it will cause an effective accumulation of sin in case it is performed with an unclean mind while it will cause an effective accumulation of virtue in case it is done with a clean mind. In the absence of an unclean mind the accumulated sin will remain ineffective, in the absence of a clean mind the accumulated virtue will remain so; this is what actually happens in the case of an exalted personage like you. (95)

Note : Here 'clean mind' should mean 'mind possessed of an auspicious type of worldly desires', 'unclean mind' 'mind possessed of an inauspicious type of worldly desires'. Again, an accumulated virtue or sin might be of two sorts, effective and ineffective. It is a highly technical Jaina notion that a mind possessed of desires (of the auspicious and inauspicious types) accumulates virtues and sins that prove effective (in the form of a cause of re-birth) while a mind free

from desires accumulates virtues and sins that are washed off as soon as they are accumulated (and hence cause no re-birth). Here 'virtue' and 'sin' respectively mean good and bad karmas which the Jaina tradition conceives as physical entities.

आत्मनः परस्य वा सुखदुःखयोः विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गयोरेव पुण्यपापास्रवहेतुत्वम्, न च अन्यथा, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। आर्तरौद्रध्यानपरिणामः संक्लेशः। तदभावो विशुद्धिः, आत्मनः स्वात्मनि अवस्थानम्॥९५॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपायाम् अष्टशत्यां नवमः परिच्छेदः ॥

Comment on Verses 92-95

In these verses, too, Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of ethical studies, but the problem discussed here is not so well known. The crux of Samantabhadra's argument is not much difficult to follow even if its details are partly mystifying. What is being argued is that the virtuous or sinful character of an act does not depend on how it externally affects the persons involved (quâ 'agent' or quâ' 'patient') in this act but on whether it has been performed with a clean or an unclean mind. But to say, as Samantabhadra does in the course of his argument, that if virtue and sin are earned as a result of respectively causing pleasure and pain to others they should possibly be earned even by an inanimate object (that might possibly be instrumental in one's causing pleasure or pain to others) makes little sense.

SECTION X
'WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS FROM EVEN SLIGHT IGNORANCE' AND 'MOKṢA RESULTS FROM EVEN SLIGHT KNOWLEDGE'

Verses 96-100

अज्ञानाच्चेद् ध्रुवो बन्धो ज्ञेयानन्त्यान्न केवली।

ज्ञानस्तोकाद् विमोक्षश्चेदज्ञानाद् बहुतोऽन्यथा ।।९६।।

If it is maintained that worldly bondage necessarily results from (even slight) ignorance, then nobody can ever attain *mokṣa* inasmuch as there are an infinite number of things there to be known. On the other hand, if it is maintained that *mokṣa* (necessarily) results from even slight knowledge, then the question arises why there should also be no worldly bondage in that case and that for the simple reason that a lot of ignorance is yet left over. (96)

अथ दशमः परिच्छेदः

यदि बन्धोऽयम् अज्ञानात्, नेदानीं कश्चित् मुच्यते, सर्वस्यैव क्वचित् अज्ञानोपपत्तेः ज्ञेयानन्त्यात्। यदि पुनः ज्ञाननिर्ह्रासात् ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः, अज्ञानात् सुतरां प्रसज्येत, दुःखनिवृत्तेरिव सुखप्राप्तिः ।।९६।।

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ।।९७।।

The enemies of the logic of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two viz. 'necessary causation of worldly bondage by even slight ignorance' and 'necessary causation of *mokṣa* by even slight knowledge') characterize

one and the same phenomenon. And if they say that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (97)

न हि सर्वात्मना एकस्यैकदा ज्ञानस्तोकात् मोक्षः बहुतश्चाज्ञानात् बन्धः इति एकान्तयोरविरोधः स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषां सिद्ध्यति येन तदुभयैकात्म्यं स्यात् ॥९७॥

अज्ञानान्मोहिनो बन्धो नाज्ञानाद् वीतमोहतः ।
ज्ञानस्तोकाच्च मोक्षः स्यादमोहान्मोहिनोऽन्यथा ॥९८॥

Ignorance causes worldly bondage in the case of one who is under the sway of delusion while it does not do so in the case of one who is free from delusion. Similarly, slight knowledge causes *mokṣa* in the case of one who is free from delusion while it does not do so in the case of one who is under the sway of delusion. (98)

Note : The Aṣṭasahasrī reads *na jñānāt* for *nājñānāt*, but that seems to be a misprint.

मोहनीयकर्मप्रकृतिलक्षणात् अज्ञानात् युक्तः कर्मबन्धः। ततः अन्यतोऽपि बन्धाभ्युपगमे अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तथैव बुद्धेरपकर्षात् मोहनीयपरिक्षयलक्षणात् मोक्ष्यति, विपर्यये विपर्यासात् इत्यधिगन्तव्यम् ॥९८॥

कामादिप्रभवश्चित्रः कर्मबन्धानुरूपतः ।
तच्च कर्म स्वहेतुभ्यो जीवास्ते शुद्ध्यशुद्धितः ॥९९॥

The origination of attachment etc. is of various types corresponding to the various types of karmic bondage (which is responsible for the origination of attachment etc.); the karma, in its turn, originates from what are its own appropriate causes. And on your position the souls are of two types, viz. those possessed of spiritual purity (and hence destined to attain *mokṣa*) and those possessed of spiritual inpurity (and hence destined not to attain *mokṣa*). (99)

संसारोऽयं नैकस्वभावेश्वरकृतः तत्कार्यसुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात्। न हि कारणस्यैक-रूपत्वे कार्यनानात्वं युक्तम्, शालिबीजाङ्कुरवत्। अपरिणामिनः सर्वथा अर्थक्रियाऽसंभवात्, तल्लक्षणत्वात् वस्तुनः, सद्भावमेव तावत् न संभावयामः। तत्र कालदेशावस्थास्वभावभिन्नानां तनुकरणभुवनादीनां किल अयं कर्ता इति महच्चित्रम्। एतेन ईश्वरेच्छा प्रत्युक्ता। न च एतेन

अस्याः सम्बन्धः, तत्कृतोपकारानपेक्षणात् । ततो व्यपदेशोऽपि मा भूत् । अभिसन्धेः अनित्यत्वेऽपि समानः प्रसङ्गः, सकृत् उत्पत्त्यादिप्रसङ्गात् विचित्रत्वानुपपत्तेरिति । तयोरेकस्वभावत्वेऽपि कर्मवैचित्र्यात् कामादिप्रभववैचित्र्यमिति चेत्, युक्तमेतत्, किन्तु न ईश्वरेच्छाभ्यां किञ्चित्, तावता अर्थपरिसमाप्तेः । एतेन विरम्यप्रवृत्तिसन्निवेशविशेषादिभ्यः पृथिव्यादेः बुद्धिमत्कारणपूर्वकत्वसाधनेन ईश्वरप्रापणं प्रत्युक्तम् । प्राक् कायकरणोत्पत्तेः आत्मनो धर्माधर्मयोश्च स्वयमचेतनत्वात् विचित्रोपभोगयोग्यतनुकरणादिसंपादनकौशला-संभवात् तन्निमित्तमात्मान्तरं मृत्पिण्डकुलालवदिति चेत्, न, तस्यापि वितनुकरणस्य तत्कृतेरसंभवात् तादृशोऽपि निमित्तभावे कर्मणामचेतनत्वेऽपि तन्निमित्तत्वम् अप्रतिषिद्धम्, सर्वथा दृष्टान्तव्यतिक्रमात् । स्थित्वाप्रवर्तनार्थक्रियादि चेतनाधिष्ठानादिति नियमे पुनः ईश्वरादेरपि मा भूत् । नायं प्रसङ्गः बुद्धिमत्त्वादिति चेत्, तत एव तर्हि प्रहीणतनुकरणादयः प्राणिनो मा भूवन् । कर्मणो वैचित्र्यादिति चेत् तर्हि तेषामीश्वरज्ञाननिमित्तत्वे समानः प्रसङ्गः । तदनिमित्तत्वे तनुकरणादेरपि तन्निमित्तत्वं मा भूत्, विशेषाभावात् । एवं चार्थक्रियादेरपि ताभ्यामैकान्तिकत्वम् । ततः कर्मबन्धविशेषवशात् चित्राः कामादयः, ततः कर्मवैचित्र्यम् । न हि भावस्वभावोपालम्भः करणीयः, अन्यत्रापि तत्प्रसङ्गानिवृत्तेः । न तर्हि केषांचित् मुक्तिः इतरेषां संसारश्च, कर्मबन्धनिमित्ताविशेषात् इति चेत्, न, शुद्ध्यशुद्धितः प्रतिमुक्तीतरसंभवात् आत्मनाम् ॥९९॥

शुद्ध्यशुद्धी पुनः शक्ती ते पाक्यापाक्यशक्तिवत् ।
साद्यनादी तयोर्व्यक्ती स्वभावोऽतर्कगोचरः ॥१००॥

Now purity and impurity are the possible inherent capacities of a soul just as cookability and non-cookability are the possible inherent capacities (of a grain of corn). As for the manifestation of these capacities, it is beginningless in the case of impurity and is possessed of a beginning in the case of purity. And this difference of behaviour on the part of the two capacities is unamenable to logic. (100)

Note : That is to say, the impure type of souls have been behaving in an unworthy fashion since beginningless time but it is at a particular time that the pure type of them begin to behave in a conspicuously worthy fashion.

भव्येतरस्वभावौ तेषां सामर्थ्यासामर्थ्ये, माषादिपाक्यापरशक्तिवत् । शक्तेः प्रादुर्भावा-पेक्षया सादित्वम् । अभिसन्धिनानात्वं शुद्ध्यशुद्धिशक्त्योरिति भेदमाचार्यः प्राह । ततोऽन्यत्रापि

साद्यनादी प्रकृतशक्त्योः व्यक्ती । कुतः शक्तिप्रतिनियमः ? इति चेत्, न हि भावस्वभावाः पर्यनुयोक्तव्याः ॥१००॥

Comment on verses 96-100

In these verses Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of ethico-theological (rather than purely ethical) studies, for the problem discussed here – viz. the problem of *mokṣa* – is at least partly theological. Samantabhadra's argument is clear enough but it seems to be somewhat in conflict with the traditional Jaina understanding of the problem. For what is here being argued is that the attainment and non-attainment of *mokṣa* depends not on the (total or partial) cessation and non-cessation of ignorance but on the (total) elimination and non-elimination of the delusion-causing karmas. It is somehow difficult to square this argument (plausible in itself) with the traditional Jaina position that the attainment of *mokṣa* must be preceded by a total cessation of ignorance and this total cessation of ignorance by a total elimination of the delusion-causing karmas. Thus both the traditional Jaina position and Samantabhadra's argument make a total elimination of the delusion-causing karmas a necessary cause of the attainment of *mokṣa*, but the former does and the latter does not make a total cessation of ignorance such a necessary cause[1]. The verses 99 and 100 offer some incidental information about the doctrine of karmas as understood by the Jaina tradition.

101 - 113 Verses

तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते युगपत् सर्वभासनम् ।

क्रमभावि च यज्ज्ञानं स्याद्वादनयसंस्कृतम् ॥१०१॥

On your showing, that knowledge pertaining to an entity which takes cognizance of all its aspects in one sweep is technically called *pramāṇa* (lit. authentic knowledge), while that which takes cognizance of these

1. In all probability when Samantabhadra grants the possibility of that ignorance does not cause worldly bondage or that slight knowledge causes *mokṣa* he is having in mind the soul that is rid of the delusion-causing karmas but has not yet become omniscient. For since in the case of such a soul the karmic bondage taking place is of an ineffective sort Samantabhadra might talk as if here there takes place no karmic bondage; similarly, since in the case of this soul *mokṣa* is bound to take place rather soon Samantabhadra might talk as if *mokṣa* has here already taken place.

aspects in succession is technically called *syādvāda* and *naya* (the former seeking to cover all these aspects, the latter some one of them). (101)

बुद्धेरनेकान्तात् येन आकारेण तत्त्वपरिच्छेदः तदपेक्षया प्रामाण्यम् । तेन प्रत्यक्षतदाभासयोरपि प्रायशः सङ्कीर्णप्रामाण्येतरस्थितिः उन्नेतव्या, प्रसिद्धानुपहतेन्द्रियदृष्टेरपि चन्द्रार्कादिषु देशप्रत्यासत्त्याद्यभूताकारावभासनात्, तथा उपहताक्षादेरपि सङ्ख्यादिविसंवादेऽपि चन्द्रादिस्वभावतत्त्वोपलम्भात् । तत्प्रकर्षापेक्षया व्यपदेशव्यवस्था गन्धद्रव्यादिवत् । तथा अनुमानादेरपि कथञ्चित् मिथ्याप्रतिभासेऽपि तत्त्वप्रतिपत्त्यैव प्रामाण्यम् । एकान्तकल्पनायां तु नान्तर्बहिः तत्त्वसंवेदनं व्यवतिष्ठेत, स्वयमद्वयादेः द्वयादिप्रतिभासनात्, रूपादिस्वलक्षणानां च तथैवादर्शनात् यथा व्यावर्ण्यन्ते । तद्विशेषोपलम्भाभ्युपगमेऽपि तद्व्यवसायवैकल्यम् । क्वचित् धर्माधर्मसंवेदनवत् परोक्षत्वोपपत्तेः । विकल्पानाम् अतत्त्वविषयत्वात् कुतः तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तिः ? मणिप्रदीप्रभादृष्टान्तोऽपि स्वपक्षघाती, मणिप्रदीपप्रभादर्शनस्यापि संवादकत्वेन प्रामाण्यप्राप्त्या प्रमाणान्तर्भावविघटनात् । न हि तत् प्रत्यक्षम्, स्वविषये विसंवादनात्, शुक्तिकादर्शनवत् रजतभ्रान्तौ । नापि लैङ्गिकम्, लिङ्गलिङ्गिसम्बन्धाप्रतिपत्तेः । अन्यथा दृष्टान्तेतरयोरेकत्वात् किं केन कृतं स्यात् ? कादाचित्कार्थप्राप्तेः आरेकादेरपि संभवात् । न हि मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संवादनैकान्तः । तथा न लैङ्गिकम्, सर्वथैवाविसंवादकत्वात् । तस्मात् सूक्तम् 'तत्त्वज्ञानमेव प्रमाणं कारणसामग्रीभेदात् प्रतिभासभेदेऽपि' इति । प्रमाणमेव वा तत्त्वज्ञानम् । ततः स्वलक्षणदर्शनानन्तरभाविनः तत्त्वव्यवसायस्य प्रमाणत्वोपपत्तेः प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमिति प्रमाणे एव इति अवधारणं प्रत्याचष्टे । अनधिगतार्थाधिगमाभावात् तदप्रमाणत्वे लैङ्गिकस्यापि मा भूत्, विशेषाभावात् । अनधिगतस्वलक्षणाध्यवसायात् अनुमितेरतिशयकल्पनायां प्रकृतस्यापि न वै प्रमाणत्वं प्रतिषेध्यम्, अनिर्णीतनिर्णयात्मकत्वात्, क्षणभङ्गानुमानवत् । ध्वनेरखण्डशः श्रवणात् अधिगमोऽपि प्राथमकल्पिकः तत्त्वनिर्णीतिरेव । तदत्यये दृष्टेरपि विसंवादकत्वेन प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेः अदर्शनानतिशायनात् । तद्दर्शनाभावेऽपि तत्त्वनिश्चये तदन्यसमारोपव्यवच्छेदलक्षणे प्रमाणलक्षणाङ्गीकरणात् । क्वचित् कुतश्चित् धूमकेतुलैङ्गिकवत् निर्णीतार्थमात्रस्मृतेः अधिगतार्थाधिगमात् प्रामाण्यं मा भूत्, प्रमितिविशेषाभावात् । प्रकृतनिर्णयस्य प्रामाण्ये हि न किञ्चित् अतिप्रसज्यते, निर्णीतेऽपि कथञ्चित् अतिशायनात् । प्रत्यभिज्ञानं प्रमाणम्, व्यवसायातिशयोपपत्तेः, तत्सामर्थ्याधीनत्वात् प्रमाणत्वस्थितेः । अन्यथा हि विसंवादः स्यात्, संशयादिवत् । लिङ्गलिङ्गिसम्बन्धज्ञानं प्रमाणम्, अनिश्चितनिश्चयात्, अनुमानवत् । सत्त्वक्षणिकत्वयोः धूमतत्कारणयोः वा साकल्येन व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तौ न प्रत्यक्षमुत्सहते, सन्निहितार्थाकारानुकारित्वात्, अपरीक्षाक्षमत्वाच्च, नानुमानम्, अनवस्थानुषङ्गात् । सुदूरमपि गत्वा

तदुभयव्यतिरिक्तं व्यवस्थानिमित्तम् अभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । उपमानादिकं प्रमाणान्तरमिच्छतां तत्त्वनिर्णयप्रत्यवमर्षप्रतिबन्धाधिगमप्रमाणत्वप्रतिषेधः प्रायशो वक्तुः जडिमानमाविष्करोति । इति प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षमित्येतत् द्वितयं प्रमाणम् अर्थापत्त्यादेरनुमानव्यतिरेकेऽपि परोक्षे अन्तर्भावात् । तत्र सकलज्ञानावरणपरिक्षयविजृम्भितं केवलज्ञानं युगपत् सर्वार्थविषयम् । तथोक्तम् 'सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायेषु केवलस्य' इति । तज्ज्ञानदर्शनयोः क्रमवृत्तौ हि सर्वज्ञत्वं कादाचित्कं स्यात् । कुतः तत्सिद्धिः ? इति चेत्, सामान्यविशेषविषययोः विगतावरणयोः अयुगपत् प्रतिभासायोगात् प्रतिबन्धकान्तराभावात् । शेषं सर्वं क्रमवृत्ति, प्रकारान्तरासंभवात् । चक्षुरादिज्ञानपञ्चकस्यापि परस्परव्यवधानेऽपि विच्छेदानुपलक्षणम्, क्षणक्षयवत् । यौगपद्ये हि सन्तानभेदात् परस्परपरामर्शाभावः सन्तानान्तरवत् । मानसप्रत्यक्षेऽपि चक्षुरादिज्ञानानन्तरप्रत्ययोद्भवेन कश्चित् विशेषः क्रमवृत्तौ, व्यवधानप्रतिभासविकल्पप्रतिपत्तेरसंभवात् । यौगपद्ये हि स्पर्शादिप्रत्यवमर्शविरोधः पुरुषान्तरवत् । विषयस्यानेकान्तात्मकत्वात् मतिज्ञानादि स्याद्वादनयलक्षितं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, केवलज्ञानवत् स्याद्वादोपलक्षितत्वाच्च ॥१०१॥

उपेक्षा फलमाद्यस्य शेषस्यादानहानधीः ।
पूर्वा वाऽज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरे ॥१०२॥

Of these types of knowledge the former (i.e. *pramāṇa*) has got neutrality (in relation to the object concerned) for its result while the latter (i.e. *syādvāda* and *naya*) either acceptance or rejection (of the object concerned). Or, we might say that all knowledge has got for its result either neutrality (to be understood in a special sense -- e.g. in the sense of 'the withdrawal of attention from everything save what is its proper object') or 'the destruction of ignorance as to its object'. (102)

सिद्धप्रयोजनत्वात् केवलिनां सर्वत्र उपेक्षा । करुणावतः परदुःखजिहासोः कथमुपेक्षा ? तदभावे कथं चाप्तिः ? इति चेत्, स्वदुःखनिवर्तनवत् अकरुणयापि वृत्तेरन्यदुःखनिराचिकीर्षायाम् । दयालोरेव आत्मदुःखनिवर्तनम्, अतोऽयमसमाधिरिति चेत्, न, न वै प्रदीपः कृपालुतया आत्मानं परं वा तमसो निवर्तयतीति । कल्पयित्वापि कृपालुतां तत्करणस्वभावसामर्थ्यं मृग्यम् । एवं हि परम्परापरिश्रमं परिहरेत् । मत्यादेः साक्षात् फलं स्वार्थव्यामोहविच्छेदः, तदभावे दर्शनस्यापि सन्निकर्षाविशेषात् क्षणपरिणामोपलम्भवत् अविसंवादकत्वासंभवात् । परम्परया हानोपादानसंवित्तिः । तथा हि - करणस्य क्रियायाश्च

कथञ्चित् एकत्वं प्रदीपतमोविगमवत्, नानात्वं च परश्वादिवत् । तस्मात् ग्राह्यसंविदाकारयोः प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थायामपि विसंवादानिराकरणे तदज्ञस्येव विषदृष्टिः प्रमाणत्वं न प्रतिपत्तुमर्हति । तावतैव प्रमाणत्वे क्षणिकत्वाद्यनुमानम् अधिगतार्थाधिगमलक्षणत्वात् न वै प्रमाणम् ॥१०२॥

वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यं प्रति विशेषणम् ।
स्यान्निपातोऽर्थयोगित्वात् तव केवलिनामपि ॥१०३॥

The word *syāt* prefacing a sentence is grammatically a *nipāta* (i.e. a particle) and it, by indicating that the state of affairs sought to be described by the sentence concerned has got numerous aspects, qualities, shows (in a particular fashion) the purport of this sentence; and since what the word *syāt* thus adds to the meaning of the sentence concerned is objectively a fact its use – authenticated by you – has got the approval even of the omniscient personages. (103)

Note : Vasunandin reads *viśeṣakaḥ* for *viśeṣaṇam* meaning the same thing.

पदानां परस्परापेक्षाणां निरपेक्षः समुदायो वाक्यम् । न तर्हि तदानीमिदं भवति - यथा यत् सत् तत् सर्वं परिणामि, यथा घटः, संश्च शब्दः इति, तस्मात् परिणामीति आकाङ्क्षणात् । प्रतिपत्तुः धर्मोऽयं वाक्येषु अध्यारोप्यते । स चेत् प्रतिपत्ता तावता अर्थं प्रत्येति, किमिति शेषमाकाङ्क्षति ? प्रकरणादिना वाक्यकल्पेन अपि अर्थप्रतिपत्तौ न वा प्राथमकल्पिकवाक्यलक्षणपरिहारः, सत्यभामादिपदवत् । सदसन्नित्यानित्यादिसर्वथैकान्तप्रतिक्षेपलक्षणः अनेकान्तः । क्वचित् प्रयुज्यमानः 'स्यात्' शब्दः तद्विशेषणतया प्रकृतार्थतत्त्वमवयवेन सूचयति, प्रायशो निपातानां तत्स्वभावत्वात्, 'एव' कारादिवत् । न हि केवलज्ञानवत् अखिलम् अक्रममवगाहते, वाचः क्रमवृत्तित्वात्, तद्बुद्धेरपि तथाभावात् ॥१०३॥

स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः ।
सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकः ॥१०४॥

Syādvāda consists in making conditional (i.e. non-absolutist) assertions concerning these or those aspects of a situation and this by utterly giving up absolutism of all sorts; such *syādvāda* – based on the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion' and on the doctrine of *naya* – helps the

ascertainment of things sought to be accepted and those sought to be rejected (by the person uttering a sentence). (104)

कथञ्चिदित्यादिः किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः स्याद्वादपर्यायः । सोऽयम् अनेकान्तमभिप्रेत्य सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षः स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां सदसदादिव्यवस्थां प्रतिपादयति । सप्तभङ्गी प्रोक्ता । द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकप्रविभागवशात् नैगमादयः शब्दार्थनयाः बहुविकल्पाः मूलनयद्वयशुद्ध्यशुद्धिभ्याम् ॥१०४॥

स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञाने सर्वतत्त्वप्रकाशने ।
भेदः साक्षादसाक्षाच्च ह्यवस्त्वन्यतमं भवेत् ॥१०५॥

The knowledge of the form of *syādvāda* and the knowledge of an omniscient personage are both the revealer of all things whatsoever (and in all their aspects); they only differ in that the former is an indirect type of knowledge while the latter a direct one. And if somebody posits a third type of knowledge he would be positing something fictitious. (105)

स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञाने इति निर्देशात् तयोरभ्यर्हितत्वानियमं दर्शयति, परस्परहेतुकत्वात् । अभ्यर्हितत्वे वा पूर्वनिपाते व्यभिचारं सूचयति । कथं पुनः स्याद्वादः सर्वतत्त्वप्रकाशनः ?, यावता 'मतिश्रुतयोर्निबन्धो द्रव्येष्वसर्वपर्यायेषु' । जीवादयः सप्त पदार्थाः तत्त्वम्, तत्प्रतिपादनाविशेषात् । तथाह भेदः - साक्षादसाक्षाच्चेति । साक्षात्कृतेरेव सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायान् परिच्छिनत्ति, नान्यतः, इति यावत् ॥१०५॥

सधर्मणैव साध्यस्य साधर्म्यादविरोधतः ।
स्याद्वादप्रविभक्तार्थविशेषव्यञ्जको नयः ॥१०६॥

A *naya* gives expression to some particular aspect of a total situation that has been comprehended by *syādvāda* , and this it does by pointing out only those features which the situation shares with its homologues and not those which are to be found only in its heterologues (an account which makes *naya* a correlate – virtual synonym – of 'probans', the hint being that *syādvāda* is a correlate – virtual synonym – of 'scripture'). (106)

'सपक्षेणैव साध्यस्य साधर्म्यात्' इति अनेन हेतोः त्रैलक्षण्यम् 'अविरोधात्' इति अन्यथानुपपत्तिं च दर्शयता केवलस्य त्रिलक्षणस्यासाधनत्वम् उक्तम्, तत्पुत्रत्वादिवत् ।

एकलक्षणस्य तु गमकत्वम्, 'नित्यत्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि विक्रिया नोपपद्यते' इति बहुल-मन्यथानुपपत्तेरेव समाश्रयणात् । यत्र अर्थक्रिया न संभवति तत् न वस्तुतत्त्वम्, यथा विनाशैकान्तः । तथा च नित्यत्वेऽपि क्रमयौगपद्याभ्याम् अर्थक्रिया न संभवति, नापरं प्रकारान्तरम्, इति त्रिलक्षणयोगेऽपि प्रधानमेकलक्षणम्, तत्रैव साधनसामर्थ्यपरिनिष्ठितेः । तदेव च प्रतिबन्धः पूर्ववद्गीतसंयोग्यादिसकलहेतुप्रतिष्ठापकम् । ततः स्याद्वादेत्यादिना अनुमितम् अनेकान्तात्मकम् अर्थतत्त्वम् आदर्शयति । तस्य विशेषो नित्यत्वादिः पृथक् पृथक् । तस्य प्रतिपादको नयः । तथा चोक्तम् -

अर्थस्यानेकरूपस्य धीः प्रमाणं तदंशधीः ।
नयो धर्मान्तरापेक्षी दुर्णयस्तन्निराकृतिः ॥ इति

तदनेकान्तप्रतिपत्तिः प्रमाणम्, एकधर्मप्रतिपत्तिः नयः, तत्प्रत्यनीकप्रतिक्षेपः दुर्णयः केवलविपक्षविरोधदर्शनेन स्वपक्षाभिनिवेशात् ॥१०६॥

नयोपनयैकान्तानां त्रिकालानां समुच्चयः ।
अविभ्राड्भावसम्बन्धो द्रव्यमेकमनेकधा ॥१०७॥

A substance is but the meeting-ground of all those features – belonging to the past, present and future periods of time – that are expressed in an exclusive fashion by these and those types and sub-types of *naya*, a meeting-ground which however does not make it obligatory that an independent relation be posited between it and the features in question. This is how a substance is one and yet possessed of a multifarious nature. (107)

उक्तलक्षणो द्रव्यपर्यायस्थानः सङ्ग्रहादिः नयः, तच्छाखाप्रशाखात्मा उपनयः । तदेकान्तानां विपक्षोपेक्षालक्षणानां त्रिकालविषयाणां समितिः द्रव्यम् । ततः तेषामपोद्धारात् गुणगुण्यादिवत् ॥१०७॥

मिथ्यासमूहो मिथ्या चेन्न मिथ्यैकान्तताऽस्ति नः ।
निरपेक्षा नया मिथ्या सापेक्षा वस्तु तेऽर्थकृत् ॥१०८॥

It might be objected that what is a conglomeration of false features is itself but a falsity (while a *naya*, inasmuch as it deals with some partial aspect of a total situation,

is an expression of some false feature). To this we reply that in our view a *naya* as such is not false; for a *naya* is false only when it seeks to stand aloof from (i. e. seeks to repudiate the truth of) the remaining *nayas* while the *nayas* acting in concert manage to describe entities that are efficacious (i.e. are genuinely real). (108)

सुनयदुर्णययोः यथा अस्माभिः लक्षणं व्याख्यातं तथा न चोद्यं न परिहारः। तथा हि - निरपेक्षत्वं प्रत्यनीकधर्मस्य निराकृतिः, साक्षेपत्वम् उपेक्षा, अन्यथा प्रमाणनयाविशेष-प्रसङ्गात्, धर्मान्तरादानोपेक्षाहानिलक्षणत्वात् प्रमाणनयदुर्णयानां प्रकारान्तरासंभवाच्च, तदतत्स्वभावप्रतिपत्तेः तत्प्रतिपत्तेः अन्यनिराकृतेः च। इति विश्वोपसंहृतिः ॥१०८॥

नियम्यतेऽर्थो वाक्येन विधिना वारणेन वा।
तथाऽन्यथा च सोऽवश्यमविशेष्यत्वमन्यथा ॥१०९॥

A sentence determines the nature of an entity either positively or negatively. Hence it is in the very nature of things that an entity must be characterized by a feature as also by the contrary of this feature; for if that were not so the entity will not be a genuine entity possessed of genuine characteristics. (109)

Note : When it is said that an entity is characterized by both a feature and its contrary what is meant is not that it is characterized by both *x* and not-*x* but that it is characterized by both *x* and absence of not-*x*'.

यत् सत् तत् सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकम्, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात्, स्वविषयाकारसंवित्तिवत्। न किञ्चिदेकान्तं वस्तुतत्त्वम्, सर्वथा तदर्थक्रियाऽसंभवात्, गगनकुसुमवत्। नास्ति सदेकान्तः, सर्वव्यापारविरोधप्रसङ्गात्, असदेकान्तवत्। इति विधिना प्रतिषेधेन वा वस्तुतत्त्वं नियम्यते, अन्यथा तद्विशिष्टमर्थतत्त्वं न स्यात्। इत्यनेन विधिप्रतिषेधयोः गुणप्रधानभावेन सदसदादिवाक्येषु वृत्तिरिति लक्षयति ॥१०९॥

तदतद्वस्तुवागेषा तदेवेत्यनुशासती।
न सत्या स्यान्मृषावाक्यैः कथं तत्त्वार्थदेशना ॥११०॥

If an entity that is in fact characterized by a feature as also by the contrary of this feature is described by a sentence as characterized by just this feature (and not also

by the contrary of this feature), this sentence will not be true. And how can the nature of reality be expounded through sentences that are false ? (110)

Note : Vasunandin reads *tadatadvastu vāgeṣā* for *tadatadvastuvāgeṣā* and *tadevetyanuśāsati* for *tadevetyanuśāsatī*; the former alteration is unimportant, the latter a mistake. And the following is how Vasunandin understands the verse : 'An entity as characterized by a feature as also by the contrary of this feature is described by a sentence as precisely thus characterized. If (even) such a sentence be not true, how will it be possible to expound the nature of reality through sentences that are false ?

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयभूतं विरुद्धधर्माध्यासलक्षणम् अविरुद्धं वस्तु। 'तदेव' इत्यैकान्तेन प्रतिपादयन्ती मिथ्यैव भारती। कथमनया अर्थदेशनम् ? इत्येकान्ते वाक्यार्थानुपपत्तिः आलक्ष्यते ॥११०॥

वाक्स्वभावोऽन्यवागर्थप्रतिषेधनिरङ्कुशः ।
आह च स्वार्थसामान्यं तादृग् वाच्यं खपुष्पवत् ॥१११॥

It is the nature of a sentence that it is absolutely capable of negating the meaning of another sentence (i.e. of the sentence that is its own opposite). And a sentence allegedly capable of expressing just its own meaning (i.e. not also capable of negating the meaning of its own opposite) denotes something that is fictitious like sky-flower. (111)

वाचः स्वभावोऽयं येन स्वार्थसामान्यं प्रतिपादयन्ती तदपरं निराकरोति, अन्यतरापाये अनुक्तानतिशायनात्। इदंतया नेदंतया वा न प्रतीयेत तदर्थः, कूर्मरोमादिवत्। न खलु सामान्यं विशेषपरिहारेण विशेषो वा क्वचिदुपलभामहे। अनुपलभमानाश्च कथं स्वं परं वा तथाभिनिवेशेन विप्रलभामहे ? ॥१११॥

सामान्यवाग् विशेषे चेन्न शब्दार्थो मृषा हि सा ।
अभिप्रेतविशेषाप्तेः स्यात्कारः सत्यलाञ्छनः ॥११२॥

It might be said that a word denotes something universal but that it is made to stand for something particular, but in that case the denotation of a word must be a falsity. So it is the word *syāt* which by enabling one

to grasp the intended particular feature acts like the stamp of truth (marking a sentence). (112)

अस्तीति केवलमभावव्यवच्छेदात् अपोहमाह इति चेत्, कः पुनरपोहः ? परतो व्यावृत्तिरभावः। कथमेवं सति अभावं प्रतिपादयति भावं न प्रतिपादयतीत्यनुक्तसमं न स्यात् ? तद्विकल्पो मिथ्याभिनिवेशवशादिति चेत्, न चैतत् तस्य पतिपादकम्, मिथ्याविकल्पहेतुत्वात्, व्यलीकवचनवत्। ततः स्याद्वाद एव सत्यलाञ्छनो न वादान्तरमित्यतिशाययति ॥११२॥

विधेयमीप्सितार्थाङ्गं प्रतिषेध्याविरोधि यत्।
तथैवादेयहेयत्वमिति स्याद्वादसंस्थितिः ॥११३॥

Something posited becomes a means of fulfilling one's intention only in case it does not stand opposed to something negated; the same is the case with something declared to be worthy of acceptance and something declared to be worthy of rejection (i.e. they too become a means of fulfilling one's intention only in case they do not stand opposed to each other). This is how *syādvāda* views the matter. (113)

अस्तीत्यादि विधेयमभिप्रेत्य विधानात् नास्तित्वादिभिः अविरुद्धम्, विधिप्रतिषेधयोः अन्योन्याविनाभावलक्षणत्वात्, स्वार्थज्ञानवत्। तद्विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मविशेषात् स्याद्वादः प्रक्रियते सप्तभङ्गीसमाश्रयात् ॥११३॥

Comment on verses 101-113

These verses constitute a summing up of the entire discussion that has gone earlier and in view of what has been said earlier it should not be difficult to follow them. A noteworthy distinction here drawn is that between *pramāṇa, syādvāda* and *naya.* Ordinarily, *pramāṇa* means any piece whatsoever of valid cognition, but here it is made to stand for the all-comprehensive cognition of an omniscient; on the other hand, *syādvāda* is made to stand for the all-comprehensive cognition of an ordinary person (a single aspect of which cognition is called *naya*). However, the distinction is not of much practical importance inasmuch as an ordinary person capable of acquiring all-comprehensive cognition is as good as an omniscient (and – be it noted – an impossibility). An instructive thesis is that all humanly made assertions are only conditionally valid assertions and that with a view to emphasizing this aspect of the situation it is proper to add the word

syāt (meaning 'somehow') to whatever assertion one might happen to make. Another instructive thesis is that all assetion is at the same time a negation viz. the negation of its own opposite; (the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion' is a particular – though, as we have seen, not an inevitable – corollary of this very thesis). Incidentally, the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion' has been shown to have for its corollary the doctrine of 'substance'; thus from the fact that assertions can be made about a present, past or future state of affairs the conclusion is drawn that a real entity is of the form of a permanent substance possessed of an infinite number of modes, present, past and future. In this connection it might be useful to recall that the Jaina characterizes an entity as 'indescribable' in two senses, viz. (i) in the sense that it is impossible to simultaneously point out what this entity is and what it is not, and (ii) in the sense that this entity is of the form of a substance possessed of infinite modes which it is impossible for us to describe in their entirety; in the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion' the former sense of the word has been adopted, but the latter seems to be more appropriate on relatively less technical occasions.

Verse 114

इतीयमाप्तमीमांसा विहिता हितमिच्छताम् ।
सम्यग्मिथ्योपदेशार्थविशेषप्रतिपत्तये ॥११४॥

Thus has the author composed the text called Āptamīmāṁsā with a view to enabling those who are desirous of doing good to themselves to distinguish between a true preaching and a false one. (114)

Note : Vasunandin reads *hitamicchatā* for *hitamicchatām*; on this reading the translation should be : 'Thus has the author, who is desirous of doing good (to others), composed the text called Āptamīmāṁsā with a view to enabling one to distinguish between a true preaching and a false one.'

इति स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदे विहितेयमाप्तमीमांसा सर्वज्ञविशेषपरीक्षा निःश्रेयसकामिनाम्, अभव्यानां तदनुपयोगात् । तत्त्वेतरपरीक्षां प्रति भव्यानामेव नियताधिकृतिः ॥११४॥

Comment on verse 114

This is the real concluding verse of the text, the verse 115 being, in all probability, a later interpolation.

Verse 115

जयति जगति क्लेशावेशप्रपञ्चहिमांशुमान्
विहतविषमैकान्तध्वान्तप्रमाणनयांशुमान् ।
यतिपतिरजो यस्याधृष्यान् मताम्बुनिधेर्लवान्
स्वमतमतयस्तीर्थ्या नाना परे समुपासते ॥११५॥

Victory be to the lord of sages who is free from birth (i.e. from the cycle of births and re-births), who acts like the sun in relation to the snow of the tangled onrush of miseries, who is possessed of the rays of the form of *pramāṇa* and *naya* that put an end to the hopeless darkness of the form of the absolutist theses, the unvanquished drops of the ocean of whose doctrine are nurtured by the various rival teachers under the misimpression that they are their own (newly developed) doctrines. (115)

Comment on verse 115

As just suggested, this verse – even if commented on by Vasunandin -- seems to be a later interpolation; otherwise, it is difficult to see why Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda have left it untouched.

श्रीवर्धमानमकलङ्कमनिन्द्यवन्द्य-
पादारविन्दयुगलं प्रणिपत्य मूर्ध्ना ।
भव्यैकलोकनयनं परिपालयन्तं
स्याद्वादवर्त्म परिणौमि समन्तभद्रम् ॥

॥ इत्याप्तमीमांसाभाष्यरूपा अष्टशती समाप्ता ॥

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